Reynolds v. Jones
| Decision Date | 05 December 1896 |
| Parties | REYNOLDS v. JONES. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from circuit court, Randolph county; John B. McCaleb, Judge.
Action by Hattie Jones against D. W. Reynolds for use and occupation of land. There was a judgment in favor of plaintiff, from which defendant appeals. Reversed.
This is a case from the Randolph circuit court, and originally an appeal to that court from the probate court of Randolph county. The subject-matter of the proceeding is the final account of Reynolds as guardian of Hattie Jones, née Kelsey, and her exceptions thereto, which exceptions were sustained, account restated accordingly, and ordered recorded, and an appeal to the circuit court, where substantially the same judgment was rendered, and from that this appeal is taken. Judgment against Reynolds as balance of account of $2,600. Alva G. Kelsey, father of Hattie, the appellee herein, died in 1862, leaving surviving him his widow and the appellee, an only child then an infant one year old, and seised and possessed of the S. W., S. E., and N. E., S. E., section 33, township 20 N. and range 3 E., and other lands in said county of Randolph, having resided on said 80 acres up to the time of his death. In 1864 the widow intermarried with D. W. Reynolds, the appellant herein, and they continued to reside on the place until the death of the widow of Kelsey, then the wife of Reynolds, in 1868; and the parties to this proceeding continued to reside there until the marriage of appellee with J. L. Jones in 1877, she being then 16 years old. Reynolds continued to reside there until ejected, in 1891. After his marriage, Reynolds became administrator de bonis non of the estate of Kelsey, and sold the lands of the estate on the 22d of January, 1872, by order of the probate court to pay debts, one J. M. Shaver becoming the purchaser of the said 80 acres for the sum of $720, and received his deed dated April 1, 1892. The sale was approved by the probate court at its April term, 1872. Shaver resold to Reynolds individually on the 28th of June, 1873, for $1,000; and afterwards Reynolds, treating the land as his own, put extensive improvements thereon to the value of $6,000, as he claimed. After paying the debts of Kelsey's estate, Reynolds had on hand, as administrator, the sum of $269, in money, and in 1872 took out letters of guardianship, and became the guardian of appellee, charging himself as such with the sum of $269. There is a controversy here as to what disposition was made of this sum finally; appellant claiming that he paid the same over to appellee, through her husband, soon after their marriage, and appellee denying that she had ever authorized such payment, and Jones that he received such sum for his wife. In 1890 appellee brought suit in ejectment against appellant individually for the 80 acres on the ground that the same, being the homestead of the family, could not have been legally sold under order of the probate court to pay debts, and claimed damages for wrongful possession for six months last past. On the final hearing of that cause in 1891 there seems to have been an agreement in the nature of a compromise after the case had been submitted to the jury, and the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court were rendered accordingly, the plaintiff obtaining judgment for 60 acres of the land and $200 damages for the six months' use. In this suit defendant pleaded statute of limitations among other things. There is a controversy between the parties as to the meaning of the compromise, appellant contending that it was intended as a settlement of all matters between the parties in reference to the land, and appellee contending that it was only an agreement to settle the matters in suit. Having in this way settled the title of the land, appellee then petitioned the probate court to cite appellant to appear therein at the July term, 1891, and make final settlement, he having never made any settlement as guardian. In response to this citation appellant filed his final settlement, which was excepted to by the appellee, principally because of his failure to charge himself with the rents of the 80 acres from the time the guardian got control of same as such till the beginning of the six months next preceding the institution of the suit in ejectment. In the course of the controversy over this settlement, appellant presented his account for board and maintenance of appellee, his ward, during the time she resided with him, taxes, improvements, etc.; so that the said back rents on the one hand and the account for support, maintenance, taxes, and improvements on the other became the principal, if not the only, matter of controversy; and both claims were finally allowed by the circuit court, which left the balance aforesaid against appellant. The record fails to show exceptions by appellee.
J. C. Hawthorne, for appellant. S. A. D. Eaton, for appellee.
BUNN, C. J. (after stating the facts).
The principal question in the case is one of pleading that is to say, whether or not appellee had a right to split up her claims for back rents, or for use and occupation, or for damages for the retention of the possession of her lands. It is a well-established rule of law that a single cause of action cannot be split in order that separate suits may be brought for the various parts of what really constitutes but one demand. It is said by the court in Dutton v. Shaw, 35 Mich. 431, that "the principle which prevents the splitting up of causes of action and forbids double vexation for the same thing is a rule of justice, and not to be classed among technicalities." In Damon v. Denny, 54 Conn. 253, 7 Atl. 409, the court said: "Where in a pending suit it is legally possible for a judgment to be rendered upon a cause of action alleged in the second suit, and the first was brought for the purpose of obtaining such a judgment, the plaintiff is...
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