Reynolds v. Lansford

Decision Date01 January 1856
Citation16 Tex. 286
PartiesWILLIAM B. REYNOLDS v. JOHN LANSFORD.
CourtTexas Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Where property is conveyed by a debtor in failing circumstances to a third person, and by the latter conveyed by deed of gift to the wife of the former, it is prima facie fraudulent and void as to antecedent creditors.

Though the deed of the vendor may be fraudulent and void as to his creditor, yet, if the vendee go into possession actual, exclusive and adverse, the statute of limitations will run in his favor and bar the rights of the creditor.

A point frequently arises in cases of this character, as to the time of the commencement of the statute against the creditor; whether before or after the recovery of his judgment; and the opinion seems to be that the statute would not commence until after judgment, as until then the creditor had no effectual means of enforcing his claim. But in this case no such question can arise, etc. [23 Tex. 414;26 Tex. 551.]

Under our former laws, donations between husband and wife were placed under restrictions. But as the law now exists, there is no principle which would impair the right of a husband to settle his property upon his wife and family, when this can be done without injury to the rights of existing creditors. [[[[[14 Tex. 443;post, 314; 24 Tex. 305;27 Tex. 507.]

Under the general policy of our laws, the right of the wife to hold property in her own right, without the intervention of a trustee, actual or constructive, cannot be impeached.

As a general rule, a wife can claim the benefit of the statute of limitations to protect her possession, to the same extent that it can be claimed by any other person; and, in ordinary cases, it would not be material, nor would it affect the rights of the wife, that the property was under the control and supervision of the husband.

In cases of this kind, where property (slaves) has been fraudulently conveyed, by an involved or insolvent debtor, for the benefit of his wife, and the property remains under the management and control of the husband as the law provides, the statute of limitations will not run in favor of the wife, against an antecedent creditor of the husband, unless the conveyance to her (or, perhaps, her claim of title) be recorded.

In trials of the right of property, levied on by execution, the benefit of the statute of limitations may be claimed without pleading it--there being no formal pleadings in such cases.

Appeal from Grimes. Tried before the Hon. Peter W. Gray.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

J. B. & G. A. Jones, for appellant.

O. C. & R. K. Hartley, for appellee.

HEMPHILL, CH. J.

The appellee, John Lansford, recovered on the 2d December, 1845, in the district court of Houston county, a judgment against John W. Adkins, for three hundred and ninety-four dollars, principal and interest. An execution was issued to Grimes county on the 13th October, 1853, which, on the 29th of the same month, was levied on a negro woman named Tina, as the property of the said John W. Adkins. On the 1st November, 1853, T. H. M. Rogers, as administrator of Emily W. Adkins, deceased, filed a claim to the said negro woman, as the property of the estate of the deceased.

The issue for trial was, whether the negro woman was liable to plaintiff's execution at the time of the levy. As the negro was in possession of Rogers, the administrator, at the time of the levy, the burthen of proof was on the plaintiff in execution; and to sustain the issue, he introduced a copy of a bill of sale from John W. Adkins to Thomas H. M. Rogers, for several slaves, including Tina, for the expressed consideration of two thousand dollars, dated 4th April, 1845, and proved and filed for record in Houston county on the 8th of March, 1848; also, a copy of deed of gift from Rogers to his sister Emily M. Adkins and her children, the issue of the marriage between herself and John W. Adkins, dated 15th April, 1845, but not recorded until the 20th May, 1854. He also proved by Mr. Arrington, that he had known John W. Adkins in Washington county for the years 1839, 1840, 1841, up to the time of his removal to Houston county, about the year 1843; that when he first knew him he was a good farmer, doing very well; had but little property except his negroes; that Adkins became considerably involved before he left Washington county, and, so far as witness knew, he has been becoming more and more involved ever since; that in 1845 or 1846 Adkins removed to Grimes county, and since that time has had but little property except the negroes named in the bill of sale; that he is now poor, and, to the knowledge of witness, had no property but one horse; that witness bought the negro named Andy from J. W. Adkins, and that Thomas H. M. Rogers paid him the money he had paid for him and took the negro; that Tina, with other negroes named in the bill of sale, remained in possession of Adkins and his wife until her death, and that the said John and Emily lived together as husband and wife; that in 1845 Rogers was probably not worth more than $5,000, and would not be likely to give his sister and her children two thousand dollars' worth of negroes. Plaintiff also offered a transcript of the judgment in evidence.

Defendant proved by several witnesses that since Adkins and his family removed to Grimes county, Emily M. Adkins had exercised acts of ownership over the negro woman Tina and others named in the bill of sale; that she hired them out, received the pay therefor, and paid the taxes on them, and gave them in as her own property up to her death, but that Tina was cook and remained at home with the family; that John W. Adkins and wife both controlled Tina as a man and wife usually do at home; that John W. and Emily M. lived together as husband and wife until her death, and that the negro Tina lived in the family. One of the witnesses had purchased one of the negroes from the wife. Adkins, the husband, gave in the negroes for taxes in 1851, as agent of his wife, and the administrator of the wife has paid taxes on them since the year 1852.

The jury having found for the plaintiff, the defendant, on motion for new trial being overruled, appealed and assigns that there was error--

1st. In the charge to the jury.

2d. In refusing to give the charges asked by defendant.

3d. In overruling motion for new trial.

These assignments are extremely vague, and we will notice such points in them only as are taken in the brief of appellant.

And first, it is insisted that the conveyances were executed several months before the judgment was rendered against John M. Adkins, and that they are conclusive against the plaintiff, unless the indebtedness accrued before the execution of the conveyance, or unless credit was given after their execution upon the faith of representations made by Adkins and wife as to the ownership of the property, or, in other words, unless there was fraud in the conveyance of the negroes, by which the plaintiff's rights were affected.

This point might have been placed in a much more satisfactory position had either party introduced evidence to show the time at which the debt accrued. If it existed at the time of the conveyance this might have been easily established on the part of the plaintiff by the introduction of a transcript of the record in the case, instead of which a transcript of the judgment only is offered, which gives no clue to the time of the accrual of the debt, except by inference that the judgment being in the same year with the conveyances, the debt most probably originated before their execution. The only fact in the case which gives a reasonable assurance that the debt accrued anterior to the bills of sale, is the order indorsed on the execution to sell for cash with appraisement. The presumption is that this indorsement was made by the clerk in the due discharge of his duty, and that the debt must have been incurred before the first day of May, one thousand...

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24 cases
  • Neal v. Pickett
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • February 17, 1926
    ...as this, which at most is merely voidable, is insufficient. So, fraud alone cannot prevent the accrual of the statutory bar. Reynolds v. Lansford, 16 Tex. 286; Hudson v. Wheeler, 34 Tex. 356; Kuhlman v. Baker, 50 Tex. 630; Connoly v. Hammond, 58 Tex. 11; Davis v. Howe, supra. The exceptions......
  • Somers v. Spaulding
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • November 12, 1940
    ... ... Gates v. Andrews, 37 N.Y ... 657 [97 Am.Dec. 764]; Compton v. Perry, 23 Tex. 414; ... Eyre v. Beebe, 28 How.Prac. [N.Y.] 333; Reynolds ... v. Lansford, 16 Tex. 286; Bump, Fraud. Conv. (2d Ed.) p ... 547; Wilson v. Buchanan, 7 Grat. [Va.] 334, and ... authorities cited." ... ...
  • Ziska v. Ziska
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • April 13, 1908
    ...Gates v. Andrews, 37 N.Y. 657. 97 Am. Dee. 764; Compton v. Perry, 23 Tex. 414; Eyre v. Beebe, 28 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 333; Reynolds v. Lansford, 16 Tex. 286; Bump, Fraud. Cony. (2d Ed.) p. 547; Wilson v. Buchanan, 7 Graf. (Va.) 334, and authorities cited." ¶5 In addition to the authorities cit......
  • Ziska v. Ziska
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • April 13, 1908
    ... ... Andrews, 37 N.Y. 657, 97 Am. Dec. 764; Compton v ... Perry, 23 Tex. 414; Eyre v. Beebe, 28 How ... Prac. (N. Y.) 333; Reynolds v. Lansford, 16 Tex ... 286; Bump, Fraud. Conv. (2d Ed.) p. 547; Wilson v ... Buchanan, 7 Grat. (Va.) 334, and authorities ... cited." In ... ...
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