Reynolds v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tennessee

• Decision Date: 13 June 1932
• Docket Number: 13426.
• Citation: 164 S.E. 602,166 S.C. 214
• Parties: REYNOLDS v. LIFE & CASUALTY INS. CO. OF TENNESSEE.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

164 S.E. 602

166 S.C. 214

REYNOLDS v. LIFE & CASUALTY INS. CO. OF TENNESSEE.

No. 13426.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 13, 1932

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Greenville County; John S Wilson, Judge.

Action by Lula Reynolds against the Life & Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee. From the judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Haynsworth & Haynsworth, of Greenville, for appellant.

C Granville Wyche, of Greenville, for respondent.

STABLER J.

This action was brought upon two policies of insurance issued by the defendant to one Freddie L. Thompson, in each of which the plaintiff, the mother of the insured, was named as beneficiary. The complaint contains two causes of action separately stated --the first for the recovery of $1,000 upon a policy dated July 21, 1930, and the second for the recovery of $872 upon a policy dated July 28, 1930. The insured died a few weeks after the policies were issued, as the result of an automobile collision in the city of Greenville.

The case was tried in the court of common pleas for Greenville county, in September, 1930; Hon. John S. Wilson presiding. At the close of the testimony, counsel for defendant made a motion for a directed verdict in its favor as to the first cause of action, and for 60 cents and costs in plaintiff's favor as to the second cause. This motion was refused, and the jury found for the plaintiff for the entire amount sued for. From judgment entered on the verdict the defendant appeals, alleging error on the part of the trial judge in refusing its motion for a directed verdict, in the admission of certain testimony, and in his charge to the jury.

The contract of insurance involved in the first cause of action contains the following provision: "This policy does not cover *** loss sustained by the insured *** while committing some act in violation of law." The contract involved in the second cause of action provides: "Within two years from date of issuance of this policy, the liability of the company under same shall be limited, under the following conditions, to the return of the premium paid thereon: *** (2) If the insured shall die *** as a result of acts committed by him while in the commission of *** some act in violation of law."

Section 21 of the traffic ordinance of the city of Greenville reads as follows: "No person without the authority of the owner or person in charge of any vehicle shall jump or climb upon the same, or sound any warning, or other signalling device or manipulate any of the levers or mechanism, or in any wise meddle or tamper with same. No person shall be allowed to ride upon the running board of any motor vehicle nor shall any car be loaded at any time so as to interfere with its control, or with other vehicles. No person shall lounge or act in a disorderly manner in any car upon the streets of Greenville at any time."

The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was made, as to the first cause of action, upon the ground that at the time of the accident the insured was riding on the running board of a truck or automobile, in violation of the ordinance quoted, and that such risk was not covered by the policy; its motion, as to the second cause of action, for a directed verdict for 60 cents and costs in favor of the plaintiff was based upon the quoted provision of the policy, which, the defendant contends, fixed the amount of its liability if the insured came to his death while in the commission of some act in violation of law.

The parties to the action do not agree as to the interpretation of the following provision of the ordinance: "No person shall be allowed to ride upon the running board of any motor vehicle." Appellant contends that a person who rides upon the running board of a car violates the ordinance, while respondent is equally as confident that the ordinance makes it an offense only for a driver of an automobile to allow any one to ride upon its running board.

Be that as it may, it is clear that the court properly refused defendant's motion, for, even if it should be admitted that the insured was violating the ordinance at the time he was injured, this alone would not be sufficient ground for direction of a verdict. In order to defeat recovery under policies excluding or limiting liability where death or injury results from an unlawful act on the part of the insured, there must be shown, in addition to the violation of the law, some causative connection between such act and the death or injury. This is the general rule.

In Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 267, 16 S.W. 723, 725, 25 Am. St. Rep. 685, the Tennessee court, construing a provision of this kind in an insurance policy, said: "In order to defeat a recovery because of such provision, there must appear a connecting link between the unlawful act and the death. It is not sufficient that there was an unlawful act committed by the insured, and that death occurred during the time he was engaged in its commission. There must be some causative connection between the act which constituted a violation of the law and the death of the insured. *** The provision of the policy excluding liability for injury received by the insured while committing an unlawful act refers to such injuries as may happen as the necessary or natural consequence of the act."

And so in Bradley v. Insurance Co., 45 N.Y. 422, 6 Am. Rep. 115. "Whatever be the nature of the violation of law urged by the insurance company, as avoiding the policy, it seems to be clear that a relation must exist between the violation of law and the death, to make good the defence; that the death must have been caused by the violation of law to exempt the company from liability."

In the case at bar, under the evidence, it could not possibly be held as a matter of law that the proximate cause of insured's death was his riding...