Reynolds v. Missouri, K.&T. Ry. Co.
| Citation | 113 N.E. 413,224 Mass. 379 |
| Parties | REYNOLDS v. MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. et al. |
| Decision Date | 21 June 1916 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; William C. Wait, Judge.
Suit by Thomas M. Reynolds against the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company and others. Plea overruled, and case reported, together with plaintiff's appeals from orders striking out part of plaintiff's replication to the plea denying plaintiff's motion to strike out the plea and the findings of fact on the hearing of that motion, and denying plaintiff's motion to offer additional evidence. Plaintiff's exceptions overruled, the order overruling the plea to the jurisdiction affirmed, and other interlocutory orders affirmed.Tyler, Corneau & Eames and Wm. E. Tucker, all of Boston, for complainant.
J. L. Thorndike and F. V. Barstow, both of Boston, for defendant.
The question at issue in this case is the jurisdictional one whether service of process has been made upon the defendant railway company, who hereafter will be referred to as the defendant.
The facts are these: The Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Kansas. Its lines of railway are located in Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and perhaps in other states, but none in Massachusetts. In 1912, it entered into an agreement whereby George E. Marsters a resident within this commonwealth was to represent its railway system as New England passenger agent, with headquarters in Boston, his compensation to consist of a commission on all revenue derived from passenger tickets sold in the six New England states, but without expense to it for office rent, advertising or traveling expenses. Thereupon, it sent him stationery with this printing:
Notice of this appointment was sent out by the railway company, which advertised him generally as its New England passenger agent. He was consulted by its officials in regard to passenger business. He was furnished with a frank for telegraphing on railway business. He sold tickets for and reserved seats and berths in cars of the Pullman Company running over the defendant's railway system, and used his telegraph frank which he was authorized to use only on the business of the railway company in connection with these transactions, although he was agent for the Pullman Company. In a comparatively few instances he issued prepaid orders for the transportation of passengers beginning at some point on the defendant's railway system, to be exchanged for a ticket to be delivered at the points indicated, to be honored by the railway company. A form of prepaid order was furnished him by the defendant for that purpose. The money received from this source was sent by Marsters directly to the defendant. Local ticket agents in Boston conferred with him whenever they wanted information respecting the defendant's railway system, or when they wanted a communication sent to it about its business, and he transmitted such communications. In some instances complaints about transportation were presented to him which he took up with the railway company. Marsters paid the rent of his store himself, and conducted there a large business in ‘Tickets and Tours' on his own account. He advertised upon his windows and walls the names of many railroads and steamship lines, including in a prominent place that of the defendant railway company. He does not have for sale at his office any tickets of the defendant railway company, but sells through his arrangement with other railroads tickets issued by such railroads, which contain coupons for passage to points on or over the system of the defendant. Tickets constantly are sold by Marsters and other persons within this state, to which are attached coupons entitling the traveler to transportation over the lines of the defendant railway company without further validation. It is his duty to influence travelers to use the system of the defendant railway company and to exert this influencethroughout the New England states. He renders no accounts to the company except for the prepaid orders. He is paid his monthly percentage on New England sales. At the Washington Street store he is conducting his own business in some respects for the benefit of the defendant railway company. In conclusion the trial judge found that:
Most of these facts have been found by the superior court judge, but as only one witness testified and apparently the trial judge did not distrust his testimony in any respect, we have treated his testimony as true and included in this statement a few facts not stated in his finding, but shown by the testimony and supporting his conclusion. See Lindsey v. Bird, 193 Mass. 200, 79 N. E. 263;Harvey-Watts Co. v. Worcester Umbrella Co., 193 Mass. 138, 78 N. E. 886.
The precise point to be decided is whether the defendant railway company was engaged in or soliciting business in this commonwealth' within the meaning of the pertinent statute.1 The question involved is a federal one upon which the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are controlling. That court has said that ‘each case of this kind must depend on its own facts.’ Washington-Virginia Ry. v. Real Estate Trust, 238 U. S. 185, 186, 35 Sup. Ct. 818 (59 L. Ed. 1262). That court has not undertaken to formulate any general rule defining what transactions are essential to the doing of business in the sense which will render the one conducting it liable to service of process. It has gone no further than to say that as to corporations:
‘The business must be such in character and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which it is served.’ St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 227, 33 Sup. Ct. 245, 248 (57 L. Ed. 486, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 77).
In that case the facts were that the name under which the defendant did business was on the door of an office in New York, together with the names of persons designated as a general freight and passenger agent and a traveling freight agent. Through one of these agents, before action was brought, the plaintiff had some negotiations and correspondence touching his claim and its settlement, which reached and were considered by the executive officers of the defendant. This was held to be the transaction of business in behalf of the defendant in such manner as to make it liable to the service of process in respect of that matter in New York.
The case at bar seems to us to fall within the principle and the facts of the Alexander Case. Marsters confessedly was the New England passenger agent advertised by the defendant as such, to whom others in this neighborhood looked for information respecting travel and accommodations to be had upon the defendant's railway system. He used the defendant's telegraphic frank for that business. He received money for transportation orders on the defendant's line and accounted for such money to the defendant. He was also constantly striving to direct travel from all New England territory over the defendant's railway system. He took up complaints as to service with executive officers of the defendant. While the case at bar possesses all the elements of doing business revealed in the Alexander record, there are present some factors lacking in that case. Tickets good over the defendant's railway system, attached as coupons to other tickets, were sold not only by Marsters (although not in his capacity as agent for the defendant), but by others within this state. The amount of revenue derived from these sales is not stated. The selling of tickets for passenger transportation is an important source of income to a railroad. The selling of such tickets accepted as good without further countersigning or stamping can only be done by authority of the defendant. Possession of such authority indicates a kind of agency. The importance of this branch of the defendant's business depends somewhat upon its magnitude. But the inference seems fair from the general testimony of Marsters that it is considerable. The selling of tickets good over the lines...
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...carrying the weight of the inference, will warrant the conclusion that it is doing business here. Reynolds v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 224 Mass. 379, 113 N.E. 413, affirmed 255 U.S. 565, 41 S.Ct. 446, 65 L.Ed. 788. Solicitation in regular course of business, together with acceptance and p......
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