Reynolds v. Petrucci

• Decision Date: 27 July 2020
• Docket Number: 20-CV-3523 (LLS)
• Parties: BRIAN EDWARD REYNOLDS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN PETRUCCI; THE CAPTAIN; LT. SUSNEY; LT. DEWIET; LT. SUDDLE, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

BRIAN EDWARD REYNOLDS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN PETRUCCI; THE CAPTAIN; LT. SUSNEY; LT. DEWIET; LT. SUDDLE, Respondents.

20-CV-3523 (LLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

July 27, 2020

ORDER TO AMEND

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Petitioner, currently incarcerated at Otisville Correctional Facility, brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. By order dated June 4, 2020, the Court granted Petitioner's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The Court directs Petitioner to file an amended petition within sixty days of the date of this order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a person in custody challenging the legality of his detention on the ground that "[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Court has the authority to review the petition and "award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled [to such relief]." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them "to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not exempt "from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa of receiving and producing child pornography and enticing a minor to engage in sexual activities, and he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms totaling 384 months). See United States v. Reynolds, No. 11-CR-42 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 15, 2012). In this petition, Petitioner alleges that he is being subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. According to Petitioner, he and other prisoners are suffering from illness and "allergy-type symptoms," and are restricted to their cells for long periods of time, because of the presence of mold, "asbestos compounds," leaks, and cold air. Also, there are no marked fire exits. After Petitioner complained, "numerous staff" retaliated against him by placing him in "wrongful segregation" and "shaking down[]" his cell and seizing his property. Petitioner asks for a hearing to present "inmate witnesses," and he seeks "release and discharge of remainder of sentence" and damages. Petitioner asserts that he filed "sensitive BP-10s and BP-9s as part of administrative review process." Petitioner moves for appointment of pro bono counsel.

DISCUSSION

A. Petition for Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

1. Grounds and Exhaustion

Petitioner seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Habeas corpus review is available for federal prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A petition challenging the execution of a prisoner's sentence, such as "the administration of parole, computation of a prisoner's sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, type of detention and prison conditions," is properlybrought under § 2241. Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001); Jabarah v. Garcia, No. 08-CV-3592 (DC), 2010 WL 3834663, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) ("When a federal inmate is challenging the conditions of confinement, the proper vehicle for such a challenge is the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241."); Ilina v. Zickefoose, 591 F. Supp.2d 145, 150 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting that "the Second Circuit has repeatedly and consistently held § 2241 to be a proper vehicle for asserting conditions-of-confinement claims, without limitation").¹

Under Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, a habeas corpus petition must specify all of a petitioner's available grounds for habeas corpus relief, set forth the facts supporting each of the specified grounds, and state the relief requested. A district court can apply these rules, which are applicable to habeas corpus petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to petitions brought under § 2241 as well. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. A petition for federal habeas corpus relief must permit the Court and the respondent to comprehend both the petitioner's grounds for relief and the underlying facts and legal theory supporting each ground so that the issues presented in the petition may be adjudicated.

While there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for a § 2241 petition, in this Circuit, exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally a prerequisite to habeas corpus relief under§ 2241. See Carmona, 243 F.3d at 634; United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1976). A federal prisoner seeking to challenge the conditions of his confinement must first utilize a four-step Administrative Remedy Program developed by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP).

Courts have also found that there are exceptions to the judicially created exhaustion requirement. See McPherson v. Lamont, No. 20-CV-0534 (JBA), 2020 WL 2198279, at *6 (D. Conn. May 6, 2020) (finding exhaustion requirement is "amenable to judge-made exceptions") (quoting Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1857 (2016)). Such exceptions include "futility ('exhaustion may be unnecessary where it would be futile, either because agency decisionmakers are biased or because the agency has already determined the issue'); incapability ('exhaustion may be unnecessary where the administrative process would be incapable of granting adequate relief"); and undue prejudice ('an unreasonable or indefinite timeframe for administrative action may sufficiently prejudice [petitioners] to justify a federal court in taking a case prior to the complete exhaustion of administrative remedies')."Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, No. 20-CV-0569 (MPS), 2020 WL 2405350, at *18 (D. Conn. May 12, 2020) (quoting Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2019)). If the Administration Remedy Program could provide a petitioner with a "genuine opportunity for relief," exhaustion of administrative remedies would not be futile. See Owusu-Sakyi v. Terrell, No. 10-CV-507, 2010 WL 3154833, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2010) (finding futility argument of petitioner seeking sentence reduction for harsh conditions of confinement to be unpersuasive because "other available remedies, such as improvement of conditions or transfer, provide a genuine opportunity for relief" and "administrative exhaustion affords the BOP the opportunity to provide the relief").

Petitioner asserts generally that he and other prisoners are being exposed to unsafe conditions of confinement, but his allegations are vague. The petition does not contain facts detailing those conditions or describing how long they have persisted or what their specific effects are on him. Moreover, Petitioner asserts that he faced retaliation after filing complaints, but does not say that he exhausted the BOP's review process. The Court grants Petitioner leave to amend his petition so that it conforms to the requirements of Rule 2(c), and also explains whether he has exhausted these claims with the BOP and, if not, why not.

2. Relief Sought

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle for a state prisoner bringing a collateral challenge to his conviction and "seeking an earlier release." Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, Petitioner seeks release from custody based on allegedly harsh conditions of confinement, and is not challenging his conviction or sentence. While habeas relief may be available to petitioners making claims based on conditions of confinement, the appropriate remedy in that context is relief from those conditions, not release from custody. In other words, release or a sentence reduction is not the type of relief that can be granted in response to claims regarding conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Boiling v. Terrell, No. 10-CV-3594, 2011 WL 705396, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.15, 2011) (noting that the remedy for petitioner's conditions-of-confinement claims, and one that the BOP has authority to grant, is the improvement of his allegedly harsh conditions of confinement, not release).

Petitioner may seek release by filing a motion in his criminal case, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, to either modify his sentence, or for compassionate release, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See United States v. Needham, No. 06-CR-911 (WHP), 2020 WL 2512105, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (noting that the sentencing court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for compassionate release); Jenkins v. United States, 246 F.R.D.138, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing circumstances under which the sentencing court may modify a sentence).

B. Damages Claim

Petitioner also seeks damages, but damages are not available in a habeas action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973). It is unclear if Petitioner intends to style his application solely as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his custody, a civil rights action for damages, or both. See Thompson v. Choinski, 525 F.3d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that it is unaware of any "basis . . . for the view that a petitioner may not seek relief under both a habeas statute and [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 in a single pleading.").

1. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

This petition could be construed as a civil action seeking damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Ashcroft v. I...