Reynolds v. Pierce
| Decision Date | 16 January 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 15969,15969 |
| Citation | 320 S.W.2d 376 |
| Parties | John B. REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. J. W. PIERCE, D/B/A Pieree Pump Company, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Fritz & Vinson and Edward C. Fritz, Dallas, for appellant.
Malone, Lipscomb & Seay, George E. Seay and Robert A. Gwinn, Dallas, for appellee.
The plaintiff, John B. Reynolds, appealed from a summary judgment in favor of defendant, J. W. Pierce, individually and doing business as Pierce Pump Company.
Plaintiff brought suit pursuant to Section 16(b), Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 216(b), to recover alleged unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime compensation for the period from January 16, 1955, to May 18, 1956.
Based upon answers in plaintiff's deposition, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in which he alleged that from August 20, 1955, plaintiff's primary duty consisted of the management of a recognized department or subdivision of defendant's business, that such duty included the customary and regular direction of the work of two or more other employees in the establishment or department, and he received $100 or over per week.
Plaintiff's answer to the motion for summary judgment contained a detailed breakdown of plaintiff's duties and incorporated his petition.
Both plaintiff and defendant tendered plaintiff's deposition.
The court severed that part of plaintiff's claims from August 20, 1955, to the end of the period for which plaintiff was employed by defendant, and entered judgment that plaintiff take nothing for said period.
The plaintiff's point of error in this Court is to the effect the court erred in holding that plaintiff's services after August 20, 1955, were exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act.
An employee who is compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $100 per week, and whose primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which he is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof, and includes the customary and regular direction of the work of two or more other employees therein, is an 'executive.' 29 U.S.C.A., Appendix, Sec. 541.1(f)--Regulations, Fair Labor Standards Act.
There is testimony in plaintiff's deposition that he, subsequent to August 20, did receive in excess of $100 per week, that he was in charge of a recognized department, and had two or more others under his direction. If the admissions were such as to allow no reasonable conclusion other than that he was a bona fide executive, then as a matter of law the plaintiff, under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 213, was not entitled to overtime compensation.
In determining the question of whether or not material issues of fact are raised on motion for summary judgment, however, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought, and must indulge in favor of such party every intendment reasonably deducible from the evidence. Smith v. Bolin, 153 Tex. 486, 271 S.W.2d 93; Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929.
Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, losing party in the summary judgment proceedings, the testimony shows: He spent his time welding; selling parts; readying material for outside crews; handling freight; routing crews; on phone calls; sweeping floors; arranging parts; manufacturing facturing equipment and pump parts; electrical work; in sales, interviews and office work. He contended the major part of his time and responsibilities were nonmanagerial. He worked on a 49 1/2 hour week basis and was 'docked' for lost time; he was under close supervision of defendant; he frequently went out on jobs as a working foreman; defendant made all decisions when he was present at the plant; being in charge of the Service Department was only one of his duties; other employees were paid more per hour than he.
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Pierce v. Reynolds
...The motion to dismiss was overruled, and the judgment for defendant was reversed and the cause remanded to the district court for trial. 320 S.W.2d 376. Defendant contends that the decree denying a recovery from and after August 20th is not a final judgment because it does not fully adjudic......
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