Reynolds v. Reynolds

Decision Date22 May 1935
Docket Number749.
PartiesREYNOLDS v. REYNOLDS et al.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, Forsyth County; Pless, Judge.

Action by Ruth Hatcher Reynolds against W. N. Reynolds, II, and others. From a judgment, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

The following judgment was rendered in the court below:

"This cause coming on to be heard before the undersigned judge of the superior court at the January 7, 1935, term of the superior court of Forsyth county, and being heard by the court upon the pleadings read as affidavits, upon oral evidence, and upon other affidavits submitted and read to the court, and the court having heard the arguments of counsel upon the issues of law arising, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: That the plaintiff, Ruth Hatcher Reynolds, and the defendant W. N Reynolds, II, were duly married in Washington, D. C., on August 8, 1932, and lived together as husband and wife until the latter part of May, 1933. That during the month of May, 1933, the mind of the defendant W. N. Reynolds, II became so affected that it was impossible for the plaintiff to live with him, and that since that date she has been compelled, by reason of his mental condition, to live separate and apart from her said husband. That at about the time of the separation of the plaintiff and the defendant W. N. Reynolds, II, it was necessary to place him in institutions for treatment, where the physicians pronounced his ailment as dementia praecox; that during the greater part of the time since May, 1933, the defendant, W. N Reynolds, II, has been at Craig House at Beacon, in the state of New York, said Craig House being an institution for the treatment of persons with mental diseases. That prior to that time, the defendant was confined for a time in Tucker Sanitarium in Richmond, Virginia. That all of the physicians that have had charge of the said W. N. Reynolds, II, agreed that his disease is dementia praecox, and that it is impossible for his mental condition to improve. The court, therefore, finds as a fact that since May, 1933, the defendant W. N. Reynolds, II, has been suffering from dementia praecox, that he is still in that condition, and that the condition is incurable. That the defendant W. N. Reynolds, II, was domiciled at the date that he became incompetent within the state of Virginia, and that his domicile is still in that state; that at proceedings duly held in the circuit court of Patrick county on the 4th day of September, 1934, he was duly adjudicated insane, the court hearing evidence, and finding the said W. N. Reynolds, II, insane; that the defendant Annie D. Tompkins, mother of W. N. Reynolds, II, was appointed by the said circuit court of Patrick county, committee for W. N. Reynolds, II, both for his person and his property, and that she has acted continuously since the said proceedings and is now acting as Committee for W. N. Reynolds, II, in the State of Virginia. That the plaintiff was born on August 26, 1908, and is in good health; that the defendant W. N. Reynolds, II, was born on the 8th day of July, 1910, and that his physical condition is good; that the expectancy of continued life of both the plaintiff and the defendant, W. N. Reynolds, II, is more than 38 years from the date of this hearing, and the court finds as a fact, considering the health, constitution, and habits of both the plaintiff and the defendant W. N. Reynolds, II, the expectation of continued life of both of them will extend far beyond the 23d day of November, 1941. That the plaintiff is without property and has no means of support other than such allowances as the court may make to her out of the property of her husband.

That on or about August 5, 1922, Harbour H. Reynolds, the father of the defendant W. N. Reynolds, II, executed and delivered to the defendant Wachovia Bank & Trust Company, as trustee, two certain trust agreements conveying to the said trustee upon the trusts therein set out certain personal property consisting primarily of stocks in the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, a corporation of the state of New Jersey, but having its principal business office and manufacturing plants in Winston-Salem, Forsyth county, North Carolina; that the Wachovia Bank & Trust Company, trustee, accepted the said trusts and has held the property conveyed to it by the said trust agreements and has acted as trustee thereunder and is still acting as such trustee at the date of this hearing.

That of the said trust agreements, the following provisions defining the duties of the trustee and the rights of the beneficiaries are respectively as follows: '(1) To keep the principal of the trust estate invested in high-grade securities, including bonds of the United States or any state or political subdivision thereof, or bonds and notes secured by first mortgages on real estate or such stocks and bonds as shall be approved from time to time by the Trust Committee of the said Trustee. The Trustee shall have power to collect, sell, invest, reinvest, manage and control in such manner as it shall deem best any of the property so held by it in trust. (2) To collect, receive, and receipt for all income, gains and profits from and upon the property held in trust, and after deducting all taxes, fees, expenses, and commissions paid or incurred by the Trustee in the administration and preservation of the trust estate, apply or pay over the said net income in the manner hereinafter provided: (a) To pay one-fourth of the net income from and upon the property held in trust in equal monthly or quarterly installments to my wife, Annie Dobbins Reynolds, during her lifetime. To pay so much as may be necessary and required for the proper support and education of my children, of the remaining net income derived from the property held in trust to the grantor during his lifetime as guardian for said children. As and when my children arrive at the age of twenty-one to pay over so much of the net income of their share of the property held in trust as is required for their proper support and education. Any part of the net income not so paid to such children shall be invested and added to the principal of their shares. When my youngest child shall arrive at the age of twenty-seven, or if he or she shall die prior to arriving at that age, then at the time he or she would have become twenty-seven, to pay over to my children then living, the child or children of any child that may then be dead to represent their parent, three-fourths in value of the property held in trust, share and share alike, discharged of this trust. Upon the death of my wife, her share, a one-fourth interest in the property held in trust, shall be added to the share of the children and either the income or the principal distributed to said children in accordance with the terms set forth.'

(1) To keep the principal of the trust estate invested in high-grade securities, including bonds of the United States or any state or political subdivision thereof, or bonds and notes secured by first mortgages on real estate or such stocks and bonds as shall be approved from time to time by the trust committee of the said trustee. The trustee shall have power to collect, sell, invest, reinvest, manage and control in such manner as it shall deem best any of the property so held by it in trust: Provided, however, that during the lifetime of the grantor, there shall be no sales or disposition of the stocks, bonds, and securities now delivered to the trustee, and which is the subject-matter of this trust agreement, except by and with the written consent of the grantor. (2) To collect, receive, and receipt for all income, gains and profits from and upon the property held in trust, and after deducting all taxes, fees, expenses, and commissions paid or incurred by the trustee in the administration and preservation of the trust estate, apply or pay over the said net income in the manner hereinafter provided: '(a) To pay the net income from and upon the property held in trust to the grantor during his lifetime in monthly or quarterly payments, at his option. Upon the death of the grantor the Trustee shall divide the property held in trust into a sufficient number of equal shares so as to give each child then living a share, or, if any of my children shall have died leaving issue, such issue to stand in the place of the deceased parent, and my wife, if then living, to be counted as a child and have a share allotted for her benefit, as hereinafter provided. That the net income from the share allotted for the benefit of my wife shall be paid to her during her lifetime, upon her death such share to be equally distributed for the benefit of my children, the income and principal therefrom to be distributed to them as herein provided. To pay over to each child, or his or her representative, so much of the net income from his or her share as may be required for his or her support and education, the remainder of the net income received by the Trustee on the share or shares of any of the children to be added to the principal of such share and invested for the benefit of same. When my youngest child surviving me at my death shall have reached the age of twenty-seven years old, then the principal constituting the share or shares of the several children held in trust shall be paid over and delivered to such child or children by the Trustee, fully discharged of the trust, the child or children of any deceased child to receive the share that his or her parent would have received if then living.'

That the value of the property held in trust under the two several trust agreements by the Wachovia Bank & Trust Company trustee, as of the date of the hearing in this cause is approximately...

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5 cases
  • Reynolds v. Reynolds
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 1 November 1935
  • Bohannon v. Trotman
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 1 February 1939
    ... ... any just ground to carry it into execution and to establish ... the peace of a family'." Reynolds v ... Reynolds, 208 N.C. 578, 622, 182 S.E. 341 ...          In ... Armstrong v. Polakavetz, 191 N.C. 731, 734, 735, 133 ... S.E ... ...
  • North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 7 April 1987
    ...Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 75 S.E.2d 512 (1953), and has been enforced even where the husband was incompetent, Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 254, 180 S.E. 70 (1935), or where the wife was financially capable of providing for her own needs. See Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E......
  • Ritchie v. White
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 10 October 1945
    ... ... VanKoten, 323 Ill. 323, 154 ... N.E. 146, 50 A.L.R. 347. 'It is well settled that a ... husband is bound to support his wife. ' Reynolds v ... Reynolds, 208 N.C. 254, 180 S.E. 70, 77. And he may not ... by contract relieve himself of the duty to support himself ... and family, and ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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