Reynolds v. Royal Mail Lines

• Decision Date: 20 December 1956
• Docket Number: No. 17884.,17884.
• Citation: 147 F. Supp. 223
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: Eldred A. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL MAIL LINES, Ltd., a corporation, Defendant. ROYAL MAIL LINES, Ltd., a corporation, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. ASSOCIATED BANNING COMPANY, a corporation, Third-Party Defendant.

147 F. Supp. 223

Eldred A. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL MAIL LINES, Ltd., a corporation, Defendant.

ROYAL MAIL LINES, Ltd., a corporation, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. ASSOCIATED BANNING COMPANY, a corporation, Third-Party Defendant.

No. 17884.

United States District Court S. D. California, Central Division.

December 20, 1956.

Ben Margolis, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.

Lillick, Geary, McHose, Roethke & Myers, and Gordon K. Wright, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

Robert Sikes, Los Angeles, Cal., for third-party defendant.

MATHES, District Judge.

Invoking the jurisdiction of this court upon the ground of diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, plaintiff has filed a complaint on the "law side" seeking damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained while he was working as a longshoreman aboard the SS "Loch Gowan", then moored at dock in the navigable waters of Los Angeles Harbor.

In one cause of action it is asserted that plaintiff's injuries and consequent damages were a proximate result of a breach by the defendant shipowner, Royal Mail Lines, Ltd., of its implied warranty under maritime law of the seaworthiness of the SS "Loch Gowan".

In the other cause of action it is asserted that plaintiff's injuries and consequent damages were a proximate result of a breach by the defendant shipowner of its duty of ordinary care under the circumstances; and it is alleged that by reason of the same conditions claimed to render the vessel unseaworthy, the shipowner was negligent in failing to maintain the vessel "and its equipment, gear and appliances in a safe * * * condition * * *."

The shipowner has filed a third-party complaint for indemnification against plaintiff's stevedoring employer, Associated Banning Company, Fed.Rules Civ. Proc. 14, 28 U.S.C., and the latter has replied with a counterclaim.

It is a story often told that the warranty of seaworthiness is implied by maritime law from the relationship of the parties; originally between shipowner and shipper, The Southwark, 1903, 191 U.S. 1, 9, 24 S.Ct. 1, 48 L.Ed. 65; The Silvia, 1898, 171 U.S. 462, 464, 19 S.Ct. 7, 43 L.Ed. 241; then between shipowner and seaman, The Osceola, 1903, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.Ct. 483, 47 L.Ed. 760; and later between shipowner and longshoreman. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 1946, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099; cf.: Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 1953, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143; Berryhill v. Pac. Far East Line, 9 Cir., 1956, 138 F.2d 859; Dixon v. United States, 2 Cir., 1955, 219 F.2d 10.

Not only is the claimed breach of the warranty of seaworthiness "of admiralty cognizance", but also the actionable negligence here alleged is a maritime tort, having occurred in navigable waters. Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 1924, 266 U.S. 171, 45 S.Ct. 39, 69 L.Ed. 228; Atlantic Transport Co. of West Virginia v. Imbrovek, 1914, 234 U.S. 52, 34 S.Ct. 733, 58 L.Ed. 1208; The Plymouth, 1865, 3 Wall. 20, 36, 70 U.S. 20, 18 L.Ed. 125; United States v. Matson Nav. Co., 9 Cir., 1953, 201 F.2d 610.

Nonetheless, plaintiff did not choose to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Nor did he attempt to invoke jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, by claiming that the causes asserted under maritime law present a case which "arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." Cf.: Paduano v. Yamashita K.K.K., 2 Cir., 1955, 221 F.2d 615, affirming D.C.E.D.N.Y.1954, 120 F.Supp. 304; Doucette v. Vincent, 1 Cir., 1952, 194 F.2d 834, 839-842; Jordine v. Walling, 3 Cir., 1950, 185 F.2d 662.

Instead, plaintiff declared under the diversity jurisdiction of this court, which normally is only invoked to assert claims arising under state law. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 1938, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188. Yet he does not rely upon state law, but upon the maritime law; and it hardly need be added that "the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon * * *." The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 1913, 228 U.S. 22, 25, 33 S.Ct. 410, 411, 57 L.Ed. 716.

Although presenting claims under the maritime law for adjudication in this court, plaintiff asserts the right under the "saving to suitors clause" of 28 U.S. C. § 1333(1) to have his case tried on the "law side", rather than in admiralty. That the "saving to suitors clause" can be thus used is but another of the many anomalies of federal diversity jurisdiction. See: Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra, 346 U.S. at pages 409, 411, 419, 74 S.Ct. at pages 204, 206, 210; Caldarola v. Eckert, 1947, 332 U.S. 155, 157, 67 S.Ct. 1569, 91 L.Ed. 1968; Williams v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 9 Cir., 1955, 227 F.2d 791, certiorari denied, 1956, 350 U.S. 960, 76 S.Ct. 348.

The probability is that the common-law remedy of trial by jury would have been available to plaintiff in the California courts on both causes of action. See Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 1945, 26 Cal.2d 365, 159 P.2d 1. And it is held that where as here federal jurisdiction is based solely upon the ground of diversity of citizenship, this court is "in effect, only another court of the State." Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 1945, 326 U.S. 99, 108, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 1469, 89 L.Ed. 2079.

When a seaman sues under the Jones Act in a state court, concurrent jurisdiction is expressly granted to enforce this statutory addition to the maritime law. See: 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, 45 U.S.C.A. § 56; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 1942, 317 U.S. 239, 243, 63 S.Ct. 246, 87 L.Ed. 239; Engel v. Davenport, 1926, 271 U.S. 33, 37-38, 46 S.Ct. 410, 70 L.Ed. 813; Panama R. Co. v. Vasquez, 1926, 271 U.S. 557, 560-562, 46 S.Ct. 596, 70 L.Ed. 1085; Second Employers' Liability Cases, Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 1912, 223 U.S. 1, 55-59, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327. As pointed out in Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 1924, 264 U.S. 375, 388-389, 44 S.Ct. 391, 394, 68 L.Ed. 748, the election which the Jones Act provides for a seaman "is between alternatives accorded by the maritime law as modified by that statute, and not between that law and some nonmaritime system." See: Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 1928, 278 U.S. 130, 134, 138, 49 S. Ct. 75, 73 L.Ed. 220; Williams v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., supra, 227 F. 2d at page 794.

But where, as here, a longshoreman or a seaman or other suitor seeks recovery in any court other than a court of admiralty on a claim cognizable under general maritime law, he necessarily relies upon the "saving to suitors clause." 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). And as the Court observed with respect to the "saving to suitors clause" in Caldarola v. Eckert, supra, 332 U.S. at pages 157-158, 67 S.Ct. at page 1570: "Whether Congress thereby recognized that there were common law rights in the States as to matters also cognizable in admiralty, or whether it was concerned only with `saving' to the States the power to use their courts to vindicate rights deriving from the maritime law to the extent that their common law remedies may be available, is a question on which the authorities do not speak with clarity. Compare Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 460, 461, 12 L.Ed. 226; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, 598-599, 15 L.Ed. 1028 * * * with Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U.S. 118, 26 L.Ed. 95; The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 28 S.Ct. 133, 52 L.Ed. 264; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171; C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 63 S.Ct. 499, 87 L.Ed. 663; Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 88, 89, 66 S.Ct. 872, 874, 90 L.Ed. 1099."

Some study of the decisions since original enactment of the "saving to suitors clause" in § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76-77, reveals that the observation just quoted should rank high in judicial understatement. The coming of the Jones Act in 1920, 41 Stat. 1007, did not contribute to clarification, and Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 has served to accent the problem. See: Stevens, Erie R. R. v. Tompkins and The Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 Harv. L.Rev. 246 (1950); Palfrey, The Common Law Courts And The Law of The Sea, 36 Harv.L.Rev. 777 (1923).

The rationale of current authority appears to be that whenever a suitor on a claim of admiralty cognizance is accorded any remedy at all in a state court, the "supremacy clause", U.S.Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, serves to prevent state remedy from "diluting" or diminishing a right, or adding to a liability, which would exist under maritime law if enforced in a court of admiralty. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra, 346 U.S. at pages 409-410, 74 S.Ct. at page 204; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., supra, 317 U.S. at page 243, 63 S.Ct. 246; Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 1922, 259 U.S. 255, 259, 42 S.Ct. 475, 66 L.Ed. 927; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 1921, 257 U.S. 233, 240-242, 42 S.Ct. 89, 66 L.Ed. 210; cf: Madruga v. Superior Court, 1954, 346 U.S. 556, 560-561, 74 S.Ct. 298, 98 L.Ed. 290; Caldarola v. Eckert, supra, 322 U.S. at pages 158, 163-165, 67 S.Ct. 1569; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 1920, 253 U.S. 149, 160-161, 166-169, 40 S.Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834; Knapp, Stout & Co. Company v. McCaffrey, 1900, 177 U.S. 638, 648, 20 S. Ct. 824, 44 L.Ed. 921; The Moses Taylor, 1866, 4 Wall. 411, 431, 71 U.S. 411, 18 L.Ed. 397.

In any event it seems likely that the California courts would adopt and apply rules of the maritime law as the law of the State, Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 1931, 282 U.S. 234, 240, 51 S.Ct. 111, 75 L.Ed. 312, in cases where the maritime law would be applicable if the admiralty jurisdiction of this court had been invoked. See: Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., supra, 159 P.2d at pages 5-7; Occidental Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 1944, 24 Cal.2d 310, 149 P.2d 841.

Recognizing the inherent difficulties attendant upon asking a jury to determine issues as to liability for unseaworthiness as well as negligence...