Reynolds v. State

• Decision Date: 11 May 1916
• Docket Number: 2 Div. 618
• Parties: REYNOLDS et al. v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

72 So. 20

196 Ala. 586

REYNOLDS et al. v. STATE.

2 Div. 618

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 11, 1916

Appeal from Circuit Court, Bibb County; B.M. Miller, Judge.

Morris Reynolds, Arthur Glass, and Hubbard Glass were convicted of the murder of Scott Craddock, and they appeal. Reversed and remanded.

McClellan J., dissenting in part.

The following charges were refused to defendants:

(1) If the witness John Allen made the statement in writing to Reuben Reynolds and Frank Fallon, admitted in evidence then the jury may take into consideration the making of such statement in determining what weight they will give to the testimony in this case of John Allen as testified to by him.

(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the witness Minnie Booth has willfully or corruptly sworn falsely to any material facts in evidence, then the jury may, in its discretion, disregard the evidence of such witness entirely.

(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the witness Minnie Booth testified at the coroner's inquest that both Arthur and Hubbard Glass fired at Scott Craddock, and further, that the said Minnie Booth testified on the coroner's inquest that Scott Craddock called three times to the defendants in their buggy to stop before they stopped on the occasion of his killing, then the jury may take such testimony into consideration in determining what weight they will give to the testimony of Minnie Booth as given in this case.

(15) If you believe from the evidence that the witness John Allen has testified willfully, falsely to any material fact then you in your discretion may disregard his testimony.

Ellison & Dominick, of Centerville, Middleton & Reynolds, of Clanton, and I.M. Engel, of Birmingham, for appellants.

W.L. Martin, Atty. Gen., and P.W. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SAYRE J.

Defendants were convicted of murder in the second degree, and each of them sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for 30 years. After due consideration we find that the judgment must be reversed for the court's refusal of charges numbered, 1, 2, 3, and 15 in the record. The case is interesting; but in view of the fact that another trial will be ordered, we do not propose to discuss the evidence. It will be enough to say that the hypotheses of these charges were supported by tendencies of the evidence, and in the peculiar circumstances of the case they may have been of peculiar and legitimate value to defendants. Some of the cases in which this court has approved charges in substantially the language of charges 2 and 15 in this record have been collected by the Court of Appeals in Pearson v. State, 69 So. 485, to which we refer. Others to the same effect were noted by this court in the recent case of Carpenter v. State, 69 So. 531, in which this court followed the settled rule in respect to such instructions. Barker v. T. C., I. Co., 189 Ala. 579, 66 So. 600.

Charges substantially like those numbered 1 and 3 in this record have had uniform approval in this court. There was evidence going to show that the witnesses to whom these charges refer had made contradictory statements concerning material facts in the case. They should have been given. Hale v. State, 122 Ala. 85, 26 So. 236, where previous rulings are cited. In Birmingham Ry. v. Glenn, 179 Ala. 263, 60 So. 111, where many of the cases on this subject are collected, this court said:

"The principle of these cases is that where particular evidence is offered for a particular and limited purpose, collateral to the main issue, as in the case of all impeaching or discrediting evidence, parties have a right to have its proper function and its limited operation presented to the jury by an appropriate instruction."

In our consideration of these charges we have not been unmindful of the amendment of section 5364 of the Code, approved September 25, 1915; Acts 1915, p. 815. As amended, the section still requires that:

"Charges moved for by either party *** must be given or refused in the terms in which they are written." It further provides that:

"The refusal of a charge though a correct statement of the law shall not be cause for a reversal on appeal if it appears that the same rule of law was substantially and fairly given to the jury in the court's general charge or in charges given at the request of

...