Reynolds v. State
| Decision Date | 06 January 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 44799,44799 |
| Citation | 363 S.E.2d 249,257 Ga. 725 |
| Parties | REYNOLDS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Archibald A. Farrar, Jr., Farrar & Farrar, P.C., Summerville, for John William Reynolds.
David L. Lomenick, Jr., Dist. Atty., LaFayette, David J. Dunn, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant, John William Reynolds, was convicted of the offenses of incest and child molestation. We affirm.
The victim in this case was Reynolds' thirteen-year-old step daughter, A.M.J. She is mildly retarded and is enrolled in a special education program at school. In early 1986 A.M.J. reported to her teacher that Reynolds had been molesting her. The teacher informed a child protective services worker, who interviewed the child. During the interview, A.M.J. again described numerous acts of child molestation committed upon her by Reynolds, including sexual intercourse.
At trial, A.M.J. testified that Reynolds, whom she referred to as "daddy", had sexual intercourse with her on several occasions. Dr. David Kerns testified, based on his examination of A.M.J., that she was "non-virginal." Further, the teacher and the social services worker were allowed to testify to statements A.M.J. had made to them regarding the event.
1. Reynolds contends the trial court erred by allowing the teacher and social services worker to testify to the out-of-court statements made by A.M.J. because the statements were hearsay and were offered to bolster A.M.J.'s in-court testimony. As regards the hearsay objection, we find this testimony falls squarely within O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 and the trial court did not err by allowing the statements. See Cuzzort v. State, 254 Ga. 745, 334 S.E.2d 661 (1985). However, Cuzzort did not decide whether such statements were admissible over an objection that they bolstered the witness' in-court testimony. It only decided the issue raised in that case which was hearsay. The validity of other objections that might be raised to such testimony was not addressed by Cuzzort. Nor will we address the bolstering issue here because it was not raised below.
2. Reynolds contends that the trial court erred by allowing the teacher and the social worker to testify to statements made by A.M.J. without first making a determination that the statements possessed "sufficient indicia of reliability."
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 does not require a hearing to determine "indicia of reliability" be held prior to receiving the testimony. Although it may be advisable in some situations to hold such a hearing outside the presence of the jury, we cannot say that failure to do so in this case was error since the trial court ultimately found the statements reliable and admitted them and obviously would have done the same following a separate hearing.
3. Reynolds argues that O.C.G.A. 24-3-16 is unconstitutional under both the federal and state constitutions in that it denies defendant the right of confrontation because he is precluded from testing the veracity of the witness at the time the statements were originally made. We disagree.
We note that in this case A.M.J. actually testified at trial and was subject to a thorough cross-examination. In this situation defendant was not denied the right of confrontation even though he was unable to confront A.M.J. when the statements were originally made. The right of confrontation is satisfied if the witness testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). See Sosebee v. State, 257 Ga. 298, 357 S.E.2d 562 (1987).
4. Reynolds also contends that his right of confrontation was violated because the teacher and social services worker testified at trial to out of court statements made by A.M.J. that were not mentioned during A.M.J.'s testimony. Therefore, Reynolds contends he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine A.M.J. regarding these statements. As noted above, however, the right of confrontation is preserved if the witness testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. It is not...
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People v. Eccleston, A090567.
...(Colo.1989) 784 P.2d 741; Thomas v. State (Del.1999) 725 A.2d 424; Perez v. State (Fla.1988) 536 So.2d 206; Reynolds v. State (1988) 257 Ga. 725, 363 S.E.2d 249; People v. Bowen (1998) 183 Ill.2d 103, 232 Ill.Dec. 800, 699 N.E.2d 577; Miller v. State (Ind.App.1986) 498 N.E.2d 1008; State v.......
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White v. State
...§ 24-3-16 does not mandate a hearing on the indicia of reliability before such child hearsay evidence is admissible. Reynolds v. State, 257 Ga. 725(2), 726, 363 S.E.2d 249. The record reveals that sufficient indicia of reliability surrounding the circumstances of each child's statements, ev......
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State v. Jackson
... ... To the contrary, OCGA § 24-3-16 recognizes the importance of the rights to compel testimony and confront witnesses; it allows an out-of-court statement of a child victim to be admitted only if "the child is available to testify in the proceedings." See Reynolds v ... State, 257 Ga. 725(4), 363 S.E.2d 249 (1988). But OCGA § 49-5-183.1 would prohibit the accused child abuser from compelling the witness' presence, and therefore prohibits him from assuring the witness' availability. Fundamental rights of one so accused cannot be ignored, and the ... ...
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The People v. Eccleston
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