Rhad v. Duquesne Light Co.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1917
• Docket Number: 55
• Parties: Rhad v. Duquesne Light Co., Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

100 A. 262

Rhad v. Duquesne Light Co., Appellant

255 Pa. 409

No. 55

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 8, 1917

Argued October 10, 1916

Appeal, No. 55, Oct. T., 1916, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Allegheny Co., April T., 1914, No. 83, on verdict for plaintiff, in case of Youakin Rhad v. Duquesne Light Company. Reversed.

Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before REID, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict for plaintiff for $3,300 and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned, among others, were in refusing to direct a verdict for defendant and in refusing to enter judgment for defendant n.o.v.

The first and second assignments of error are sustained. The judgment is reversed, and is here entered for defendant.

Charles F. Patterson, with him Francis R. Harbison, for appellant. -- The facts material to determine the question of probable cause of the injury are not in dispute and it is, therefore a question of law for the court: West Mahoning Township v. Watson, 116 Pa. 344; Douglass v. N.Y. Central &amp Hudson River R.R. Co., 209 Pa. 128.

The proximate cause of an event is that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new independent cause, produces that event and without which that event would not have occurred: Wallace v. Keystone Automobile Co., 239 Pa. 110; Dannehower v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 218 Pa. 216; Finkbeiner v. Solomon, 225 Pa. 333; Carpenter v. John M. Miller & Son, 232 Pa. 362; Trout v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 236 Pa. 506; Widger v. Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 161; Berman et al. v. Schultz, 40 Misc. 212; Berman et al. v. Schultz, 84 N.Y.S. 292; Vincent & Seymour v. Crandall & Godley Co., 131 A.D. 200; Keber v. Central Brewing Co. of N.Y., 150 N.Y.S. 986; Sorrusca v. Hobson, 155 N.Y.S. 364; Frashella v. Taylor, 157 N.Y.S. 881.

The fact that the person responsible for the intervening act is a child does not affect the case, but if the act itself is an intervening efficient cause it will break the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury, even though it is the act of an irresponsible child: Otten v. Cohen et al., 1 N.Y.S. 430; Loftus et al. v. Dehail et al., 133 Cal. 214; Stephenson v. Corder, 71 Kansas 475; Ebright v. Mineral R.R. & Mining Co., 15 A. Repr. 709; George et al. v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 126 Cal. 357; Board of Trade Bldg. Corp. v. Cralle, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 297; O'Connor v. Brucker, 117 Ga. 451; Jutein v. Hurley et al., 98 Mass. 211.

It was error to allow the jury to determine that it was the duty of the defendant's chauffeur to anticipate interference with the machine by strangers: Lewis v. Wood, 247 Pa. 545; Philadelphia & Reading R.R. Co. v. Hummell, 44 Pa. 375; Ebright v. Mineral R.R. & Mining Co., 15 A. Repr. 709; Biddle, et ux., v. Hestonville, Mantua & Fairmount Pass. Ry. Co., 112 Pa. 551; Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238; Cole v. German Savings & Loan Soc., 124 Fed. Repr. 113.

The plaintiff's evidence that the exercise of due care on the part of the defendant required it to turn the front wheel into the curb was based upon the false theory that it was defendant's duty to exercise extra precaution against the interference of boys: Berman et al. v. Schultz, 40 Misc. 212; Berman et al. v. Schultz, 84 N.Y.S. 292; Keber v. Central Brewing Co. of N.Y., 150 N.Y.S. 986; Vincent & Seymour v. Crandall & Godley Co., 131 A.D. 200; Sorrusca v. Hobson, 155 N.Y.S. 364; Frashella v. Taylor, 157 N.Y.S. 881.

Meredith R. Marshall, with him Rody P. Marshall, for appellee. -- The application of proximate and remote cause is often very difficult. There seems to be no definite rule to determine it. Each case seems to have been decided on its own special circumstances. A cause is not too remote to be looked to merely because it produces the damage by means of intermediate agency: Loughlin v. Penna. R.R. Co., 240 Pa. 174; Butterman v. McClintic-Marshall Construction Co., 206 Pa. 82; Wideman v. Smith, 1 Lack. Jur. 203; Henry v. Klopfer, 147 Pa. 178; Rachmel v. Clark, 205 Pa. 314; Duffy v. Sable Iron Works, 210 Pa. 326; McBride v. McNally, 243 Pa. 206; Mulligan v. Homestead Boro., 243 Pa. 361; Kitchen v. Union Twp., 171 Pa. 145; Burrell Twp. v. Uncapher et al., 117 Pa. 353; Koelsch v. Philadelphia Co., 152 Pa. 355; Addis v. Hess, 29 Pa.Super. 505; Kreiner v. Straubmuller, 30 Pa.Super. 609.

Before BROWN, C.J., MESTREZAT, POTTER, STEWART and FRAZER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE POTTER:

This is an action of trespass brought to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff, which he alleges resulted from the negligence of an employee of the defendant. The circumstances attending the accident, as disclosed by the testimony, were substantially these: On September 12, 1913, about midday, an automobile, belonging to defendant, in charge of an experienced chauffeur, was driven on Bedford avenue up to the curb, headed down street, at a point where there was a considerable grade. The driver stopped the car, put on the brake, shut off the engine, and went into a restaurant for lunch. A nurse girl, who was in charge of a child, was sitting upon a door step at that point. She stepped to the automobile at the edge of the sidewalk and placed the child upon the seat. A twelve-year-old boy, passing by, stopped, put his hand upon the brake, rattled it, either for his own amusement or that of the child, and, as a consequence, the brake was released. The car started down the hill, along the curb, and ran a short distance when a stranger got upon the car and attempted to stop it; but, before he could get it under control, it struck and injured the plaintiff, who was pushing a fruit cart in the street. At the trial, plaintiff contended that in addition to the use of the brake, the car should have been more securely guarded against the possibility of movement by having its front wheel turned against the curbstone. The defendant set up the exercise of due care upon the part of the chauffeur, in that he put on the brake and left the automobile in a safe position, from which it would not have moved had it not been for the interference of the boy. It was further contended, that the unwarranted interference of the boy, in releasing the brake, was the proximate cause of the injury, and, as the facts in this respect were not in dispute, it was urged that the question of proximate cause was one of law for the court, and should not have been left to the jury. In West Mahanoy Township v. Watson, 116 Pa. 344, GORDON, J., speaking for the court, said: "It is also urged that the question of remote or proximate cause was for the jury and was properly submitted. This would be so were there any dispute about the facts, but where, as in this case, they are not disputed, the court should determine the question as a matter of law." In Douglass v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 209 Pa. 128, it was said (p. 131): "The rule is well settled that the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act without probable foresight, and if the facts as to the cause of the injury are not disputed the question of proximate cause becomes one of law for the determination of the court."

In Nirdlinger v. American District Telegraph Co., 245 Pa. 453, plaintiff sued to recover damages for loss by theft of various articles from his house which defendant had undertaken to equip with electrical burglar alarms. There was evidence that defendant had negligently failed to set the alarms, and on the same night the burglary was committed. The court below refused to instruct the jury that the damages recoverable were only those which were sustained as a result of defendant's breach of contract, but submitted to the jury the question whether the negligence of defendant was the proximate cause of the burglary and permitted recovery of the value of the articles stolen. The judgment of the lower court was reversed by this court, and, in the opinion by Mr. Justice STEWART, he said (p. 459): "It is to be observed that on this particular question of proximate cause there was no conflict of testimony whatever, and the fact of an intervening agency was manifest. A submission of the question therefore was unwarranted; it was clearly within the province and duty of the court to decide it." He further said: "The result of the court's submission of the question to the jury was a recovery by plaintiff for an act of negligence which at best was a remote cause of the loss. Admitting the facts to be as claimed by the plaintiff, the learned trial judge should have held that they did not show defendant's negligence to have been the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss."

In the present case, it is undisputed that the chauffeur left the car with the brake set, and that it stood in that position until the boy interfered with it. The boy testified that he put his hand on the brake, shoved it, and rattled it, and the automobile started to go. He said, "I guess it started from me playing with the levers." Here then we have a new, independent and unexpected factor, which was in itself the real occasion of the mischief. The effective cause of the injury was shown to be the interference of the boy, and it was not the failure of the chauffeur to use the additional precaution of turning the front wheel against the curb. Suppose that, instead of merely turning the car adrift, as he did, the boy had...