Township of West Mahanoy v. Watson

• Decision Date: 09 May 1887
• Docket Number: 435
• Citation: 116 Pa. 344,9 A. 430
• Parties: WEST MAHANOY TOWNSHIP v. M. C. WATSON
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

9 A. 430

116 Pa. 344

WEST MAHANOY TOWNSHIP v. M. C. WATSON

No. 435

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 9, 1887

Argued April 21, 1887

ERROR TO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY.

No. 435 January Term 1887, Supt. Ct.; Court below, 294 July Term 1884, C.P.

In the court below this was an action in case for negligence by M C. Watson against the township of West Mahanoy, Schuylkill county, for damages for the loss of a pair of horses, a sleigh and harness.

On January 16, 1884, two horses and a sleigh, owned by M. C Watson, were being driven along a public highway in West Mahanoy township, Schuylkill county. Striking upon an ash heap, the sleigh was upset, the driver thrown out and the body of the sleigh separated from the runners. The driver was dragged some distance when he let go the reins. The horses then continued running along the township road and eventually got upon the track of the Lehigh Valley Railroad, where, after they were driven off by one overtaking train, they changed their course and, running in the opposite direction, were struck by another moving train and killed. Watson brought suit against the township to recover damages. In his declaration, the negligence charged in the first count consisted in allowing the ash heap upon the road, and in the second, in not having opened the road to the proper width; both counts claiming damages for the injury to the sleigh and harness and for the loss of the horses.

The case was in this court after a former trial, wherein there was a judgment for the plaintiff for $520, including $20 damages to the sleigh and harness, which judgment was reversed: 112 Penn. St. 574. The additional facts, shown by the plaintiff's testimony at a second trial, and which were undisputed, sufficiently appear in the opinion in this case.

The following were certain points of the defendant township with the answers of the court thereto:

7. The plaintiff's undisputed testimony showing that these horses were killed, not on the township road, but on the Lehigh Valley Railroad, by a moving locomotive (not owned or controlled by the township), which ran upon and killed them, the negligence of the township, if any, was not the proximate, but the remote cause of the killing of the horses, and the plaintiff cannot recover their value in this action.

Answer: It is not disputed that the engine, No. 389, of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, while moving east, killed the plaintiff's horses, but whether or not the defendant is liable for such killing depends upon how the horses got there and how and when they encountered the engine, as we have heretofore instructed you, and we therefore decline to affirm this point and refer you to what we have heretofore said upon this subject as an answer to this point.

9. The uncontradicted testimony produced by the plaintiff shows that several miles from the scene of the upset, these horses had abandoned the township road and were going east on the Lehigh Valley Railroad track, engine No. 69 following them and occasionally whistling danger signals until the train overtook them, when they left the railroad track and turned directly back to the west, crossing the railroad track between the rear of coal train drawn by engine No. 69 and its pushing engine No. 403, which had been detached, and having continued their flight west for nearly two miles, came into collision with an eastward moving coal train drawn by engine No. 389, and were thus killed. The killing of the horses being admitted, as proved, the negligence of the township, if any, was the remote, and not the proximate cause of the killing of the horses, and the plaintiff cannot recover their value in this action.

Answer: We do not say that the uncontradicted facts of the case in this particular are or are not as they are here stated. We leave you to ascertain what the testimony before you bearing upon this subject proves. It is not denied that the horses encountered engine No. 389 of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, and were killed, but as to how they got there, whether by continuous flight without having recovered from their original fright or after having recovered from the effects of the runaway, etc., we have submitted to you in our general charge as we believe to be our duty to do under the authorities given to us by our Supreme Court, and we need not now repeat what we have said to you upon this subject but a few minutes ago, but refer you to it as an answer upon this subject.

10. The undisputed testimony offered by the plaintiff shows that several miles from the scene of the upset, these horses running east on the railroad, being followed and overtaken by a whistling locomotive, got out of the way of the engine and, operated upon by a new fright, completely changed their course to run west instead of east, and thus by this change of direction of flight came into collision with another engine, which killed them. These facts show an independent intervening agency beyond the negligence of the township, which operated upon these horses and their fright, without which they could not have been killed when and as they were, and the plaintiff cannot recover their value in this action.

Answer: Whether these horses changed their course from east to west and thus encountered engine No. 389, or whether engine No. 69 struck them or the part of the sleigh or tongue to which they were attached and thus turned them around as Ryan testifies, you must ascertain from the testimony before you. As to the doctrine or rule of approximate and remote cause and the circumstances under which the township would or would not be liable we have heretofore instructed you in our general charge, and your attention is directed to what we then said in answer to this point.

The jury found for the plaintiff in $470, whereupon, after a motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial was refused, the defendant took this writ assigning as error the answers of the court to the 7th, 9th and 10th points.

The judgment is now reversed and a new venire ordered.

Mr. S. H. Kaercher and Mr. Mason Weidman, for the plaintiff in error:

1. The facts not being in dispute, it was the duty of the court to tell the jury whether the negligence of the township was the proximate or the remote cause of the killing of the horses: Hoag v. Railroad Co., 85 Penn. St. 293.

2. The court should have instructed the jury that under the undisputed facts of the case, the negligence of the township was not the proximate but the remote cause of the killing of the horses, and that the plaintiff below could not recover for that loss.

Causa proxima non remota spectatur, is a maxim of the common law which simply means that the defendant shall be held liable for the natural consequences flowing from his act of negligence, such as could be reasonably expected to follow; the proximate and not the remote results. The question in such cases is: "did the cause alleged produce its effects without another cause intervening?" Penn. R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Penn. St. 353; Hoag v. Railroad Co., 85...