Rhame v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 July 1961
• Docket Number: No. 17807,17807
• Citation: 121 S.E.2d 94,238 S.C. 539
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: W. H. RHAME, Respondent, v. NATIONAL GRANGE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

Page 94

121 S.E.2d 94

238 S.C. 539

W. H. RHAME, Respondent, v. NATIONAL GRANGE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 17807.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 21, 1961.

Nelson, Mullins, Grier & Scarborough, Columbia, for appellant.

T. B. Bryant, Jr., Orangeburg, for respondent.

MOSS, Justice.

W. H. Rhame, the respondent herein, brought this action against National Grange Mutual Insurance Company, the appellant herein, to recover benefits under a policy of insurance which provides for the payment of medical expenses.

The appelant herein, on January 1, 1960, issued and delivered to the respondent a 'Combination Automobile Policy', insuring three Ford trucks and two Ford automobiles, and it was provided that the appellant would pay on behalf of the insured all sums which he should become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicles insured. The bodily injury liability was limited to $10,000 to each person, and to $20,000 for each accident. There was also included in the insuring agreement a clause providing for the payment of property damage not exceeding the sum of $5,000.

The policy in question contained a medical provision with a limit of liability to each person of not more than $500. This medical payment provision is contained in Coverage C and is as follows:

'To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical and dental services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services:

'Division 1. To or for each person who sustains bodily injury, sickness or disease, caused by accident, while in or upon or while entering into or alighting from the automobile provided the automobile is being used by the named insured or his spouse if a resident of the same household, or with the permission of either;'

Under the 'Exclusion' it is provided that 'This policy does not apply': * * *

'(g) under division 1 of coverage C, to bodily injury to or sickness, disease or death of any employee of the named insured or spouse arising out of and in the course of (1) domestic employment by the named insured or spouse, if benefits therefor are in whole or in part either payable or required to be provided under any workmen's compensation law, or (2) other employment by the named insured or spouse;'

It is admiatted that on March 30, 1960, one of the respondent's insured trucks was involved in an accident and two of his employees, one being the truck driver, and the other a helper, received injuries in said accident and incurred medical expenses to the extent of $693.25, which said sum was paid by the respondent. It is also admitted that the two employees of the respondent who were injured were farm laborers, and that their injuries arose out of and in the course of their employment.

The appellant denied liability and asserted that since respondent's employees were farm laborers and received injuries arising out of their employment, coverage was expressly excluded under provision (g) above quoted.

This case was tried before the Honorable Carroll E. Summers, presiding Judge of the Orangeburg County Court, and a jury, at the 1961 February term thereof, and resulted in a verdict for the respondent in the sum of $693.25, the amount demanded in the complaint.

The appellant made a timely motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the employees of the respondent, who were farm laborers, and whose injuries arose out of an accident in the course of their employment, were expressly excluded from coverage as to medical payment, under the terms and provisions of the insurance policy in question. The trial Judge overruled such motion, holding that the provision of the exclusion clause was ambiguous and that it was for the jury to construe this provision and determine whether the policy afforded coverage to the two injured employees of the respondent. After the rendition of the verdict in favor of the respondent, the appellant moved for judgment non obstante veredicto on the same ground as was included in its motion for a directed verdict. This motion was refused. This appeal is from the refusal of the trial Judge to grant the motion of the appellant for a directed verdict and for judgment non obstante veredicto.

It appears from the record that the policy in question was sold to the respondent by Cameron E. Sauls, a licensed agent for the appellant. Sauls was unable to attend the trial of this case but furnished an affidavit wherein he stated that he advised the respondent to buy the medical coverage and that he was under the impression that all drivers of the trucks were covered thereby. He further stated that he sold the insurance to the respondent with that understanding. It was agreed by counsel for the parties that if Sauls were present he would so testify, but his testimony was objected to by the appellant on the ground that to admit such would violate the parol evidence rule, thereby by varying the terms of a written instrument. Further objection was made on the ground that this agent had no authority to bind the company by giving an interpretation of the terms of the written policy. This objection was overruled and the statement of this witness allowed as evidence.

We have held in numerous cases that where the language of a contract is free from ambiguity, its construction is for the Court. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Joyce, 231 S.C. 493, 99 S.E.2d 187.

In the case of Quinn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., S.C., 120 S.E.2d 15, 16, we said:

'It is a well settled rule that the terms of an insurance policy must be construed most liberally in favor of the insured and where the words of a policy are ambiguous, or where they are...