Rhinehart v. Shambaugh
| Decision Date | 17 June 1941 |
| Docket Number | 45582. |
| Citation | 298 N.W. 876,230 Iowa 788 |
| Parties | RHINEHART v. SHAMBAUGH. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; E. W. Dingwell, Judge.
Plaintiff recovered personal injury damages caused by an auto collision at an intersection. Defendant appeals from the refusal of the trial court to direct a verdict on the theory of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Affirmed.
R. K Craft, of Adel, and Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, of Des Moines, for appellant.
Curtis W. Gregory, of Adel, and Emmert, James, Needham & Lindgren of Des Moines, for appellee.
There is practically no dispute in the evidence. 13th street in the town of Dallas Center runs north and south, and is intersected at right angles by Maple street running east and west. Both streets are gravelled. Plaintiff-appellee was driving his new Dodge pickup truck east on Maple street. When he reached a point about 20 feet west of the sidewalk on the west side of 13th street he looked to the north and south and saw no one approaching. He could see about 150 feet to the south down 13th street. Appellee then proceeded into the intersection. When the front wheels of appellee's truck were nearly even with the east curb on 13th street the car driven by defendant-appellant struck the right door of the truck with such force as to throw it on to the parking on the north side of Maple street, causing appellee's injuries. An eye witness estimated the speed of appellant's car as it approached the intersection at 40 miles per hour, and the speed of appellee's truck just before it was hit at 15 miles per hour. The intersection was in a residential district where the maximum speed permitted by statute is 25 miles per hour. Section 5023.01, Code 1939.
At the conclusion of appellee's evidence appellant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The trial court overruled the motion. Appellant offered no evidence and dismissed his counter claim without prejudice. His counsel stated that it was the intention to stand upon the motion for directed verdict. The jury returned a verdict for appellee in the sum of $1,000 upon which judgment was entered. The single question raised upon this appeal is that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The theory advanced by counsel, as we understand it, is that at the time appellee claims to have looked to the south before entering the intersection, appellant's car must have been within the distance appellee claims was exposed to his view and therefore if he looked, he must have seen it; that if he did not see appellant's car he was negligent in not making an efficient observation and therefore in either event he was contributorily negligent. The decision upon which appellant seems to place most reliance is Hewitt v. Ogle, 219 Iowa 46, 256 N.W. 755.Hittle v. Jones, 217 Iowa 598 250 N.W. 689, as well as some other decisions are also relied upon.
It of course goes without saying that upon this appeal the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to appellee. Also, that ordinarily the question of contributory negligence is for the jury unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could arrive at but one conclusion therefrom. In view of appellant's approach to the question of contributory negligence, it is proper for us to repeat the observation made by this court, speaking through Justice Sager, in Short v. Powell, 228 Iowa 333, 291 N.W. 406, at page 407: " It is to be remembered that when speeds and distances are spoken of, we are dealing with estimates and not with certainties." See, too, Eby v. Sanford, 223 Iowa 805, 807, 273 N.W. 918. Obviously such testimony as we have before us pertaining to the speed of the respective vehicles, the distance from the intersection where appellee claims to have looked for approaching vehicles and the distance open to his view must not be considered as accurate measurements of speed or distances.
Even if we adopt appellant's theory of dealing with the question of contributory negligence, we are clear that the record does not present a case of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The jury might well have found that appellee was traveling 15 miles per hour and that appellant was traveling 40 miles per hour, or that appellant was traveling 2 2/3 times as fast as appellee; that the distance from the place where appellee claims to have looked for...
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