RHODE ISLAND F. WELF. RTS. ORG. v. DEPARTMENT OF S. & R. SERV.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4567.
• Citation: 329 F. Supp. 860
• Parties: The RHODE ISLAND FAIR WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION et al., Plaintiffs, v. The DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

329 F. Supp. 860

The RHODE ISLAND FAIR WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION et al., Plaintiffs, v. The DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 4567.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

July 27, 1971.

Cary J. Coen, John M. Roney, R. I. Legal Services, Inc., Providence, R. I., Adele M. Blong, Steven J. Cole, Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Richard J. Israel, Atty. Gen., W. Slater Allen, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Providence, R. I., for defendants.

Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare by Lincoln C. Almond, U. S. Atty., D. R. I., Providence, R. I., amicus curiae.

General Assembly of R. I. by William G. Gilroy, Providence, R. I., amicus curiae.

OPINION

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

A review of the brief but frenetic history of this action is essential to an understanding of its present posture.

I Procedural History

As originally filed, the class action plaintiffs herein, who purport to represent the entire class of Rhode Island recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (hereinafter AFDC), challenged a March 25, 1971 order of the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter Department) which suspended all payments for items contained in the so-called "special needs" category of assistance of the AFDC program.¹ This Court granted plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order on April 2, 1971, and enjoined the defendants from failing to grant special needs payments on the same basis as they were provided on March 24, 1971. This Court found authority for that order in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23), as interpreted in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970). The parties agreed to an extension of that order to allow the State the opportunity to develop a new program in compliance with federal law.

An Act of the State legislature subsequently was signed into law which provided in part:

"Section 40-6-9 of the general laws in Chapter 40-6, entitled Public Assistance, as enacted pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1970, is hereby amended to read as follows:

40-6-9. Amount and standards of assistance.—The amount of assistance which any recipient shall receive under the provisions of sections 40-6-6, 40-6-7 and 40-6-8 shall be determined with due regard to his requirements and the conditions existing in his situation, and to the income and resources available to him from whatever source, and shall be sufficient, when added to the income and resources determined to be available to him, to provide him with a reasonable subsistence compatible with health and well-being. The amount of assistance which any recipient eligible under the terms of sections 40-6-6, 40-6-7, and 40-6-8 shall receive, shall not exceed the standards of assistance approved and promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this section and sections 40-6-18, 40-6-20 and 40-6-22, provided, however, that said standards of assistance shall not include payments for household equipment and furnishings or indebtedness and, provided further that a supplementary payment may be made in the event of an emergency of a catastrophic nature as defined by the director of the department of social and rehabilitative services. The standards of assistance approved, promulgated and in effect as of January 1, 1971, shall continue to be maintained without change until further legislative action pertaining thereto." (emphasis added)

Regulations were promulgated by the Department on May 13, 1971, to carry out the legislative mandate. The plaintiffs thereafter filed an amended complaint, seeking injunctive relief against the new regulations. Since this new challenge rested on constitutional² as well as statutory (i.e., § 602(a) (23)) grounds, a three-judge court was requested pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281. Finding immediate and specified irreparable injury from application of the new regulations to certain affiants who are members of the plaintiff class,³ this Court, on June 24, 1971, entered a limited temporary restraining order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(3), ordering resumption of special needs payments for household furnishings and equipment under the criteria that existed on March 24, 1971. Insofar as probability of success on the merits was a factor considered by me in evaluating the request for temporary relief, the opinion accompanying the restraining order considered solely the authority of § 602(a) (23) and Rosado, without considering the validity of the constitutional argument.

The remaining members of the three-judge court were appointed on July 7 and on July 12 an order was entered remanding the statutory issue for resolution by the single initiating judge while retaining jurisdiction of the constitutional claim, a procedure explicitly commended in Rosado and previously stipulated to by the parties herein. In anticipation of the fact that this procedure would leave the continued vitality of the June 24 restraining order in considerable doubt,⁴ this Court held a full and complete hearing on July 6 on the merits of the statutory claim, at the conclusion of which the parties agreed to extend the restraining order to July 26 in order to allow this Court time for consideration of written briefs and for disposition of the statutory claim, if it subsequently were remanded to me. On the basis of testimony presented at the hearing, the Court expanded its existing restraining order to include special needs payments for indebtedness on utility bills where the recipient faced a shut-off of service.

With prior agreement of the parties, this Court requested the participation of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare as an amicus curiae, which again was a procedure recommended by Rosado. A representative of H.E.W. attended the July 6 hearing, has submitted a substantial memorandum on the questions of law involved in this litigation and has, in short, given this Court complete cooperation and helpful advice, for which I am most appreciative.

II Standard of Need

From at least January 1, 1968 to May 13, 1971,⁵ the Rhode Island public assistance standard of economic security was defined as the aggregate of three categories of need:⁶

A. Individual Requirements covered basic needs for food, clothing, etc.

B. Group Overhead Items covered shelter, heat and utilities

and

C. Individual Requirements under Specified Circumstances ("Special Needs") covered:

1. Transportation

2. Housekeeping Services

3. Personal Maintenance During Temporary Hospitalization

4. Household Equipment and Furnishings

5. Telephone

6. Indebtedness

7. Moving

8. Burial

9. Special Medical Supplies

During that period, the basic Individual Requirements payment was budgeted for each AFDC recipient according to family size and age of children. Also during that period, Group Overhead Items were budgeted for each AFDC recipient on the basis of standard payments according to family size, for heat and utilities, and actual expenses for shelter costs. Finally, special needs payments were authorized only when a recipient demonstrated a need for an item allowable under that category, under criteria established in § 202 of the Public Assistance Manual and discussed infra. At all times relevant to this action, the amount of payment, if any, due an AFDC applicant or recipient has been the difference between the amount needed, as determined by the particular family's AFDC standard, and the income available to that family to meet such requirements. No adjustment of the basic monthly grant has been made since May 13.

Payment for any item included as a special need in the budget of an AFDC applicant or recipient has been made during all times relevant to this action either (1) by adding the money amount, as determined by the appropriate cost standard, to the regular bi-monthly assistance payment; or (2) by issuing a separate assistance check payable to the recipient or to the recipient and vendor, to cover the amount necessary to meet the particular special need; or (3) by voucher which authorizes the purchase of the particular special need item. Whichever method of payment is used, special need items have been, and are, included in the AFDC standard.

On May 13, 1971, the Department published a revision of the Public Assistance Manual, removing special need items 4, 6 and 7 from that category of assistance and setting forth "* * * new criteria and procedure for meeting these needs through the Emergency Assistance Program, § 202.2" (see cover letter signed by James H. Reilly, Assistant Director of the Department, dated May 13, 1971, at 1.) It is these changes which constitute the sole controversy herein.

III Emergency Assistance Program

The Emergency Assistance Program in broad outline provides payments for the former special needs items 4, 6 and 7 when a recipient faces an emergency need caused by a disaster beyond the control of the family (illustrative examples offered by the State being a fire or a flood). A recipient who demonstrates a need for emergency assistance under the foregoing criterion is ineligible, however, if he has received any other payment under the Emergency Assistance category during the preceding twelve months. Finally, any single payment is limited to a maximum period of 30 consecutive days.⁷

IV Household Equipment and Furnishings

The criteria for meeting this category of need, prior to May 13, 1971, were as follows:

A. Household Furniture and Major Equipment—

"Purchase of household equipment which is considered to include major items essential to the operation of a home such as stoves, refrigerators, tables, and beds can be considered for persons with established homes when it has been determined that (1) these items are worn out beyond repair or that the condition of the item does not warrant costly repair investments, or (2) that the essential item(s) is lacking and the person is unable to operate a home without it. *

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