Rhode Island Fish. All. v. R.I. Dept., Envir. Man.

• Decision Date: 23 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-2390.,08-2390.
• Citation: 585 F.3d 42
• Parties: RHODE ISLAND FISHERMEN'S ALLIANCE, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT et al., Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

585 F.3d 42

RHODE ISLAND FISHERMEN'S ALLIANCE, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 08-2390.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard September 15, 2009.

Decided October 23, 2009.

Robert J. Caron for appellants.

Sean H. Donahue and Gary E. Powers, Chief Deputy Legal Counsel, Department of Environmental Management, with whom Donahue & Goldberg, LLP, Terence J. Tierney, Special Assistant Attorney General, Mark A. McSally, and Kelly, Kelleher, Reilly & Simpson were on consolidated brief, for appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, SELYA and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

This appeal brings us face to face with two exotic creatures: the American lobster and a state-law claim that may or may not contain an embedded federal question sufficient to ground a claim of original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (commonly known as "federal question" jurisdiction). Cases of this sort require courts to venture into a murky jurisprudence. The answers are rarely black or white but, rather, more often doused in varying shades of gray. The difficult jurisdictional question presented here is no exception.

The underlying case began as a state-court challenge to regulations promulgated by the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM). Those regulations imposed restrictions on lobster-trap allocations for Rhode Island waters. The challenge to them centers on the DEM's alleged use of retroactive control dates in composing the regulatory scheme.¹

The DEM thought that it was obliged to adopt the retroactive control dates by federal law. Accordingly, it removed the case to the federal district court. The plaintiffs moved to remand, but the district court refused to relinquish jurisdiction. R.I. Fishermen's All., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. (RIFA I), No. 07-230 (D.R.I. Nov. 5, 2007) (unpublished order). The court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. R.I. Fishermen's All., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. (RIFA II), No. 07-230, 2008 WL 4467186, at *16 (D.R.I. Oct.3, 2008).

After careful consideration of the plaintiffs' ensuing appeal, we agree that the district court appropriately exercised federal question jurisdiction over the case. Once the jurisdictional puzzle is solved, the challenge to the regulations is easily dispatched. The tale follows.

I. BACKGROUND

We rehearse here the regulatory framework and travel of the case to the extent needed to place this appeal in perspective.

A. Regulatory Framework.

In 1942, Congress consented to and approved the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact (the Compact), an interstate agreement among fifteen states (including Rhode Island) and the District of Columbia. See Pub.L. No. 77-539, 56 Stat. 267. All the signatories are situated close to the Atlantic coast.

Under the Compact, the signatories are to exercise joint regulatory oversight of their fisheries through the development of interstate fishery management plans. See Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 27-28 (1st Cir.2005). Originally, participation in any given fishery management plan was voluntary. Id. In 1993, however, Congress implanted some teeth in the Compact by adopting the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act (the Management Act), Pub.L. No. 103-206, 107 Stat. 2447 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5108).

Among other things, the new law made state compliance with fishery management plans compulsory. See 16 U.S.C. § 5104(b)(1). It also designated the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (the Commission) as the body that would prepare and adopt interstate fishery management plans. Id. §§ 5102(3); 5104(a)(1). The Commission works through species-specific management boards (such as the American Lobster Management Board) to develop such plans.

Once a plan is formulated and approved, each affected state is required to implement it, usually through the medium of state laws and regulations. See Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 27-28. The Commission itself monitors compliance. 16 U.S.C. § 5104(c). If a state fails to comply with an approved plan, the Commission may notify the Secretary of Commerce, who has the power to impose a moratorium on fishing of the relevant species in the waters of the noncompliant state. Id. § 5106(c).

In 1997, the Commission decided to take steps to combat rampant overfishing of lobster stock. In a determined effort to protect the supply of these appetizing arthropods, it adopted Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for American Lobster. Then, worried about especially rapid depletion of the lobster stock in "Area 2"—the waters off Massachusetts and Rhode Island—the American Lobster Management Board engrafted Addendum VII onto Amendment 3. Addendum VII requires these states to allocate lobster traps to fishermen based on each fisherman's documented lobster catch during 2001-2003. See Addendum VII, § 2.1.1.

In 2006, the DEM adopted Regulation 15.14.2 for the avowed purpose of "bring[ing] the State of Rhode Island into compliance with Addendum VII." 12-080-012 R.I.Code R. § 15.14.2-1. The taking of lobsters in Rhode Island waters requires either a federal permit or a state license. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 20-2.1-4(a); 12-080-012 R.I.Code R. § 15.1. The state's licensing scheme, in turn, involves lobster-trap allocations. See 12-080-012 R.I.Code R. § 15.14.2. Under the new regulation, eligibility for a lobster-trap allocation depends, inter alia, on a showing (i) that the applicant held a DEM-issued commercial lobster license or federal permit for Area 2 at some time in the 2001-2003 time frame; and (ii) that he had documented lobster landings from traps in Area 2 during that time frame. Id. § 15.14.2-6.

B. Proceedings Below.

Distressed by what they perceived as the use of retroactive control dates in the new regulatory framework, the lobstermen clawed back. On June 4, 2007, the Rhode Island Fishermen's Alliance, a trade organization acting by and through its president, Richard Fuka, and eight individual lobster fishermen (Steven Riley, Brian Loftes, Stephen Mederios, Greg Duckworth, Vincent Carvalho, Peter DiBiase, Robert Morris, and Andrew Cavanagh) filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the DEM and its director, Michael Sullivan, in his official capacity, in a Rhode Island state court. The plaintiffs alleged that the adoption of Regulation 15.14.2 violated the Rhode Island Constitution and an array of Rhode Island statutes.

Despite the fact that the complaint alleged only state-law causes of action, defendants DEM and Michael Sullivan invoked federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Shortly thereafter, the Commission and the Rhode Island Lobstermen's Association, along with seven individual lobster fishermen (Al Christopher, Lanny Dellinger, Al Eagles, Aaron Gerwitz, Michael Marchetti, Harry Towne, and Russ Wallace), filed motions to intervene, which were granted by the district court. The plaintiffs challenged the existence of federal jurisdiction and asked the district court to remand the case to the state court. The district court denied their motion. RIFA I, at 11.

The case proceeded in the federal forum. In due season, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. In a well-reasoned rescript, the district court granted the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiffs' motion. RIFA II, 2008 WL 4467186, at *16.

The plaintiffs now appeal both the denial of their motion to remand and the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm both rulings.

II. ANALYSIS

We divide our analysis into two main segments. We first address the tangled jurisdictional issue and then briefly address the merits.

A. Jurisdiction.

The district court denied the motion to remand without an evidentiary hearing. Thus, we review de novo the propriety of that order (and, thus, the court's underlying conclusion that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the action). See Fayard v. N.E. Vehicle Servs., LLC, 533 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.2008).

Removal of a civil action from state to federal court is proper only if the action initially could have been brought in the federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Because the defendants concede that there is no conceivable basis for federal jurisdiction apart from 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the propriety of removal hinges on whether the district court had federal question jurisdiction. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 11 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983).

The relevant statute grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. There is no mechanical test for determining when an action "aris[es] under" federal law. See Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 8, 103 S.Ct. 2841 (noting that the phrase "arising under" has "resisted all attempts to frame a single, precise definition for determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall outside, the original jurisdiction of the district courts"). This does not mean, however, that we are left rudderless on a sea of uncertainty.

Experience teaches that there are two types of actions that fall within the encincture of federal question jurisdiction. The first (and most familiar) category involves direct federal questions; that is, suits in which the plaintiff pleads a cause of action that has its roots in federal law (say, a claim premised on the United States Constitution or on a federal statute). See, e.g., Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987 (1916) (Holmes, J.); Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir.2000). The second (and far more rare) category involves embedded federal...