Rhode Island Medical Society v. Whitehouse

• Decision Date: 23 June 2004
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 97-416L.
• Citation: 323 F.Supp.2d 283
• Parties: RHODE ISLAND MEDICAL SOCIETY; Pablo Rodriguez; Benjamin S. Vogel; and Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island, Plaintiffs, v. Sheldon WHITEHOUSE, Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island, in his Official Capacity, and Lincoln C. Almond, Governor for the State of Rhode Island, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

323 F.Supp.2d 283

RHODE ISLAND MEDICAL SOCIETY; Pablo Rodriguez; Benjamin S. Vogel; and Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island, Plaintiffs, v. Sheldon WHITEHOUSE, Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island, in his Official Capacity, and Lincoln C. Almond, Governor for the State of Rhode Island, Defendants.

C.A. No. 97-416L.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

June 23, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lynette J. Labinger, Roney & Labinger, Providence, RI, Catherine Weiss, Louise Melling, Caitlin Borgmann, Talcott Camp, New York, NY, for plaintiffs.

Rebecca Tedford Partington, Providence, RI, for defendant.

Claire J.V. Richards, Providence, RI, for intervenor-defendant.

Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., Esq., Providence, RI, for movant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LAGUEUX, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on objections to the attached Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lovegreen, regarding his assessment of attorneys' fees properly due Plaintiffs as prevailing parties in the instant litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Following the appeal of this matter to the First Circuit, Plaintiffs, Rhode Island Medical Society, Pablo Rodriguez, Benjamin S. Vogel, and Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island, filed two motions for attorneys' fees and costs incurred during the course of this litigation in the District Court and on appeal. Plaintiffs' motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Lovegreen for preliminary review, findings, and a recommended disposition. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Local Rule 32(c). The magistrate judge held a hearing on these motions July 10, 2003, and after hearing argument and reviewing the written materials submitted, he made the following recommendations regarding Plaintiffs' motions for attorneys' fees and costs: (1) For legal work performed in the District Court, the ACLU-RFP attorneys (Attorneys Weiss, Borgmann, and Camp) were entitled to a total of $234,416.68 in fees and costs, and, as local counsel, Attorney Labinger was entitled to a total of $48,707.94. (2) For legal work performed in the First Circuit, the ACLU-RFP attorneys were entitled to a total of $36,000.73 in fees and costs. The magistrate judge recommended no compensation be awarded to Attorney Labinger for legal work performed at the appellate level. Thus, the magistrate judge recommended that Plaintiffs be awarded a grand total of $319,125.35 in attorneys' fees and costs.

Despite this large recommended award, Plaintiffs object to the magistrate judge's calculation of attorneys' fees on two grounds. First, Plaintiffs note that, in the course of evaluating the number of hours properly compensable under 42 U.S.C.1988, the magistrate judge eliminated 319.15 of the hours for which Plaintiffs' attorneys sought compensation for their work in this Court, and 162.51 of the hours for which Plaintiffs' attorneys sought compensation in the First Circuit. Plaintiffs object to the elimination of 183.07 hours in this Court and 85.83 hours eliminated for appellate work, arguing that these reductions were unjustified, and should be reinstated. Second, Plaintiffs' lead counsel from the ACLU-RFP based in New York City object to the magistrate judge's imposition of Rhode Island rates for their services. These out-of-state lawyers argue that New York rates are appropriate for their legal work on this case, and ask the Court to revise the award on this basis.

Review of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation is de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; Local Rule 32(c)(2). After reviewing the record, hearing argument on Plaintiffs' objections and considering the memoranda submitted by the parties, this Court adopts the disposition recommended by the magistrate judge, subject to one revision. As described further below, the Court reinstates 6.5 of the hours eliminated by the magistrate judge for time spent preparing four First Circuit status reports by Attorney Borgmann, because the claimed time, as now explained by Plaintiffs in their objection to the magistrate judge's recommendation, was both necessary and reasonable. However, this writer concludes that all of the magistrate judge's other recommended reductions and eliminations were warranted, and specifically adopts his determinations in this regard. In addition, the Court agrees with the magistrate judge that local Rhode Island rates are appropriate for the ACLU-RFP attorneys involved in this case, and, as further described herein, refuses to impose New York City rates for the services rendered by Attorneys Weiss, Borgmann, and Camp in this litigation.

I. Calculating Attorneys' Fees

In calculating the correct amount of attorneys' fees, district courts in this Circuit are required to employ the "lodestar" approach. Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 140 F.Supp.2d 111, 123 (D.Mass.2001); see also Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir.2001); Maceira v. Pagan, 698 F.2d 38, 39 (1st Cir.1983). Under this method, the district court must calculate the "lodestar," or the "reasonable hourly rate for each attorney and for the type of work he or she performed" and, after performing any necessary adjustments, multiply the adopted rate times the number of hours each attorney "reasonably worked" on the case, with the understanding that in some cases the number of hours reasonably spent on a case may be less than the number of hours actually worked. Maceira, 698 F.2d at 39 (noting that, under the lodestar approach, "[t]he final figure combines reasonably objective market factors with the court's own perception of the litigation"). The First Circuit has described the calculation as follows:

In implementing this lodestar approach, the judge calculates the time counsel spent on the case, subtracts duplicative, unproductive, or excessive hours, and then applies prevailing rates in the community (taking into account the qualifications, experience, and specialized competence of the attorneys involved).

Gay Officers, 247 F.3d at 295 (citing Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir.1992)).

Thus, when awarding attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, this Court must first determine the number of hours reasonably spent by each attorney in this litigation, eliminating any hours that are, in the Court's judgment, "duplicative, unproductive, or excessive," and then must multiply that figure times the reasonable hourly rate the court deems appropriate for such legal work. Id. Reasonable hourly rates have been defined as "prevailing rates in the community for comparably qualified attorneys." Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 937; Andrade v. Jamestown Housing Authority, 82 F.3d 1179, 1190 (1st Cir.1996). For purposes of attorneys' fees, the relevant community is usually where the court is located. Gay Officers, 247 F.3d at 296 (citing Adcock-Ladd v. Sec'y of Treas., 227 F.3d 343, 350 (6th Cir.2000)). As noted by the magistrate judge, the party requesting attorneys' fees bears the burden of providing sufficient documentation to the court to establish the hours and rates sought. Where the provided documentation is inadequate, "the district court may reduce the award accordingly." O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 77 F.Supp.2d 258, 263 (D.R.I.1999) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)); see also Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104 Acres of Land, 32 F.3d 632, 634 (1st Cir.1994). Utilizing the standard thus outlined, this writer now turns to the claimed fees at issue.

II. Reasonable Hours Spent

In calculating the number of compensable hours, it is the Court's function to ascertain the amount of time actually spent on the case by the attorneys involved, "and then subtract from that figure hours which were duplicative, unproductive, excessive or otherwise unnecessary." Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 937. In other words, the Court must compensate only for those hours that it finds reasonable, taking into account the nature of the litigation and the tasks performed by the attorneys.

Plaintiffs object to the magistrate judge's recommended hour reductions in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. As to the hours eliminated in the District Court, Plaintiffs lump their objections into two basic assertions as to where they allege the magistrate judge erred: (1) "Failure to recognize that preliminary injunction hearings (or depositions) were scheduled," and (2) "Failure to recognize the scope of reply necessary in second round preliminary injunction papers." Regarding hours the magistrate judge eliminated in the First Circuit, Plaintiffs base their objection on the magistrate judge's "[m]isunderstanding of the issue on appeal." These specific objections will be discussed in turn.

A. Eliminated Hours Prior to Scheduled Proceedings

Plaintiffs specifically object to three instances where the magistrate judge eliminated hours Attorneys Borgmann and Camp spent drafting practice questions and engaging in witness preparation prior to scheduled preliminary injunction hearings and/or depositions, which were later cancelled.¹ The total time objected to on this basis for work done in the District Court is 45 hours. Plaintiffs argue that the magistrate judge's eliminations were improper because he failed to comprehend that hearings and depositions were scheduled at the time the work was performed. Defendants argue that the described work was insufficiently described in Plaintiffs' affidavits and contemporaneous records to merit an award. In addition, Defendants argue that Attorney Borgmann's hours spent drafting practice hearing questions were unnecessary, as these questions had already been drafted for proceedings in previous litigation.

After reviewing the record, this writer concludes that these hours were properly eliminated by the magistrate judge because of Plaintiffs' incomplete billing records. As noted above, Plaintiffs, as those seeking attorneys fees, bear the burden of providing sufficient...