Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104 Acres of Land, More or Less, In Providence County, State of R.I.

• Decision Date: 04 April 1994
• Docket Number: 94-1283,Nos. 93-2126,s. 93-2126
• Citation: 32 F.3d 632
• Parties: TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 104 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, IN PROVIDENCE COUNTY, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, Defendant-Appellee, Walter R. and Clara J. Lawrence, Judith B. Moreau, et al., Defendants-Appellants. TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter R. LAWRENCE; Clara J. Lawrence; Judith B. Moreau, Defendants-Appellants. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 632

32 F.3d 632

TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 104 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, IN PROVIDENCE COUNTY, STATE

OF RHODE ISLAND, Defendant-Appellee,

Walter R. and Clara J. Lawrence, Judith B. Moreau, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter R. LAWRENCE; Clara J. Lawrence; Judith B. Moreau,

Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 93-2126, 94-1283.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard April 4, 1994.

Decided Aug. 24, 1994.

Morton L. Simons, with whom Barbara M. Simons, Simons & Simons, Robert S. Bruzzi and Law Office of Robert S. Bruzzi, Washington, DC, were on brief for appellants.

Paul M. Sanford, with whom Kathryn S. Holley, Christine M. Gravelle, Peter V. Lacouture and Tillinghast Collins & Graham, Washington, DC, were on brief for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, CYR and BOUDIN, Circuit Judges.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

Defendants Judith Moreau and Walter and Clara Lawrence ("the landowners") appeal the district court's thirty percent reduction of an award of attorneys' fees based upon a failure of the landowners' counsel to adequately document the charges. The landowners also appeal the district court's failure to include certain costs and prejudgment interest in the award, and the district court's denial of a subsequent fee application seeking reimbursement for fees and expenses incurred in prosecuting the initial fee application. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are set forth with greater detail in the district court's opinion regarding the principal fee application in Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104 Acres of Land, 828 F.Supp. 123 (D.R.I.1993). In 1986, plaintiff-appellee Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. ("Tennessee Gas") sought a certificate of public convenience from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") to allow Tennessee Gas to construct facilities for the transmission of natural gas on the landowners' property. In May 1989, FERC issued Tennessee Gas a conditional certificate for construction on the property. In December 1989 and February 1990, Tennessee Gas brought eminent domain proceedings in the district court against the landowners, seeking to obtain rights-of-way and a portion of their land in order to construct and maintain the natural gas pipeline. The landowners retained counsel to intervene in the FERC proceeding and requested FERC to modify its May 1989 certificate by rerouting the final leg of the proposed line to utilize existing rights-of-way. After proceedings in the district court and a proceeding before FERC, Tennessee Gas changed the route of its pipeline and dismissed the eminent domain proceedings against the landowners.

The landowners moved for costs and attorneys' fees, pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act ("Relocation Act"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4601 et seq. On August 25, 1993, the district court awarded the landowners attorneys' fees but disallowed thirty percent of the fees requested by the law firm of Simons & Simons ("Simons"), one of the two firms that represented the landowners, because it found that the firm failed to adequately document its charges. Tennessee Gas paid the fee award on September 7, 1993. On September 22, 1993, the landowners filed a supplemental fee application seeking reimbursement for fees and expenses incurred in prosecuting the principal fee application during the period from April 29, 1992, to March 1993. On September 24, 1993, the landowners filed a notice of appeal from the district court's order with respect to the principal fee application. On March 2, 1994, the district court entered judgment denying the supplemental fee petition because the court determined that the petition was untimely. The landowners appealed the March 2 order. In April, this court ordered that both appeals be consolidated.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Reduction in Attorneys' Fees

The landowners sought an award of costs and attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4654 which provides that in a condemnation action abandoned by the condemnor, the court "shall award" the property owner "such sums as will in the opinion of the court reimburse such owner for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney ... fees, actually incurred because of the condemnation proceedings." The landowners contend that because Section 4654 uses the mandatory language "shall award," an award of attorneys' fees under this section is not discretionary, and a landowner's computation of hours should be accepted even if there is insufficient documentation absent a specific showing of abuse. We disagree.

Section 4654 provides for the reimbursement of "reasonable" costs and fees. This Court's opinions "have left reasonably open the question of precisely how the judge ascertains the number of hours reasonably expended" by counsel on a case in which attorneys' fees are sought. United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Com., 847 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1988) (internal quotations and citation omitted). "What we expect the trial court to do is make concrete findings, supply a clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award, and most of all, retain a sense of overall proportion." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, we review the district court's fee award for abuse of discretion. Foley v. Lowell, 948 F.2d 10 (1st Cir.1991).

The district court indicated that it would employ the lodestar analysis in determining the reasonableness of the fee applications. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 828 F.Supp. at 128. "If an alternative method is not expressly dictated by applicable law, we have customarily found it best to calculate fees by means of the [lodestar] time and rate method...." Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 526 (1st Cir.1991). Because Section 4654 does not dictate an alternative method to calculate fees, the district court's use of the lodestar method was proper.

Where a district court applies the lodestar method, the fee-seeker must usually provide a particularized account of his claim. Id. at 527. "[T]he absence of detailed contemporaneous time records, except in extraordinary circumstances, will call for a substantial reduction in any award or, in egregious cases, disallowance." Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir.1984). In order for litigants to receive fee awards, this court has required that they submit "a full and specific accounting of the tasks performed, the dates of performance, and the number of hours spent on each task." Weinberger, 925 F.2d at 527 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The district court found that the Simons' time sheets were not sufficiently detailed to enable the court to determine whether the fees were excessive or duplicative. The district court stated that "[t]he time summaries are replete with time charges for such matters as 'Confer with co-counsel,' 'Confer with client,' 'Review materials,' 'Review documents,' and 'Legal Research' without any indication of the subject matter involved." The district court explained that in addition to making it impossible for the court to gage whether the task performed was warranted, the failure to include some description of the subject matter of the task made it impossible to determine if the time factor allocated was appropriate or excessive. The district court also found that discrepancies in Simons' submissions raised questions as to their accuracy and whether such records were kept contemporaneously. The district court clearly explained its findings and the court was justified in reducing the fee award. The court did not abuse its discretion...