Rhodes v. Michigan
| Decision Date | 28 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2:17-CV-12416-TGB |
| Parties | KELLY JANE RHODES, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Kelly Jane Rhodes, a prisoner at the Women's Huron Valley Correctional Facility in Ypsilanti, Michigan, suffered serious physical injuries when an industrial laundry cart fell on her while working as a laundry porter. Plaintiff claims that the officers assisting her in unloading the laundry cart on October 15, 2015 failed to train her about the hazardous requirements of working as a laundry porter, failed to supervise her, failed to communicate with each other while a laundry cart was being lowered from a truck, and failed to warn Plaintiff as an approximately 400-pound industrial laundry cart was flung from the truck and struck Plaintiff on the head. Although the record is undisputed that Plaintiff suffered serious injuries, the question is whether the conduct of the officers violated Plaintiff's clearly established Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because the negligent or arguably reckless acts alleged here do not rise to the level of a clearly established constitutional violation, Court will GRANT Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff has been incarcerated at the Women's Huron Valley Correction Facility (WHVCF) since May 2013. In October 2015 she was assigned to work for the Michigan Department of Correction ("MDOC")'s laundry services. As a "laundry porter" Plaintiff and other prisoners were responsible for loading and unloading semi-trucks using heavy institutional laundry carts filled with used and clean linens. An MDOC employee (Defendant Richard Jones) operated the semi-truck, and another MDOC employee (Defendant Paul McPherson) operated a hydraulic lift gate and the safety mechanisms on the lift gate so that the laundry carts could be loaded on and unloaded from the semi-truck. Jones Deposition, ECF No. 55-4, PageID.677.
The accident happened on October 15, 2015, which was Plaintiff's second day working as a laundry porter. ECF No. 55-2, PageID.632. She worked alongside two other prisoners, Anthernett Thomas and Tabitha Parker. On that morning, Defendant Jones arrived with a truck full of clean laundry carts.1 He positioned the truck for unloading and the back door of the truck was raised. Defendant Jones, Defendant McPherson, Plaintiff, and Thomas all testified that in the usual course, Defendant Jones would push or pull two laundry carts to the back of the truck (one at a time) and place them on a hydraulic lift gate that was attached to the back of the truck. Two laundry porters would meet Defendant Jones at the back of the cart and steady the laundry carts with their hands. Defendant Jones would "guide" the laundry carts on to the lift gate and ensure that the laundry porters had control of the laundry carts before letting go. Defendant Jones would then signal to Defendant McPherson who operated the hydraulic lift gate and McPherson would shout "ready." Then McPherson would operate the hydraulic lift gate carrying the two full laundry carts and lower them to the ground. The laundry porters were expected to "catch" or "steady" or "guide" the laundry carts as they were lowered. Once they were lowered, a third laundry porter would wheel the carts away and bring them into the prison. Thomas Deposition, ECF No. 55-3, PageID.664-66; Jones Deposition, ECF No. 55-4, PageID.678, 680, 682; McPherson Deposition, ECF No. 55-5, PageID.721, 723, 737; Rhodes Deposition, ECF No. 55-2, PageID.639-40.
On October 15, after approximately seven laundry carts had already been lowered from the truck, Plaintiff and another porter2 were waiting at the back of the truck to unload two more laundry carts full of clean laundry. At that moment, according to the complaint, Jones "pushed" a laundry cart out such that it "rolled out of the truck, onto the lift gate, and off onto Plaintiff's head and neck area." ECF No. 29, PageID.231. The laundry cart struck Plaintiff in the head and landed on top of her legs. Several officers radioed for assistance and Plaintiff was taken by ambulance to a hospital in Ann Arbor. Plaintiff suffered traumatic brain injury, a fractured skull, internal cranial bleeding, fractured nasal bones, and lacerations to her face and scalp.
Plaintiff thereafter brought the underlying lawsuit against the State of Michigan, the Michigan Department of Corrections, MDOC employees Richard Jones, Paul McPherson, Sonal Patel, the warden of WHVCF, and various supervising correctional officers at WHVCF and with the Michigan State Industries ("MSI") prisoner work program. See Original Complaint, ECF No. 1. She alleged federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of violations of the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process, as well as state law claims for gross negligence, negligent operation of a government-owned vehicle, violation of the Michigan No-Fault Act and battery. The Michigan Department of Corrections and the State of Michigan were dismissed without prejudice by stipulation of the parties. See ECF No. 16. And Plaintiff's state law claims were dismissed with prejudice. See ECF No. 51. Only Plaintiff's federal claims arising under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment survive. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. ECF No. 48. Plaintiff responded. ECF No. 55. At the hearing on Defendants' motion, Plaintiff agreed to voluntarily dismiss the following individual defendants: Glen Garbinski, Sonal Patel, Stephanie Jackson, Shontel Barnes, Tonya Allen, and Norman Laughlin. After these voluntary dismissals, the remaining defendants are Paul McPherson and Richard Jones.
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations omitted); Redding v. St. Edward, 241 F.3d 530, 531 (6th Cir. 2001).
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party carries this burden, the party opposing the motion "must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The trial court is not required to "search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989). Rather, the "nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact." In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court must then determine whether the evidence presents a sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the challenged claims to the trier of fact or whether the moving party must prevail as a matter of law. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Jones and McPherson violated her Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment and for "fail[ing] to protect" her given their special, custodial relationship. ECF No. 55, PageID.616-22. As governmental officials acting within the scope of their duty, Jones and McPherson have claimed they are protected by qualified immunity. ECF No. 48, PageID.476-81. "Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense shielding governmental officials from liability as long as their conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Cartwright v. City of Marine City, 336 F.3d 487, 490 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is traditionally a two-step inquiry where courts must determine "whether the plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutionally protected right" and whether that right is so "clearly established" that a "reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that Jones and McPherson are not entitled to qualified immunity. Cartwright, 336 F.3d at 491.
To bring a claim under the Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishments" provision, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test that encompasses an objective element and a subjective element. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991). The objective element asks whether the deprivation the plaintiff experienced was sufficiently serious. Id. The subjective element asks whether the defendant officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. In cases challenging prison conditions, the culpable state of mind is deliberate indifference. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); see also Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 646 (7th Cir. 1997) (). "[A]cting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk...
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