Rhodes v. Regents of the Univ. of N.M.
| Decision Date | 20 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-01128 JCH/SMV |
| Parties | DAVID RHODES, Plaintiff, v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO, GARNETT S. STOKES, Individually, and MITZI M. MONTOYA, Individually. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Garnett S. Stokes and Mitzi M. Montoya's (collectively, “Individual Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims Against the Individual Defendants (ECF No. 10). The Individual Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff David Rhodes's claim that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. Because the law has not clearly established that the Individual Defendants' acts were unconstitutional the Court will grant the motion.
On a motion to dismiss, a federal court generally assesses “the legal sufficiency of the allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint.” Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2008). If the court is presented with but does not exclude matters outside of the pleadings, then the court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The court has broad discretion to accept or reject materials beyond the pleadings. See Lowe v. Town of Fairland 143 F.3d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir. 1998). And the court need not convert the motion to one for summary judgment if the court considers documents that are referred to in the complaint, indisputably authentic, and central to the plaintiff's claim. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1072 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2005)).
Turning to the complaint, the court “should disregard all conclusory statements of law and consider whether the remaining specific factual allegations, if assumed to be true, plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). The complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” but “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In addition to assuming the truth of the specific factual allegations, the court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and allow all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Archuleta, 523 F.3d at 1283.
Defendant Regents of the University of New Mexico (“UNM”) hired David Rhodes as a technical analyst in January 2018. Compl. ¶ 1 (ECF No. 1-1). A year and a half later, in June 2019, UNM placed Rhodes on administrative leave. Id. ¶ 11. And three months after that, in September 2019, UNM terminated Rhodes “without cause.” Id. ¶ 1. UNM justified the termination by claiming that Rhodes had attempted to lessen the seriousness of his criminal history. See id. ¶ 11.
Rhodes timely appealed the decision to a Peer Review Committee (“the Peer Committee”). Id. ¶ 12. The Peer Committee held a hearing in November 2020. Id. Then, in January 2021, the Peer Committee reversed the dismissal and ordered Rhodes to be reinstated. Id. ¶ 13.
In February 2021, UNM President Garnett Stokes and UNM Vice President of Human Resources Dorothy Anderson met to discuss Rhodes's termination and the decision of the Peer Committee. Id. ¶ 19. Rhodes also suggests that Dean Mitzi Montoya met with President Stokes. See id. ¶ 5. President Stokes and Dean Montoya neither reinstated Rhodes nor explained their refusal to do so. Id. ¶ 20.
Instead, Dean Montoya appealed the Peer Committee's decision to President Stokes on February 28, 2021. Id. ¶ 13. On March 28, 2021, Rhodes responded by asserting that Dean Montoya did not have the authority to appeal the Peer Committee's decision. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16. Rhodes renewed his objection and demanded reinstatement in a June 9, 2021, letter from his attorney. Id. ¶ 14. Rhodes did not receive a reply to his March response or his June letter. Id. He remained without reinstatement. Id.
So, on October 12, 2021, Rhodes filed a complaint in the New Mexico Second Judicial District Court. Id. at 1. Along with state-law claims against UNM, see id. ¶¶ 10-28, Rhodes brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that President Stokes and Dean Montoya violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. See id. ¶¶ 29-50. UNM and the Individual Defendants filed a notice of removal to this Court on November 24, 2021. Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1). The Individual Defendants then moved to dismiss Rhodes's constitutional claim based on qualified immunity. See Mot. to Dismiss 2 (ECF No. 10).[1]
To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff has the burden to show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (emphasis added). A court may generally “address the two prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis in either order.” Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10th Cir. 2019); see Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 707 (2011). In certain circumstances, however, the Tenth Circuit instructs courts to grant qualified immunity based only on the second prong. See Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1180-81 (10th Cir. 2011). Three of these circumstances exist when “deciding the constitutional question requires ‘an uncertain interpretation of state law,'” when “‘qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage' and ‘the precise factual basis for the . . . claim . . . may be hard to identify,'” and when “it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a right.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237, 238 (2009)).
As for the second prong, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant's conduct “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231). A right is “clearly established” if there is “an on-point Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision establishing the unlawfulness of the alleged conduct” or if “the clearly established weight of authority from other courts supports the plaintiffs' assertions about the state of the law.” Hunt v. Montano, 39 F.4th 1270, 1284 (10th Cir. 2022).
Put another way, the “salient question” is whether contemporaneous law gave defendants fair warning that their treatment of the plaintiff was unconstitutional. Id. Previous cases need not be precisely on point or even “fundamentally similar” to put an official on notice. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002); see Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1289 (10th Cir. 2019). At the same time, a court's inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam)).
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To prove a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process, Rhodes must show (1) that a state actor deprived him of a liberty or property interest, and (2) that Rhodes did not receive constitutionally sufficient procedures. Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). The Individual Defendants concede that Rhodes had a property interest in his employment. See Mot. to Dismiss 6 (ECF No. 10). Thus, Rhodes must show that the Individual Defendants terminated his employment without constitutionally sufficient procedures.
A public employer usually must offer “‘some kind of a hearing' prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 546 (1985) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972)) (“The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.”). If the pre-termination hearing meets only minimum constitutional requirements, then the employee must receive “a full-blown, adversarial post-termination hearing, held at a meaningful time.” Calhoun v. Gaines, 982 F.2d 1470, 1477 (10th Cir. 1992).
Rhodes claims that the Individual Defendants did not provide him “with any meaningful pre or post termination hearing.” Compl. ¶ 38 (ECF No. 1-1). But Rhodes does not provide specific facts about the constitutional inadequacy of the pre-termination procedures. See id. Nor does Rhodes make any legal arguments about the pre-termination procedures in his response to this motion. See Pl.'s Resp. (ECF No. 14).
The Court will thus disregard Rhodes's claim about the inadequacy of pre-termination procedures. The claim is a legal conclusion that is unsupported by specific factual allegations. See Collins, 656 F.3d at 1214. In addition, Rhodes waived the issue of pre-termination inadequacy by “failing to make any argument or cite any authority to support his assertion.” United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1492 (10th Cir. 1996).
As for the inadequacy of post-termination procedures, however Rhodes advances four reasons why the Individual Defendants failed their constitutional obligations. First, Rhodes asserts that President Stokes violated Rhodes's right to an...
To continue reading
Request your trial