Rhodes v. Spartanburg County, 19860

• Decision Date: 16 July 1974
• Docket Number: No. 19860,19860
• Citation: 207 S.E.2d 85,262 S.C. 644
• Parties: Elizabeth Frances RHODES, Appellant, v. SPARTANBURG COUNTY, Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 85

207 S.E.2d 85

262 S.C. 644

Elizabeth Frances RHODES, Appellant, v. SPARTANBURG COUNTY, Respondent.

No. 19860.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 16, 1974.

Patrick E. Knie, Morre, Stoddard & Sanders, Spartanburg, for appellant.

Rembert D. Parler, Spartanburg, for respondent.

BRAILSFORD, Justice:

In this action for damages arising from an automobile collision, the defendant conceded liability, and the parties stipulated to property damage of $3000.00. The jury was instructed to separate the amount of damages awarded for loss of earnings from that awarded for personal injury generally. The verdict was for plaintiff, '(T)hree thousand dollars property damage, and two thousand eighty-seven dollars for personal injury, and one thousand two hundred dollars loss of income.' Plaintiff, who at the time of her injury was a twenty-one-year-old co-ed at the University of South Carolina in Spartanburg, has appealed on four exceptions. Respondent raises two preliminary procedural questions which will be disposed of first.

The proposed case and exceptions served upon respondent consisted of a statement and four exceptions. The respondent served upon appellant a proposed amendment substituting a new statement for the one served, which was disallowed by appellant. Pursuant to Rule 4, Section 7, the case was submitted to the trial judge for settlement. The court allowed the substitution of the statement proposed by respondent, and also granted appellant's request to be allowed to print the pleadings and transcript of the trial which, apparently, had been omitted from the case as originally served by inadvertence. Respondent complains that the court exceeded its authority by allowing the insertion into the case for appeal of the pleadings and transcript which had not been served on respondent within the time allowed; and contends that so much of the order as went beyond the allowance of the respondent's proposed amendment was a nullity. We disagree. The notice by which the matter got before the judge is not included in the transcript. However, by the terms of Rule 4, Section 7, 'the case (was) submitted to (him) for settlement.' Upon such submission, the judge 'can allow so much of the case proposed, or amendments as he sees fit, or he can make a report of the whole case himself, and we are bound by whatever case the judge makes. It is his duty to give some settlement and report in order that the cause may be heard on appeal.' Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. Martin, 118 S.C. 319, 110 S.E. 804, 805 (1921). See also the well considered opinion by the present Chief Justice in South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Meredith, 241 S.C. 306, 128 S.E.2d 179 (1962), and the authorities therein reviewed.

There can be no doubt that the subject matter before the trial judge was the settlement of the case for appeal nor that he had jurisdiction of it. He issued an order settling the case from which no appeal has been taken. The parties and this Court are bound by the case so made.

Respondent next urges that the appeal be dismissed for failure of any of the four exceptions to comply with Rule 4, Section 6. Exception oen assigns as error the admission of evidence as to payments made to appellant by her employer during the period of her alleged disability, in violation of the collateral source rule. Exception two charges that the jduge erred in refusing to instruct the jury concerning this rule. In the light of Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759 (1967), and the body of law concerning this rule from other jurisdictions, Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 516, 522 (1966), the point made by these exceptions seems abundantly clear. We find no merit in exceptions 3 and 4, and, since neither contains a complete assignment of error, we overrule them without discussion.

Plaintiff's automobile was struck from behind on May 8, 1972. She was hospitalized on that day and discharged on May 12. Initial x-rays were negative, but a fracture of the fifth metatarsal of the foot was discovered later. She suffered headache and other pains and was nervous and upset. Her injuries, in addition to the fracture, were diagnosed as 'whiplash of the neck, contusions of the forehead, contusions of the right elbow, right knee, and left ankle.' A collar was placed on her neck which she wore until August 14. Upon her discharge from the hospital, appellant continued under her doctor's care. She made seven...