Rhodes v. State
| Decision Date | 09 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 44583,44583 |
| Citation | 257 Ga. 368,359 S.E.2d 670 |
| Parties | RHODES v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Samuel J. Brantley, The Brantley Group, Hinesville, for Otis rhodes.
Dupont K. Cheney, Dist. Atty., Hinesville, J. Stephen Archer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Eddie Snelling, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Otis Rhodes shot and killed Reginald Cromedy with a handgun. Rhodes appeals his conviction of malice murder. 1
1. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Rhodes assigns error to the trial court's refusal to give his requested charges on involuntary manslaughter under OCGA § 16-5-3(a) (misdemeanor-manslaughter) and OCGA § 16-5-3(b) (), and on self-defense. He contends that he was acting in response to a perceived threat and that, at worst, his act of pointing of a pistol at Cromedy was a misdemeanor.
3. A dispute arose concerning the positioning of Cromedy's car, in that it partially blocked Rhodes' passage. Rhodes testified: (It should be noted that the jury was charged on Rhodes' theory of accidental shooting.)
The record contains no evidence of a verbal threat made by Cromedy to Rhodes. There was testimony that Cromedy said he could "get out of the car and discuss this like a man," whereupon Cromedy exited his car and "reached for" Rhodes, but after Cromedy saw Rhodes' handgun, he re-entered his automobile. These acts, standing alone, do not constitute a sufficient threat to render the pointing of a loaded pistol at another a lawful act of self-defense.
4. Rhodes contends that his use of the pistol was the misdemeanor of pointing a firearm at another, and not the felony of aggravated assault. Under OCGA § 16-11-102, a person who "intentionally and without legal justification points or aims a gun or pistol at another" commits a misdemeanor. Under OCGA §§ 16-5-20(a)(2) and 21(a)(2), a person who, using a deadly weapon, commits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury commits the felony of aggravated assault. These provisions present, at first glance, an apparent conflict, in that the pointing a firearm is, in itself, frequently an aggravated assault.
Prior to the adoption of the Criminal Code in 1968, Code Ann. § 26-2908 read: "Any person who points or aims a gun or pistol, whether loaded or unloaded, at another, not in a sham battle by the military and not in self-defense or in defense of habitation, property, or person, or other instances standing upon like footing of reason or justice, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The present statute, OCGA § 16-11-102, provides: "A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he, intentionally and without legal justification, points or aims a gun or pistol at another, whether the gun or pistol is loaded or unloaded." It is seen that the substance of the new statute contains essentially the same elements as the old. There has been a substantial change, however, in the definition of aggravated assault, as defined in the Criminal Code. Before 1968, simple assault was defined as "an attempt to commit a violent injury on another." Code Ann. § 26-1301 (now OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1)). Aggravated assault then was defined as an assault with intent to murder, rape, or rob. Code Ann. § 26-1302(a)(1) (now OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(1)). There was no analog to OCGA §§ 16-5-20(a)(2) or 21(a)(2). Thus, pointing a firearm at another without legal justification and without intent to murder, rape, or rob was always a misdemeanor, whether or not the victim was apprehensive of being injured. The 1968 codification included Code Ann. §§ 26-1301(a)(2) and 26-1302(a)(2), now codified as OCGA §§ 16-5-20(a)(2) and 21(a)(2), and established that the use of a deadly weapon in such manner as to place another in reasonable apprehension of immediate...
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Patterson v. State
...533 S.E.2d 374 (2000). And, this Court has previously addressed the genesis of OCGA § 16–5–20 (a) (2), observing in Rhodes v. State , 257 Ga. 368, 369, 359 S.E.2d 670 (1987), that in enacting OCGA § 16–5–20 (a) (2) in 1968, the General Assembly effected “a substantial change ... in the defi......
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Dunagan v. State
...the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury, the felony of aggravated assault has occurred." Rhodes v. State, 257 Ga. 368, 370(5), 359 S.E.2d 670 (1987). See also Gilbert v. State, 209 Ga.App. 483, 484(1), 433 S.E.2d 664 (1993). These cases recognize that pursuant to t......
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Beeman v. United States
...person in "reasonable apprehension" of an immediate violent injury. See O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-20(a), 16-5-21(a) (1990); Rhodes v. State, 257 Ga. 368, 359 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1987). As Georgia courts have explained, "reasonable apprehension" is determined based solely on the victim’s viewpoint, with......
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State v. Harlacher, A15A1856.
...for attempted aggravated assault.21 Accordingly, until such time as the Supreme Court of Georgia clarifies the extent of its holding in Rhodes, we are obliged to rule that the trial court did not err in granting Harlacher's general demurrer.Judgment affirmed.ELLINGTON, P.J., concurs.McFADDE......