Rhodes v. Turner

Decision Date23 April 1943
Docket NumberNo. 14481.,14481.
Citation171 S.W.2d 208
PartiesRHODES v. TURNER et al.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Appeal from County at Law No. 2, Tarrant County; Thomas J. Renfro, Judge.

Suit by J. L. Turner against T. C. Rhodes to recover for damages sustained when the plaintiff's automobile was stolen while in a parking lot operated by the defendant, wherein the Home Insurance Company intervened. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

McGown, McGown, Godfrey & Logan and John M. Scott, Jr., all of Fort Worth, for appellant.

W. L. Coley, of Fort Worth, for appellee J. L. Turner.

Callaway, Wade & Davis, of Fort Worth, for Home Ins. Co., intervener.

BROWN, Justice.

On July 12, 1941, appellee, J. L. Turner, drove his automobile to a public parking lot that was conducted by appellant, T. C. Rhodes, and, as was the custom, delivered his car to a negro employee who worked at the said lot, and the said employee took the car and parked it at some place on the lot and gave Turner the customary claim check or parking ticket which served to identify the delivered car.

As was also the custom and practice, after Turner left the car and went with his family to visit a place of amusement, the negro attendant moved the car to another position on the lot, leaving it facing one of the two public streets that bound the parking lot and at a place where there was no barrier or obstruction of any kind to prevent the car from being driven from the lot and into the street and away, the keys having been left in the ignition lock.

When Turner and his family came back to claim the car, the said negro employee took the claim check, or ticket, and the customary fee for parking the car and after going over the premises announced to Turner that he could not locate the car. The negro told Turner that he had parked the car at a certain spot just about thirty minutes before Turner called for it, showed him the vacant place where he said he had parked the car and said that he did not know what became of it.

Turner, who does not live in the City of Fort Worth, where the parking lot is maintained, made a number of trips to Fort Worth and to Dallas in search of the car. It was finally located in Laurel, Mississippi, and Turner went to such place and found a man incarcerated there who admitted that he stole the car from the said parking lot.

The car had been driven more than 6,000 miles since it was taken from the parking lot.

Turner had insurance on the car, and the insurance carrier paid him the sum of $114.02, which was the estimate made by one of the automobile sales and service companies of Fort Worth, as the amount necessary to repair the damage done to the car in the interim.

Turner brought suit against Rhodes and alleged the fact of the ownership of the parking lot, its conduct by defendant, the delivery of the car to defendant's employee, the payment of the parking fee, and that the entire length of the lot fronting on the south line of Sixth Street was kept open, without any rail or barrier being provided at such side of the lot, and that it was maintained so that an automobile could be readily driven in and upon and out and from such lot at any and all points along its said front side with ease and convenience, and that the same conditions exist as to the east line of such lot for more than one-half of its length.

The allegations of the petition are sufficient to set forth a contract of bailment for hire, and plaintiff pleaded that it was the duty of the defendant and his employee in charge of the premises to use and exercise reasonable care and diligence to protect the automobile from damage, theft, pilferage or other injury and to redeliver the same to him in as good condition as said car was when it was delivered to the defendant, but that the defendant failed and neglected to keep proper watch over and care for the car and as a consequence of the negligence and carelessness of defendant, plaintiff's car was taken from the parking lot or driven away without the defendant's employee, to whom it had been delivered, knowing what became of it.

He further alleged that his car was a 1941 Chevrolet sedan, with serial number AA94379 and six cylinders, was in good condition and of the value of $975; that he recovered the auto 30 days after it was taken and found that it had been driven more than 6,000 miles since it was taken from him and that its parts had been damaged and worn (as shown by an exhibit attached to his petition and made a part thereof) in the estimated value of $115; that merchandise and personal property left in the car of value of $21.59 had been lost or disposed of; and that he had expended much valuable time and money in an effort to find and recover his car, which was shown by the exhibit to his petition and made a part of same.

He prayed for a recovery of all these detailed items and others not necessary to mention.

The exhibit is itemized and is assuredly sufficient to put the defendant on notice of what the plaintiff expects to prove and is attempting to recover.

No special exceptions to the petitions of the plaintiff and intervener appear to have been presented and acted upon.

The defendant set forth a general denial, and specially pleaded that it was his custom, in keeping with the usual and customary business practice incident to the operation of a parking business, to issue a check, or claim ticket, to each person who delivers a car to defendant for parking; but that he does not assume the responsibility for the care and safe-keeping of automobiles or of personal property left in cars, and that he only offers the public the easement and privilege of occupying a part of his premises for a nominal charge, which is fifteen cents when the car is parked for three hours, or less, and twenty-five cents where it is parked more than three hours and less than twenty-four hours; that he delivered to plaintiff the customary claim check which had plainly written upon it the following: "Not responsible in case of fire, theft or for articles left in car"; that plaintiff accepted such claim check and therefore he then and there entered into a valid and binding contract whereby the defendant's liability in connection with the car was expressly limited to the furnishing of a place for parking it, but without any liability, expressed or implied, in the event the car was stolen.

The cause was tried to the court, a jury being waived by all parties, and the court found for plaintiff and rendered judgment of recovery for three pleaded items, viz.: $21.50 for loss of the items of personal property left in the car; $60 for loss of time and expenses necessarily used by plaintiff in searching for the car; and $114.02 for the use and benefit of intervener, Home Insurance Company, to reimburse such intervener for the sum paid by it to plaintiff under the terms of the insurance contract.

Rhodes having appealed contends in his brief that there are three issues, viz.: (1) There was no evidence showing negligence, since the evidence does not show how the car was taken from the lot; (2) that the proof positively shows that the car could have been removed whether the defendant was or was not negligent, and therefore the act of negligence was not, as a matter of law, the proximate cause of the damage; and (3) there is no competent proof of the elements of damages found by the trial court.

As relating to the first issue, in point one the appellant asserts that there is no evidence in the record tending in any way to show whether or not his employee kept a proper lookout for the safety of the car and the finding of negligence is not supported by a scintilla of evidence.

We see no merit in the contention. The testimony shows that on one entire side of this parking lot, it is maintained without rails or barriers of any kind and so constructed that cars may be driven into the lot and from it at any point or place and onto the adjoining public street, and that one-half of another side of the lot is similarly maintained and constructed.

It is testified to that there was only one person on duty at the lot; that the attendant not only left the ignition key in the auto lock but that when the attendant could not locate the car, he told the plaintiff he had moved it about thirty minutes before it was called for, and he had placed it next to the street, where the evidence shows it was easily driven from the lot by any one who cared to drive it off, and the attendant pointed out the exact spot where he said he had parked it; the place at that time being unoccupied by any car.

The testimony shows that the defendant owns and operates another parking lot just across the street from the one involved in this suit.

Rhodes testified that it was the duty of his attendant "to take care of cars when they went in there, to park them and protect them so far as they could protect them at all times". At another time he testified that the negro attendant's duties were "to park cars, get out cars when the customers come, and to watch the lot".

The testimony shows that it was defendant's theory that the car was stolen and the subsequent facts prove that his theory was correct. He even advanced the theory that some soldier had taken the car and said that this was being done and that doubtless the car would be found in another parking place, or abandoned on the street at some place.

Appellant seems to contend that it was the duty of the plaintiff to account for the whereabouts and actions of the negro employee, from the time he says he last parked the car, at a particular place, up and until the owner called for his car.

We see no merit in the contention; and we see no merit in the second point urged under the second issue raised, to the effect that the evidence discloses that the thief could have slipped into...

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  • McAshan v. Cavitt
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • May 17, 1950
    ...protect the automobile from theft. Exporters' & Traders' Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Schulze, Tex.Com.App., 265 S.W. 133; Rhodes v. Turner, Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W.2d 208; Rhodes v. McDonald, 141 Tex. 478, 172 S.W.2d 972; Ablon v. Hawker, Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W.2d 265; Direct Navigation Co. v.......
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    ...over appellee's automobile, or cause door, shutters or barriers installed. Then, again the majority cites the case of Rhodes v. Turner, Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W.2d 208, 210, as being "very much akin" to the case at bar. It will be seen in the cited opinion that Turner and Rhodes were bailor an......
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    • Texas Supreme Court
    • February 5, 1975
    ...our own state. See cases collected in 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 50, n. 87; 6 Am.Jur. (Rev.Ed.), Bailments § 371, n. 17; Rhodes v. Turner, Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W.2d 208, mandamus to certify questions refused in Rhodes v. McDonald, 141 Tex. 478, 172 S.W.2d 972; Callihan v. Montrief, Tex.Civ.App., 7......
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