State v. Maestas

• Citation: 298 Kan. 765,316 P.3d 724
• Decision Date: 24 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 106,214.,106,214.
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Michael MAESTAS, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Kansas

298 Kan. 765

316 P.3d 724

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Michael MAESTAS, Appellant.

No. 106,214.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Jan. 24, 2014.

Syllabus by the Court

1. An appellate court reviews a prosecutorial misconduct claim alleging improper comments using a two-step analysis. First, the appellate court decides whether the comments were outside the wide latitude a prosecutor is allowed, e.g., in discussing evidence. If so, there was misconduct. Second, if misconduct is found, the appellate court determines whether the improper comments prejudiced the jury against the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial.

2. Prosecutors are given wide latitude in the language and manner of presentation during closing arguments, but those arguments must remain consistent with the evidence. If they are not, the first prong of the prosecutorial misconduct test is met and on appellate review the court must consider whether the misstatement prejudiced the jury against the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial.

3. A prosecutor may commit misconduct by making an improper comment, even when that improper comment is prompted by, or made in response to, arguments or statements by defense counsel.

4. Appellate courts consider three factors in determining when prosecutorial misconduct so prejudiced a jury against a defendant that a new trial should be granted: (a) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (b) whether the misconduct showed ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (c) whether the evidence against the defendant was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the jurors' minds. And while none of these factors individually controls, and before the third factor can override the first two, an appellate court must be able to say the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60–261 and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), have been met.

5. When both the constitutional and nonconstitutional error clearly arise from the same acts and omissions, an appellate court begins with a harmlessness analysis of the constitutional error. If the constitutional error is reversible, an appellate court need not analyze whether the lower standard for harmlessness under K.S.A. 60–261 also has been met. Under both standards, the party benefiting from the error bears the burden of demonstrating harmlessness.

6. A district judge has a duty to instruct on any lesser included offense established by the evidence, even if that evidence is weak or inconclusive. But there is no duty to instruct on a lesser included offense if the jury could not reasonably convict the defendant on that lesser included offense based on the evidence presented.

7. K.S.A. 22–3219(1) provides that evidence of mental disease or defect excluding criminal responsibility is not admissible unless the defendant serves on the prosecuting attorney and files with the court written notice asserting that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged as a result of mental disease or defect.

8. A defendant is entitled to present his or her theory of defense. The exclusion of evidence that is an integral part of that theory violates a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial. But the right to present a defense is subject to statutory rules and caselaw interpreting the rules of evidence and procedure.

9. K.S.A. 21–4634 precludes imposing any mandatory term of imprisonment for premeditated first-degree murder on a defendant who is mentally retarded as defined by the statute. If the district court, upon request, initially finds sufficient reason to believe the defendant is mentally retarded, the court must order an examination of the defendant by two licensed physicians or licensed psychologists, or one of each, and conduct a hearing. The defendant has a right to present evidence and cross-examine any witnesses at that hearing.

10. A district court's finding that a defendant is mentally retarded must be based on the definition set out in K.S.A. 21–4634(f), the defendant's court-ordered examinations, and the evidentiary hearing. The district court's decision whether a defendant is mentally retarded for the purposes of K.S.A. 21–4634 is reviewed by an appellate court for an abuse of discretion.

11. A court of last resort will follow the rule of law it established in its earlier cases unless clearly convinced that rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent.

12. K.S.A. 22–3430 authorizes a district court to commit a defendant convicted of a felony to the state security hospital or any state or county institution provided for the reception, care, treatment, and maintenance of mentally ill persons in lieu of imprisonment when a court-ordered examination prepared in accordance with K.S.A. 22–3429 shows: (a) The defendant is in need of psychiatric care and treatment; (b) such treatment may materially aid in the defendant's rehabilitation; and (c) the defendant and society are not likely to be endangered by permitting the defendant to receive such psychiatric care and treatment in lieu of confinement or imprisonment.

13. A district court's decision whether to commit a defendant convicted of a felony to the state security hospital or any state or county institution provided for the reception, care, treatment, and maintenance of mentally ill persons under K.S.A. 22–3430 is reviewed by an appellate court for an abuse of discretion. Prior caselaw holding that a decision refusing to commit the defendant was not reviewable on appeal is overruled. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 255 Kan. 680, 692–93, 877 P.2d 946 (1994); State v. Adkins, 236 Kan. 259, 261, 689 P.2d 880 (1984).

Christina M. Kerls, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Paul F. Kitzke, county attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BILES, J.:

Michael Maestas, Jr., appeals from a first-degree premeditated murder conviction rendered after he admitted stabbing his mother to death. He advances five issues: (1) prosecutorial misconduct; (2) the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense of reckless second-degree murder; (3) alleged infringement on his right to present his defense; (4) the district court's determination for sentencing purposes that he was not “ mentally retarded” under K.S.A. 21–4634; and (5) the district court's refusal to commit Maestas to the state security hospital rather than prison under K.S.A. 22–3430. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On August 1, 2009, Maestas placed a 911 call requesting an ambulance at the Hugoton, Kansas, residence he shared with his mother, Lorenza. Maestas told the operator he got carried away, went into Lorenza's bedroom with a knife, and stabbed her. He said she was still breathing. While the call remained connected, Officer Marvin Johnson arrived. Maestas said, “Can you come in please?” Maestas then said, “[Unintelligible] stabbed my mom,” and, “[S]he's over here.”

Maestas was interviewed by a Stevens County Sheriff's detective. Maestas explained that he called 911 “because I stabbed my mom.” He said he used a silver pocket knife. He told the detective Lorenza was asleep in her bedroom with the lights out when he began stabbing her. He said he was lying in his bed and heard voices and these voices were getting to him and it sounded like people were “in there.” He then said, “When I walked in[to] her room I just started stabbing and then, like, I just got out of control, I—I didn't stop.”

Maestas said he was not sure how many times he stabbed his mother. He told the detective she started screaming during the attack, saying his name and telling him to stop, but he “just lost control and kept stabbing her.” He said she fell off the bed and he continued stabbing her. Maestas said he then looked to see if she was still breathing; stood next to her saying he was sorry; washed his hands; returned to talk to her; washed his hands again; and then called 911. He estimated the incident took 10 to 20 minutes.

Pretrial Proceedings

At a preliminary hearing, the district court found reason to believe Maestas was incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to be evaluated at the state security hospital in Larned, Kansas (Larned). Based on a report prepared from that evaluation, the district court later concluded Maestas was competent to stand trial.

Maestas engaged his own expert, Dr. Mark Goodman, a licensed psychologist, to perform a competency and psychological evaluation. In his report, Goodman concluded Maestas was oriented to time, place, and person, but had poor intellectual judgment. He concluded: “[Maestas] is well aware, intellectually, of right from wrong.” Goodman observed that it was possible Maestas' statements about hearing voices were true and that it was difficult to determine if he intentionally killed his mother because it was possible he acted out against her due to his psychosis. Goodman diagnosed Maestas with “Psychotic Disorder: N[ot] O[therwise] S[pecified],” noting possible borderline intellectual functioning. He also reported that Maestas denied killing his mother. Goodman further concluded that Maestas' psychological disorder played a role in the killing, but due to Maestas' denial the extent it played was unclear.

The State moved for an order in limine prohibiting the parties from discussing at trial Maestas' mental health, well-being, capacity, intent, intelligence, or any disorders he might be alleged to have. In support, the State argued there was no issue about competence following the competency hearing, no evidence regarding insanity or other defenses concerning mental health, and no designated expert regarding Maestas' mental health. It also noted...