Rhyne v. Municipal Court
| Decision Date | 22 December 1980 |
| Citation | 170 Cal.Rptr. 312,113 Cal.App.3d 807 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Rita RHYNE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the NORTH COUNTY JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 18701. |
Donald L. Clark, County Counsel, Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Anthony Albers, Deputy County Counsel, San Diego, for defendant and appellant.
Nineteen-year-old Rita Rhyne and her six-month old infant appeared before David Walker, Judge, Municipal Court North County Judicial District (Municipal After a factual hearing, the trial court issued its peremptory writ of mandate commanding the Municipal Court "to furnish a counseling attorney or attorneys to any persons charged with crimes which could result in confinement, prior to and during their appearance in your court." After further contested hearings, extensive findings of fact were made followed by a judgment ordering the Municipal Court to furnish counsel on the exact terms and conditions set forth in the peremptory writ. The trial court denied Rhyne's attorney's (Tom Adler) request (Code Civ.Proc., § 1021.5) for attorney fees. The Municipal Court appeals the judgment granting the writ of mandate. Rhyne appeals the order denying attorney fees.
Court) at its morning misdemeanor arraignment session. Without advice of or waiver of rights, without benefit of counsel, Rhyne pleaded guilty to petty theft-a first offense. Judge Walker immediately jailed the woman and child. After four hours of confinement, Judge Walker stayed the jail sentence three days and ordered Rhyne to report to the county jail to serve the balance of her sentence. Rhyne obtained counsel and sought a writ of habeas corpus and writ of mandamus on behalf of herself and others similarly situated with respect to denials of fundamental constitutional rights when in attendance at the Municipal Court arraignment sessions presided over by Judge Walker. Walker was[113 Cal.App.3d 812] served by mail (Code Civ.Proc., § 1013a(3)) by the superior court clerk with Rhyne's petition for writ of habeas corpus. 1 By agreement of the parties, Judge Walker was excused from the proceeding 2 and the Municipal Court retained as the party respondent
The factual matrix underlying the action are detailed in the trial court's finding of fact. They disclose a gross, consistent pattern of denial of most fundamental constitutional rights to persons appearing before Judge Walker at the Municipal Court misdemeanor arraignment sessions.
The North County Municipal Court conducted misdemeanor arraignments three mornings a week (9 a. m. to 12 p. m.) at which there were up to 100 defendants present. Defenders Program of San Diego, Inc. (Defenders) provided legal assistance to indigents charged with crimes in San Diego County. Before July 1, 1978, they were employed by the North County judicial district to counsel with defendants before and during their appearances at the misdemeanor arraignment sessions. The superior court found the counseling attorneys performed the following functions: (1) advising all persons, before their court appearance, of their constitutional rights; of the elements of the crimes with which they were charged; of the defenses to the charged crimes and of technical defenses such as pleas in abatement and of possible constitutional issues applicable to their case; (2) assisting the court in determining which persons were eligible for court appointed counsel by discussing defendants' financial situations with them and helping them fill out the necessary forms; (3) explaining contingencies, consequences that could follow from the entry of a guilty plea such as the effect of certain driving convictions on defendants' Department of Motor Vehicle records or in crimes involving moral turpitude, the potential employment and licensing difficulties which could occur, and advising entry of a guilty plea where appropriate; and (4) engaging in plea bargaining with the district attorney's office and thus aiding in resolution of cases at an early stage of the proceedings. In sum, Defenders performed the ordinary prearraignment duties of defense counsel.
Before July 1, 1978, Defenders had on several occasions filed, or threatened to file, writs challenging various procedures employed in Judge Walker's trial courtroom which Defenders felt deprived defendants Thereafter persons charged with misdemeanors who appeared for morning arraignment reported to a clerk's desk outside the courtroom, where they were asked to initial and sign an advisal of constitutional rights form. Those who told the clerk of their desire to plead guilty were given a separate form which recited a waiver of counsel and an admonition of the possible consequences of a guilty plea. The forms utilized for the admonition were either incorrect or incomplete in terms of setting forth the possible penalties and other consequences of a plea of guilty. From the time a defendant was furnished with the forms until the actual appearance before the judge, a time lapse of up to three hours could occur.
of their constitutional rights. When, on July 1, 1978, Judge Walker assumed the role of presiding judge of the North County judicial district, he immediately terminated Defenders' counseling services in face of Defenders' offer to provide the services at no cost to the court.
The clerks furnishing the forms did not review the forms with the defendants nor did they explain any of the language.
The superior court found persons of average intelligence, without legal assistance, were in many instances unable to comprehend the full meaning and legal significance of the words contained in these forms.
Any defendant appearing at morning arraignment who wished to consult with counsel before entering the courtroom was advised (1) no attorney was available to consult with them, or (2) they could return in the afternoon when a counseling attorney would be available. Although several thousand persons were arraigned during the time period in question there was no evidence of anyone returning in the afternoon to consult Defenders or any other attorneys.
Those defendants who arrived in the courtroom on time for the misdemeanor arraignment session received a mass admonishment by the court which included a statement that they "may be entitled to counsel in serious matters." Late arrivals (such as Rhyne) may have been arraigned without receiving any admonishment by the court.
The general procedure when a defendant's case was called, was to call the defendant forward to stand with a group of other people charged with similar offensess. The entire group was usually questioned by the court en masse. If a defendant requested the assistance of court appointed counsel, he was told to fill out an application and his case would then trail until the end of the calendar or a pause in the proceedings.
The superior court found many defendants entered guilty pleas in misdemeanor arraignment court who: (1) had not been adequately advised of their constitutional rights by the court; (2) had not made an on the record waiver of their constitutional rights; (3) had not been properly advised of the consequences of their guilty pleas; (4) had been coerced into pleading guilty by threats of having bail set and being remanded to custody if they persisted in pleading not guilty; (5) had pleaded guilty although they denied guilt and there was no factual basis for their plea; (6) had been sentenced to time in custody based on uniform policies of the court as to certain offenses which failed to take into consideration each individual's particular circumstances; and (7) had entered pleas to reduced charges as a result of plea bargaining between the court and the defendant.
The superior court, based upon these findings of fact, concluded the procedures employed by the Municipal Court "do not comport to the minimal requirement of due process of law and deprive defendants of effective assistance of counsel" as guaranteed by both the California and United States Constitution.
The Municipal Court asserts (1) lack of jurisdiction of the superior court because of "lack of personal service"; (2) the trial court erred in denying the Municipal Court an opportunity to file a formal answer and Rhyne's appeal asserts error in the denial of Adler's request for attorney fees, arguing the Municipal Court as a "public entity" is not exempt from an award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
have a full hearing thereon; (3) the trial court erred in using mandamus as a remedy; and (4) Rhyne did not have sufficient "beneficial interest" to maintain the jurisdiction of the superior court.
Our task begins with the threshold contention of lack of jurisdiction. The Municipal Court asserts personal jurisdiction was lacking because the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the order on the petition, the writ of habeas corpus, and the amended petition for class action writ of habeas corpus and/or writ of mandamus, with its supporting points and authorities, were not personally served. It is further argued, assuming personal service was not required, the superior court never acquired personal jurisdiction over the Municipal Court with regard to the writ of mandate proceedings since the Municipal Court was never served with an alternative writ, an order to show cause or a noticed motion sufficient to bring it within the jurisdiction of the superior court.
These arguments overlook critical, decisive facts. The Municipal Court, after appearing specially, moved for a continuance of the September 26, 1978, hearing, after the superior court ruled against its jurisdictional contentions. The continuance was denied. Following this rebuff, the proceedings...
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