Ribley v. Harsco Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 May 1977
• Citation: 57 A.D.2d 228,394 N.Y.S.2d 740
• Parties: Harry J. RIBLEY, as parent and natural guardian of Deborah Ribley, an infant, et al., Respondents, v. HARSCO CORP., Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 740

394 N.Y.S.2d 740

57 A.D.2d 228

Harry J. RIBLEY, as parent and natural guardian of Deborah Ribley, an infant, et al., Respondents, v. HARSCO CORP., Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

May 12, 1977.

Dugan, Lyons, Pentak, Brown & Tobin, Albany (Edwin J. Tobin, Albany, of counsel), for appellant.

De Graff, Foy, Conway & Holt-Harris, Albany (Michael Cunningham, Albany, of counsel), for respondents.

Before KOREMAN, P. J., and GREENBLOTT, KANE, MAIN and HERLIHY, JJ.

HERLIHY, Justice.

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff Deborah Ribley when her hair became entangled in a drive shaft of a manure spreader which she was operating on her father's farm on October 28, 1973. Miss Ribley had stopped to pick up a rock in the field when her hair became entangled in the drive shaft causing a total avulsion of her scalp and other injuries.

The manure spreader had been manufactured by the defendant in 1961. The machine was shipped by the defendant to a dealer in 1961 and it was subsequently sold by the dealer to a customer in 1964. Subsequently, the dealer repossessed the machine and sold it to one Royal Ribley in 1966. The detailed statement of the background facts is contained in the decision of Special Term (84 Misc.2d 744, 377 N.Y.S.2d 375).

Upon this appeal the defendant primarily contends that interrogatories are not permitted under the doctrine of strict products liability because such cause of action is simply an extension of liability in negligence and CPLR 3130 prohibits interrogatories as to negligence liability for personal injuries.

The defendant does not dispute that interrogatories would properly be allowable in this action if the plaintiffs were proceeding in negligence and breach of warranty instead of negligence and strict products liability (see Allen v. Minskoff, 38 N.Y.2d 506, 509-510, 381 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455-456, 344 N.E.2d 386, 387-388).

While great emphasis is placed upon analogy to seek a holding that strict products liability is only negligence in another guise, the first question should be whether "analogy" is appropriate in the face of the literal language of CPLR 3130 prohibiting interrogatories as to injuries "resulting from negligence, or wrongful death * * *." The reasons underlying the exclusion of interrogatories as a disclosure device in negligence actions were referred to in the case of Allen v. Minskoff (supra). We find no intention on the part of the Legislature that the exclusion be applied not only to negligence causes of action but also to causes of action which might have similarities to negligence pleadings. Furthermore, in the case of Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 335, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463, 298 N.E.2d 622, 624) it was expressly noted that proof of negligence was unnecessary as to a manufacturer of a defective product where the defect caused injuries, with various provisos (id. at 342, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469, 298 N.E.2d at 628). In the case of Victorson v. Bock...