Ricardo N., Inc. v. Turcios de Argueta

• Decision Date: 08 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-0111,94-0111
• Citation: 907 S.W.2d 423
• Parties: 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 726 RICARDO N., INC., Petitioner, v. Maria Margarita TURCIOS DE ARGUETA, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Luis Argueta, Deceased, and as Guardian of Xiomara Margarita Argueta, Maria de Los Angeles Argueta, Jorge Samuel Argueta, and Maria Aidee, Minors, Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 423

907 S.W.2d 423

38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 726

RICARDO N., INC., Petitioner, v. Maria Margarita TURCIOS DE ARGUETA, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Luis Argueta, Deceased, and as Guardian of Xiomara Margarita Argueta, Maria de Los Angeles Argueta Jorge Samuel Argueta, and Maria Aidee, Minors, Respondents.

No. 94-0111.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Nov. 17, 1994.

Filed June 8, 1995.

Christa Brown, Austin, G. Don Schauer, Daniel D. Pipitone, Corpus Christi, for petitioner.

Miguel A. Saldana, Richard E. Zayas, Brownsville, for respondents.

HECHT, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court.

With no word of explanation, Juan Luis Argueta, a seaman on the shrimping vessel, the Betty N, jumped overboard in the middle of the night in high seas about eighty miles off the Texas coast. His disappearance and presumed death make it impossible to ascertain his motives, but there are indications that he acted out of distress over rumors of his wife's infidelity. She, Maria Margarita Turcios de Argueta, on behalf of herself, Argueta's estate and his four minor children, sued the Betty N and its owner, Ricardo N., Inc., alleging negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688 (1988), and unseaworthiness under the Death on the High Seas Act ["DOHSA"], 46 U.S.C.App. § 761 (1988). After trial to the bench, the court found for Turcios on both claims and rendered judgment against both defendants for actual and punitive damages, and pre- and post-judgment interest. The court of appeals reversed the judgment against the Betty N, and reversed the punitive damages award, but affirmed the judgment for actual damages and interest against Ricardo N. 870 S.W.2d 95.

Of the several arguments defendants make on appeal, we find one dispositive. We hold that Turcios was obliged to prove that defendants caused Argueta's death, and that she failed to do so. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment that Turcios take nothing.

I

Argueta, a citizen of El Salvador, came to Brownsville to live with his sister. He found work as a shrimper on the Betty N, a fishing vessel with a crew of four: the captain, who was in command of the vessel; a rigman, who worked the nets; and two headers, who looked for shrimp. Argueta was one of the headers.

Argueta had worked on the Betty N about six months when he learned that his wife, who was still in El Salvador, was being unfaithful to him. Disturbed by this news, Argueta asked his wife to join him in the United States, and she traveled as far as Belize. Argueta sent her money for the rest of the trip via a friend, but later heard that the friend also had an affair with her. Argueta was even more upset at this latest episode, but by the time he next embarked upon the Betty N he seemed fine and did not mention his wife.

On the third day at sea Argueta asked to be taken to Houston. The captain responded that he would either call the Coast Guard to come get Argueta or put him ashore at the nearest port the next morning. Argueta began working that evening, but later threw his stored clothes overboard and told the captain that he did not want to work. Argueta went to his cabin, either voluntarily or on the captain's orders. At 1:30 a.m., the crew was still working and the boat was moving forward at about two miles per hour. The night was clear with a bright moon; the seas were high, four to six feet; the wind was blowing at fifteen to twenty knots. Argueta came on deck wearing only his pants and shoes, and stripped to his underwear. When a crew member asked what he was doing, Argueta, without reply, jumped overboard. Argueta was a good swimmer and the water was warm enough for someone to survive in it for several hours.

The captain immediately ran forward to the pilot house to stop the vessel. No flare was thrown to mark the spot where Argueta entered the water, nor was a life ring thrown because the crew could not see Argueta. The captain marked the vessel's position on the chart and recorded the compass reading in the log. Meanwhile, the rigman raised the nets, which took about fifteen minutes. The crew then called for help using citizen band radios, which had a shorter range than the ship's sideband radios. About eighty minutes after Argueta jumped overboard, the crew contacted another vessel, which in turn contacted the Coast Guard. The Betty N searched for Argueta the rest of the night, the Coast Guard searched the next day, and the Betty N fished in the same area for three days, but Argueta was never found. Turcios testified that Argueta did not have suicidal tendencies.

The trial court found that the Betty N was unseaworthy because it was not properly equipped, nor its crew properly trained, for emergencies. There is no dispute that the ship did not have flares or cable cutters to jettison the nets. There is no evidence whether the ship's life preservers did or did not have lights as required by Coast Guard regulation, 46 C.F.R. § 25.25-13. No evidence suggests that any of the crew members had been trained for emergencies while employed by Ricardo N., although the captain had received such instruction in obtaining certification as a vessel captain in El Salvador. The safety materials on the Betty N were in English, and only the rigman could read English. It is unclear whether anyone knew how to use the sideband radios. The trial court also found that Ricardo N. was negligent in failing to prepare the Betty N and its crew for emergencies. The court found that the crew should have detached the fishing nets instead of lifting them, radioed for help immediately with a sideband radio, thrown out life preservers, set off flares, posted a lookout to try to keep Argueta in sight, and turned the vessel toward the direction Argueta jumped overboard. The trial court awarded $100,000 to Turcios and $50,000 to each of the four minor plaintiffs. The court also awarded plaintiffs $200,000 in punitive damages.

The court of appeals reversed the punitive damage award, holding that such damages cannot be recovered under either the Jones Act or the DOHSA. The appeals court also reversed the judgment against the Betty N, holding that jurisdiction of in rem suits in admiralty is exclusive in the federal courts. Turcios does not appeal from either of these holdings. The court of appeals affirmed the award of actual damages against Ricardo N.

Ricardo N. denies that any evidence supports the trial court's findings of unseaworthiness and negligence, but it does not argue for reversal of the court of appeals' judgment based on this lack of evidence. Rather, Ricardo N. argues that there is no evidence that the unseaworthiness and negligence found by the trial court could have caused Argueta's death. It points to the testimony of Turcios' own expert to the effect that even if the Betty N had done everything perfectly, it would "probably not" have made any difference in rescuing Argueta, and that it was "sheer and utter speculation" to think that anything the Betty N might have done differently could have saved him. The court of appeals determined that there is some evidence to support the trial court's finding of causation, and that in any event, there should be a presumption of causation under the circumstances of this case, a presumption that Ricardo N. failed to overcome.

II

Before we consider the evidence of causation, we must first identify the duty Ricardo N. owed Argueta. That duty is prescribed by the marine rescue doctrine, which holds that when a person goes overboard the ship must use every reasonable means to retrieve him from the water if he can be seen from the ship, and if he cannot be seen, must search for him as long as it is reasonably possible he is alive. Reyes v. Vantage S.S. Co., 609 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir.1980). The doctrine thus stated has two branches. 1B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 30, at 3-223 to 3-239 (7th ed. 1991). One branch--"search" cases--concerns seamen who disappear, having apparently fallen overboard; their "presence or location in the water is not readily discernible from the ship." Reyes, 609 F.2d at 142 (quoting 1B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 30 at 3-225 (6th ed. 1976)); Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, 310 F.2d 284, 286 (4th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913, 83 S.Ct. 728, 9 L.Ed.2d 721 (1963). In these situations, the ship must search for the seaman as long as it is reasonably possible he is alive in the water, and must, of course, retrieve him if found. Reyes, 609 F.2d at 142. The other branch--"rescue" cases--involves "those where a seaman has fallen overboard and is struggling in close proximity to and is visible from the ship." 1B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 30, at 3-225. In rescue situations, the ship must use "every reasonable means to retrieve the seaman from the water." Reyes, 609 F.2d at 142.

Whether a seaman falls or jumps into the water, the duty to rescue arises the instant he goes overboard. Id. at 143. The duty arises because the seaman must follow orders, even orders putting him in danger; because the sea is inherently dangerous; and because the vessel represents the only means to save the life of a human being with no other source of help. See Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir.1931).

III

The court of appeals thought that the causal connection between the conduct of a ship's crew and the failure to rescue a man overboard is often presumed in "rescue" cases in which the seaman remains visible, as opposed to "search" cases in which the seaman has disappeared, and that this is a "rescue" case. Ricardo N. argues that this is not a "rescue" case because there is no evidence Argueta could be seen from the moment he entered the water. Thus, Ricardo N. contends that the appeals court applied the wrong branch of the marine rescue doctrine. This dispute assumes that the proof required for causation depends on the nature of the duty owed to the seaman. We are unable to discern such a connection,...