Rice v. Angell

Decision Date19 March 1889
Citation11 S.W. 338
PartiesRICE <I>v.</I> ANGELL.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Appeal from district court, Galveston county; W. H. STEWART, Judge.

Hume & Kleberg, for appellant. Gresham, Jones & Spencer, for appellee.

GAINES, J.

A demurrer was sustained to the petition in the court below, and, plaintiff having declined to amend, his suit was dismissed. He appeals to this court. The case being novel, we insert the substance of the allegations in the petition, as taken from appellant's brief: The petition alleged that defendant was indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $5,000, for that, on November 21, 1884, plaintiff and defendant entered into a copartnership in the business of fire and marine insurance agents under the firm name of Angell & Rice, for so long a time as they should mutually agree to continue the same; that at the time of the formation of said partnership, and long prior thereto, plaintiff and defendant were, each for his own account, engaged in the business of fire and marine insurance agents, and that it was agreed by them in entering into said partnership that plaintiff should pay to the defendant for a one-half interest in the general insurance agency of said defendant, which was then being conducted in the city of Galveston, under the name of C. E. Angell & Co., the sum of $2,650, and, in addition to such payment, bring into the new firm as much of his former business as possible, in consideration whereof the said plaintiff was to own in his own right one-half of said entire business, and was to receive one-half of all the profits, earnings, and emoluments which might arise from, or come out of, said copartnership business; that plaintiff accordingly paid to said defendant said sum of $2,650 for a one-half interest in the general insurance business of said defendant, and brought into said new firm all of his former business, and in every way fully complied with said agreement of partnership, and he then and there became the partner of said defendant, and the full and absolute owner of one-half of the general insurance agency business formerly owned by said defendant alone, and of the good-will of said business; that at said time a one-half interest in said business of said defendant was fully worth in the market of Galveston the said sum of $2,650; that said partnership was conducted and carried on by and between plaintiff and defendant from said date last aforesaid until about the 31st of December, 1886, when defendant declined and refused to further continue the same; that at the time when plaintiff purchased a one-half interest in the said business of defendant, with the good-will thereof, and at the time of the formation of said copartnership, said defendant, in his said business, represented the following insurance companies, and held their agencies for the city of Galveston, to-wit, the Liverpool, London & Globe Insurance Company, the Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Company of Philadelphia, the Universal Insurance Company of England, the Union Insurance Company, Philadelphia, and the Hibernia Fire Insurance Company of New Orleans; that after said partnership was formed it acquired the general agency of said Hibernia Fire Insurance Company for the entire state of Texas, and also the local agencies of the Sea Insurance Company and the Phœnix Insurance Company, of Brooklyn, and retained in its business all of said local agencies held by said defendant in his former business; that the agencies of all of said insurance companies were very valuable in the business of a general insurance agency, and greatly increased the value of such a business, and that the same was worth in the market at Galveston at the time of the dissolution of said partnership between plaintiff and defendant the sum of $10,000; that prior to said date of dissolution large sums of money out of the assets of said firm were expended in building up and extending said partnership business by advertising and establishing branch agencies in the state of Texas; and that plaintiff had devoted his entire time and energy and business experience in procuring, and did procure, for the same a large and lucrative custom; and that the said business at the 31st of December, 1886, was of the value of $10,000, and was then growing and steadily increasing in value; but that said defendant declined and refused to further continue said copartnership, and insisted upon a dissolution thereof; and in view of this fact plaintiff agreed to a dissolution, and offered to pay defendant $5,000 for said defendant's interest therein, or to take said sum for his (plaintiff's) interest in said firm, both of which propositions defendant declined, but then and there wrongfully and forcibly, and without regard to plaintiff's rights, took possession of all of the business of said partnership, and of its connections and good-will, and entirely excluded plaintiff therefrom, and declined, and still declines, to pay this plaintiff anything whatever for his share in said business. Plaintiff further says that all insurance...

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26 cases
  • MacFadden v. Jenkins
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 6 Marzo 1918
    ...survive him. Sheldon v. Houghton, Fed. Cas. No. 12,748; Read v. Mackey, 95 N.Y.S. 935; Slack v. Suddoth (Tenn.) 45 L.R.A. 589; Rice v. Angell (Tex.) 3 L.R.A. 769; Masters v. Brooks, 117 N.Y.S. The good will of a business--not personal reputation--is property. Read v. Mackay, 95 N.Y.S. 935; ......
  • Rossing v. State Bank of Bode
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 28 Noviembre 1917
    ...would be of no value. It is held in Bell v. Ellis, 33 Cal. 620,Farwell v. Huling, 132 Ill. 112, 23 N. E. 438, and Rice v. Augell, 73 Tex. 350, 11 S. W. 338, 3 L. R. A. 769, that it impairs the value of good will that the business is not profitable. It must follow that, if the business is de......
  • Rossing v. State Bank of Bode
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 28 Noviembre 1917
    ...evidence that it would be of no value. It is held in Bell v. Ellis, 33 Cal. 620, Farwell v. Huling, (Ill.) 23 N.E. 438, and Rice v. Angell, (Texas) 11 S.W. 338, it impairs the value of good will that the business is not profitable. It must follow that, if the business is defunct, its "good ......
  • Spayd v. Turner, Granzow & Hollenkamp
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • 9 Agosto 1985
    ...See Lyon v. Lyon (1966), 246 Cal.App.2d 519, 54 Cal.Rptr. 829; Cook v. Lauten (1954), 1 Ill.App.2d 255, 117 N.E.2d 414; Rice v. Angell (1889), 73 Tex. 350, 11 S.W. 338; Jackson v. Caldwell (1966), 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667; Annotation (1959), 65 A.L.R.2d 521. There appears, however, to be......
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