Rice v. Bunce

• Decision Date: 31 January 1872
• Citation: 49 Mo. 231
• Parties: T. M. RICE, Plaintiff in Error, v. HARVEY BUNCE, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM T. SEELY, AND THE UNKNOWN HEIRS OF WILLIAM T. SEELY, Defendants in Error.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

49 Mo. 231

T. M. RICE, Plaintiff in Error,

v.HARVEY BUNCE, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM T. SEELY, AND THE UNKNOWN HEIRS OF WILLIAM T. SEELY, Defendants in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

January Term, 1872.

Error to Moniteau Circuit Court.

G. T. White, for plaintiff in error.

Ferguson had a right to appear at the sale as a bidder: 1. For the reason that he owned an equity to the north half, and sought by the purchase to acquire the legal title to the whole lot. 2. He bid also for the south half, in which he claimed title. (Jewett v. Miller; 6 Seld., N. Y., 402; Blount v. Robeson, 3 Jones, N. C., 73; Taylor v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 482; Carpenter v. Stillwell, 12 Barb. 128; Otis v. Still, 8 Barb., S. C., 102.) Ferguson's sheriff's deed being upon record, and reciting the judgment obtained by Seely's administrator and a sale by the sheriff under his direction, was certainly a notice to Shropshire. (See 4 Johns., N. Y., 262, 268; Hill on Trust. 794-5, 844 n.) The sheriff's deed was at any rate enough to put Shropshire on inquiry. (See 4 Kent, 179-80.) The sheriff's deed imparted notice, and that notice extended to all it contained. (Picot v. Page, 26 Mo. 415.) And Ferguson bidding for whatever interest Seely's estate might have had in the entire lot, was no abandonment of his right to the half. (Bartlett v. Glascock, 4 Mo. 62; Vaughn v. Tracy, 22 Mo. 415 et seq.;Webster v. Vansteenbergh, 46 Barb. 211; see Jenkins v. Eldridge, 3 Sto. 297-8; Maupin v. Emmons, 47 Mo. 307-8.) Shropshire having knowledge of Ferguson's equity, cannot now plead estoppel in pais. (Hill v. Eply, 31 Penn St. 331; Goodson v. Beachman, 24 Ga. 150.) Estoppels in pais are not allowed to operate except where in good conscience and honest dealing the party ought not to be permitted to gainsay his admissions. (McAferty v. Conover, 7 Ohio St. 99.) The act or admission must have been expressly designed to influence the conduct of another, and must in fact have influenced such other party. (Byers v. Farwell, 9 Barb., S. C., 615; Morris v. Moore, 11 Humph. 433; Copeland v. Copeland, 28 Me. 325; Crocket v. Lashbrook, 3 Monr. 530.) In order to make the plea of estoppel available to Shropshire, it must appear that he was not only ignorant of Ferguson's title, but that he had no means of knowledge (Commonwealth v. Mentz, 10 Barr, 527; Brown v. Wheeler, 17 Cow. 345.)

Draffin & Muir, with Edmond Burke, for defendants in error.

It is a well-settled principle of law that when a party having a right to an estate permits or encourages a purchaser to buy it of another, the purchaser shall hold it against the person who has the right. In the case at bar, the testimony of all the witnesses concur in the fact that at the sale made by Bunce in March, 1867, and at which defendant Shropshire purchased, Ferguson, the plaintiff's vendor, was present--failed to disclose or to proclaim to the bidders present that he claimed any interest in the property--bid the sum of $500 for the property himself, thereby inducing and encouraging the defendant Shropshire to buy the property; and under those circumstances, to permit Ferguson to come in and set up his title in opposition to that of the party whom he then induced by his acts, his words and his silence, to expend his money, would be manifest injustice. The conduct of Ferguson at such sale amounted to an equitable estoppel. He could easily have disclosed his interest therein, if any he had; and to permit him subsequently to take advantage of his silence at and acquiescence in the sale of the property by Bunce, would be promoting fraud and injustice. (Newman v. Hook, 37 Mo. 207; Taylor et al. v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 482; McDermott v. Barnum et al., 19 Mo. 204; Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Ch. 353; Riley v. Miami Ex. Co., 5 Ohio, 333; Buckingham v. Dille, 10 Ohio, 288; Carter v. Longworth, 4 Ohio, 384; Huntsucker v. Clark, 12 Mo. 333.)

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff filed his petition in the nature of a bill in equity in the Circuit Court, for the purpose of vesting in him the title to certain real estate therein mentioned. The case, as made out by the pleadings and proofs, shows that one Seely in his lifetime was the proprietor and owner of a lot in the town of Tipton, and that he verbally sold one-half of the same to one Vancise; that Vancise took possession thereof, and erected improvements on the same; that he paid the purchase-money, but received no deed. Subsequently he became indebted to Seely, and left the premises and removed to Illinois, leaving, however, an agent to control the property.

Seely having died, Bunce administered on his estate and obtained judgment on the debt against Vancise, and caused his equitable interest in the lot to be sold to satisfy the same, and Ferguson became the purchaser, and received a sheriff's deed therefor. Afterward an order was made by the Probate Court authorizing the administrator to sell the real property of Seely for the payment of debts. Bunce, the administrator, proceeded to advertise and sell the whole of the lots in controversy as the property of Seely's estate, and Shropshire, who is one of the defendants, became the purchaser for the sum of $550, which the testimony shows was about the full value of the lot. At the administrator's sale, Ferguson, who had purchased the interest of Vancise when the same was sold by the sheriff, appeared and was one of the bidders. His bid was the next highest to Shropshire's. At the time of the sale he said nothing about his interest, and did not proclaim that he had any claim or title to the lot. He then sold and transferred by quit-claim whatever interest he possessed in the lot to Rice, the plaintiff, but the whole testimony goes to prove that Rice has never paid or parted with any consideration for the same.

Upon this state of the record the court below gave judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff sued out his writ of error.

It is insisted by the counsel for the plaintiff in error that although Ferguson was present and bid at the sale, and entered into the competition without in any way indicating that he made any...