Rice v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 06 March 1882
• Citation: 100 Pa. 28
• Parties: Rice <I>versus</I> Commonwealth.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

100 Pa. 28

Rice versus Commonwealth.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 22, 1882.

March 6, 1882.

February 22d 1882.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., GORDON, PAXSON, STERRETT and GREEN, JJ. MERCUR and TRUNKEY, JJ., absent

ERROR to the Quarter Sessions of Lackawanna county: Of January Term 1882, No. 31.

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Cornelius Smith, for the plaintiff in error, cited—Commonwealth v. Walton, 2 Brewst. 489.

J. F. Connolly (with him E. W. Simrell, district attorney, and H. M. Hannah), for the defendant in error.

Mr. Justice PAXSON delivered the opinion of the court, March 6th 1882.

The plaintiff in error was convicted in the court below of the offence of seduction. The record having been brought into this court for review, several errors have been assigned to the rulings of the learned judge, the most material of which are the second and third.

It was palpable error to instruct the jury, that evidence to corroborate the prosecutrix in regard to the promise of marriage is no longer necessary. Upon this point the learned judge charged: "There is no doubt but that in the early history of these cases, when the defendant was not permitted to go upon the witness stand, and not allowed to testify, that there should be corroborative evidence to sustain the charge made by the young lady of the promise of marriage. But in our day and generation, when a defendant may go upon the witness stand and testify equally as well as the prosecutor, then of course these essentials are not absolutely necessary, although they may yet appear in the case. The proper way to dispose of cases of this kind is to take each case as it stands on its own four legs, take the case as the parties built it up, keeping in mind their standing in society, and their immediate manner of courtship."

The 41st section of the Act of 31st March 1860, P. L. 392 which defines the offence of seduction, expressly provides, "That the promise of marriage shall not be deemed established, unless the testimony of the female seduced is corroborated by other evidence, either circumstantial or positive."

The fact that a defendant charged with seduction is now allowed to testify on his own behalf does not repeal this provision of the Act of 1860. It is urged, however, that this error was cured by the previous portion of the charge, in which the law upon this subject was correctly ruled. If we take the charge as a whole we find this point ruled both ways. Unfortunately, the erroneous ruling was the last, and therefore likely to have made lodgment with the jury. We cannot say it did no harm, in view of the conviction of the plaintiff in error, and the very feeble corroboration of the prosecutrix upon the question of the promise of marriage.

The learned judge also erred in charging: "It is contended that this case requires the essentials, so far as the making of presents, writing of love-letters and all of such things that pass between young people, to make out this case. But we have long passed that day, so far as courtship is concerned ....