Rice v. Crozier

• Decision Date: 24 October 1908
• Citation: 117 N.W. 984,139 Iowa 629
• Parties: EMILY M. RICE, Appellant, v. M. W. CROZIER, Executor of the Estate of William H. H. Rice, Deceased, Appellee
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

117 N.W. 984

139 Iowa 629

EMILY M. RICE, Appellant, v. M. W. CROZIER, Executor of the Estate of William H. H. Rice, Deceased, Appellee

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 24, 1908

Appeal from Mahaska District Court.--HON. K. E. WILCOXEN, Judge.

ACTION on a note signed by the decedent, dated September 18, 1865 and due in two years after date. The defendant demurred on the ground that the note was barred by the statute of limitations. Demurrer sustained, and the plaintiff stands on her petition. Judgment for defendant, and the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

John F. and Wm. R. Lacey, for appellant.

John O Malcom, for appellee.

OPINION

EVANS, J.

The plaintiff avers: That she was married to the deceased, William Rice, in 1859. That in 1864 or 1865 he received in her behalf certain moneys, amounting to $ 2,300, from the administrator of the estate of her deceased father, and that he signed a receipt therefor jointly with the plaintiff. That on September 18, 1865, as evidence of said trust he executed an instrument in writing as follows: "September 18, 1865. Two years after date I promise to pay Emily M. Rice the sum of $ 2,100 for value received. The condition of this note is that it is to draw no interest for twelve months after my death. [Signed] William H. H. Rice." That under the said instrument an express trust was created, and the said William H. H. Rice never denied the said trust in his lifetime, and never repudiated the same. The plaintiff's principal contention is that, under the law in force at the time said contract was made, she could not maintain an action at law against her husband, and that her only remedy under the statutes at that time was to present her claim against the estate of her husband after death, or after insolvency or bankruptcy, if living. She contends that the law then existing became a part of the contract, and that it could not be altered by subsequent legislation, and that the statute of limitations, therefore, has never commenced to run against her until the death of her husband.

This argument is, of course, bottomed upon the proposition that under the statutes of Iowa in September, 1865 a wife had no legal remedy for the collection of a debt against her husband during his life-time and solvency. Assuming this proposition to be correct, there is plausibility in the argument offered. But we are convinced that this initial proposition of the plaintiff is not tenable. In Jones v. Jones, 19 Iowa 236, and Logan v. Hall, 19 Iowa 491, the court did sustain actions brought by the wife against her husband. Section 2771 of the Revision of 1860 by clear implication if not by its express terms, removed from a married woman the disability to sue her husband in relation to her separate estate. Even at common law, and before any statute was enacted, she had a complete remedy by bill in equity. Jones v. Jones, supra, was an action at law, being a replevin by the wife for certain household furniture, and the wife as plaintiff was allowed to prevail therein. It is true that an important fact in that case was that the plaintiff wife had separated from her husband "for good cause;" but that fact had no relevancy to her ability or disability to sue her husband, but to her right of possession of the household goods. Except for such separation for good cause, the husband, as head of the...