Rice v. Franklin Loan & Finance Co., 11602.
Decision Date | 11 April 1927 |
Docket Number | 11602. |
Citation | 82 Colo. 163,258 P. 223 |
Parties | RICE et al. v. FRANKLIN LOAN & FINANCE CO. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
On Rehearing, July 5, 1927.
Department 1.
Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Charles C Sackmann, Judge.
Action by Bert Rice and another against the Franklin Loan & Finance Company and others. To review judgment of nonsuit, plaintiffs bring error.
Reversed and new trial granted.
On Rehearing.
Richard K. Gandy, of Denver, for plaintiffs in error.
John P James, of Denver, for defendants in error.
The plaintiffs in error brought this action under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Sess. Laws 1923, Chap. 98) to declare void a note and chattel mortgage which they gave the Franklin Loan Company, defendant in error. The ground of the action was that the note was usurious under C. L. c. 63, entitled Money Lenders. They were nonsuited, and bring error.
One reason for the decision was variance between the plaintiffs' allegations and their proof. We do not think it sound. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs 'made, executed, and delivered to said company their promissory note and chattel mortgage. * * *' The proof was that, when plaintiffs went to the defendant company to borrow money, they, at the request of the company, made the note payable to one McIntire, who immediately indorsed it to the company, who then and there delivered the cash proceeds by check payable to said McIntire, which was then and there indorsed by him, and delivered to the plaintiffs by the company, and all this was done to 'get around the law.' The fact that the transaction was a subterfuge, and that the loan was in truth made by the company to plaintiffs, and the note and mortgage made by them to the company, is the only legitimate inference from the evidence. The plaintiffs had therefore proved what they alleged, and there was no variance. See C. L. § 3797, quoted below. But, even if that where not so, the evidence was admitted without objection on the score of variance, and the point was therefore waived, as we have many times held. Tew v. Power, 37 Colo. 292, 295, 297, 86 P. 342.
But defendants argue that none but persons 'engaged in the business of making loans * * * to the value of $300 or less * * *' are subject to the said Money Lenders' Act, and that they are not shown to have been engaged in such business, and so are not subject to the act. We think, however, that the statute embraces more than persons 'engaged in the business.' While the first section (C. L. § 3781) and other sections refer only to persons in the business, section 3797 goes further, and forbids usury by any person. It is as follows:
The section, it is seen, expressly includes 'any person who, * * * by any device or pretense * * * seeks to obtain a greater compensation than is authorized by this act,' and the enforcement of any loan for which more than 12 per cent. has been contracted for is forbidden. The question, then, whether defendants were 'engaged in the business' of making such loans, is without consequence. If the allegation that they were so engaged had been left out, the complaint would still have stated a cause of action, and, since the evidence shows the loan to have been at a rate greatly in excess of 12 per cent., it follows that the case so stated was proved.
The judgment is reversed, and new trial granted.
The CHIEF JUSTICE and SHEAFOR and WHITFORD, JJ., concur.
On Rehearing.
It is urged that section 17 of the act in question, in so far as it affects persons not 'engaged in the business of making loans * * * of the value of $300 or less,' is unconstitutional, because not embraced in the title of the act. We do not assent to that proposition, first, because it is within the literal interpretation of the title; second, because it is germane to the subject of the title.
First. The title of the act is as follows:
'An act to license and regulate the business of making loans in sums of three hundred dollars ($300.00) or less, secured or unsecured, at a greater rate of interest than twelve (12) per centum per...
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ARTICLE 51 DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
...P.2d 557 (Colo. App. 1993). Applied in Colo. & Utah Coal Co. v. Walter, 75 Colo. 489, 226 P. 864 (1924); Rice v. Franklin Loan & Fin. Co., 82 Colo. 163, 258 P. 223 (1927); Bedford v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 104 Colo. 311, 91 P.2d 469 (1939); Colo. Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 105 Colo. 373, 98 P.2d 112......
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ARTICLE 51
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