Rice v. Gruetzmacher

Citation30 Wis.2d 222,140 N.W.2d 238
PartiesCharles RICE, Appellant, v. Orville GRUETZMACHER et al., Defendants, Maryland Casualty Co., a foreign corporation, Respondent.
Decision Date01 March 1966
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

Walter J. Steininger, Milwaukee, Thomas P. Maroney, Milwaukee, of counsel, for appellant.

Moore Moore & Crivello, Frank T. Crivello, Milwaukee, for respondent.

GORDON, Justice.

Because of the peculiar factual scenery, Maryland Casualty Company was called upon to perform in a chameleonic capacity; this is because it was both the workmen's compensation carrier and also the liability insurer of Mr. Rice's employer, Hennes Trucking Company.

Mr. Rice, the plaintiff, has objected to having the Maryland Casualty Company share in the proceeds which were derived from the settlement of Mr. Rice's third party action. His position is that it is inequitable for the workmen's compensation carrier, Maryland Casualty Company, to share in the proceeds after it had thrown mountainous roadblocks in Mr. Rice's path. The appellant contends that his claim was really worth $75,000 but that he was obliged to settle for the far lesser figure of $17,000 because of the several defenses which were made known by Maryland Casualty Company to the other defendants.

The alleged inequity would seem greater if the record established that Maryland Casualty Company utilized confidential or privileged data that had come into its possession in its capacity as the workmen's compensation carrier. However, the record does not support the appellant's charge that Maryland Casualty Company disclosed defensive techniques which it had learned only by reason of its status as the workmen's compensation carrier.

An even more serious flaw in the appellant's position arises when one reads the relevant Wisconsin statutes. The directness of the legislative pronouncements in the case at bar brings to mind the comment of Mr. Justice Holmes in United States v. Wurzbach (1930), 280 U.S. 396, 398, 50 S.Ct. 167, 168, 74 L.Ed. 508:

'* * * there is no warrant for seeking refined arguments to show that the statute does not mean what it says.'

After reciting the manner in which the proceeds of a third party action are to be divided, sec. 102.29, Stats., asserts the following in subsection (4):

'If the insurance carrier of the employer and of the third party shall be the same, or if there is common control of the insurer of each, the insurance carrier of the employer shall promptly notify the parties in interest and the industrial commission of that fact; likewise, if the employer has assumed the liability of the third party he shall give similar notice; and, in default of such notice, any settlement with an injured employe or beneficiary shall be void. Nothing contained in this subsection shall prevent the employer or compensation insurer from sharing in the proceeds of any third party claim or action, as set forth in subsection (1).' (Emphasis added.)

It is thus clear that the legislature affirmatively recognized that an insurer might have a dual capacity; nevertheless, the statute provides that this fact will not bar such an insurer from enjoying a share of the proceeds. In Huck v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. (1961), 14 Wis.2d 445, 450, 111 N.W.2d 434, 436, sec. 102.29(4), Stats., was before this court, and it was said:

'Sec. 102.29(4), Stats., indicates that the legislature had in mind the possibility that the insurance carrier of the employer and of the third party might be the same, or that the employer might have assumed the liability of the third party. It merely requires notice to be given in such event and provides further: 'Nothing contained in this subsection shall prevent the employer or compensation insurer from sharing in the proceeds of any third party claim or action, as set forth in subsection (1).'

Once we determine that Maryland Casualty Company was by statute entitled to share in the proceeds, we must consider whether...

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7 cases
  • Ceria M. Travis Acad., Inc. v. Evers
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
    • October 31, 2016
    ...held that although a statute permits certain actions, parties may nonetheless stipulate to the contrary. See Rice v. Gruetzmacher, 30 Wis.2d 222, 227–28, 140 N.W.2d 238 (1966) (holding that a worker's compensation insurer is entitled to share in a third-party settlement under the statutory ......
  • Stevens v. Wis. Pwr. Lgt.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
    • August 5, 1985
    ...19, 24, 329 N.W.2d 925, 927 (1983). The statutory language expressly limits an insurer's recovery. See Rice v. Gruetzmacher, 30 Wis.2d 222, 227, 140 N.W.2d 238, 240-41 (1966) (citing Huck v. Chicago, St.P., M. & O. R. Co., 14 Wis.2d 445, 449-50, 111 N.W.2d 434, 436 (1964)). Interest is not ......
  • Eberle v. Joint School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Ithaca, etc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • January 30, 1968
    ...not rest upon mere inference. Eckstein v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1937), 226 Wis. 60, 70, 275 N.W. 916. Rice v. Gruetzmacher (1966), 30 Wis.2d 222, 228, 140 N.W.2d 238. Since the facts, conclusions and inferences which the plaintiff utilizes to establish her case for estoppel are t......
  • Gabriel v. Gabriel
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • February 27, 1973
    ...556, 561, 277 N.W. 141.3 Eberle v. Joint School Dist. No. 1 (1968), 37 Wis.2d 651, 656, 155 N.W.2d 573, citing Rice v. Gruetzmacher (1966), 30 Wis.2d 222, 228, 140 N.W.2d 238.4 Pick Foundry, Inc. v. General Door Mfg. Co. (1952), 262 Wis. 311, 319, 55 N.W.2d 407.5 Mortgage Discount Co. v. Pr......
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