Rice v. Hickerson
| Decision Date | 25 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-18-00694-CV,04-18-00694-CV |
| Parties | Paul D. RICE and M. Susan Rice, Appellants v. Charles C. HICKERSON and Eva M. Hickerson, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 452nd District Court, Mason County, Texas
Honorable Robert R. Hofmann, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice
AFFIRMED; STAY LIFTED
This appeal centers on access to an easement—and whether the dominant estate owners may replace a pre-existing, manual gate with a cattle guard or electric gate. The dominant estate owners tried to replace the manual gate with an electric gate, but the servient estate owners stopped them. When negotiations failed, the dominant estate owners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the court granted the requested relief, and the servient estate owners appeal. For the reasons given below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
Appellants Paul and Susan Rice, the servient estate owners, owned over 500 acres of land in Mason County, Texas. In 2006, the Rices divided their property and sold a landlocked tract of about 175 acres, along with two access easements, to the Webers.
The easement at issue allows the dominant estate "free and unobstructed" access over a portion of the Rices' property. The easement clauses in the 2006 deed read as follows:
Paralleling the Rices' property line, the easement is shaped like a backwards "L" as shown below.
Image materials not available for display.
In 2015, Chris and Eva Hickerson (the Hickersons) purchased the 175-acre tract from the Webers, and the manual gate was still in place. The Hickersons live in the home on the property as their primary residence. The Hickersons use the manual gate to access their property.
Shortly after they purchased the land, the Hickersons tried to replace the manual gate with an electric gate, but the Rices stopped the installation. After negotiations about the gate failed, the Hickersons sought a declaratory judgment. They asked the trial court to construe the easement and declare that their access to the easement must be free and unobstructed. They asked the court to order the Rices to remove the manual gate and allow them to replace it with a cattle guard or electric gate. The Hickersons also sought attorney's fees and costs.
In a discovery dispute, the Rices failed to respond to numerous discovery requests, and the Hickersons sought discovery sanctions. In response, the Rices sought sanctions against the Hickersons. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Rices' motion for sanctions and sanctioned Susan Rice $1,500 for failure to cooperate in discovery.
Both sides moved for summary judgment, but the trial court denied both motions and the case proceeded to trial. After a bench trial, the trial court rendered a final judgment. The judgment declares "that the present manual gate across the easement constitutes an obstruction to [the Hickersons'] necessary and convenient use of the easement." It permanently enjoins the Rices from maintaining the manual gate or any other obstruction across the easement. And it prohibits the Rices from interfering with the Hickersons' installation of an electric gate, cattle guard, or other device to replace the manual gate. The judgment also orders that the Hickersons recover their attorney's fees from the Rices.
The Rices requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court made.
On appeal, the Rices identified eleven issues but organized their arguments into five:
We address each issue in the same order argued by the Rices.
INJUNCTIVE, DECLARATORY RELIEF
In their first issue, the Rices argue the trial court erred in granting injunctive and declaratory relief for the Hickersons. As subparts to their first issue, the Rices argue the easement language is ambiguous, the evidence was neither legally nor factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings on the Hickersons' control over the easement, the judgment changes the nonexclusive easement into an exclusive easement, and the declaratory relief misconstrues the terms of the easement. We address each argument in turn.
For the ambiguity question, the relevant portion of the easement reads as follows:
Grantees and grantees' guests, invitees, lessees, agents and others permitted by grantees shall have free and unobstructed ingress, egress and regress, by foot, on horseback, with automobiles, trucks and other vehicles, livestock and equipment, over and across the easement tracts described herein as to grantees shall be deemed necessary or convenient at all times and seasons.
The trial court concluded that the easement's plain language was not ambiguous and as grantees, the Hickersons were entitled to "free and unobstructed ingress, egress and regress . . . over and across the easement" and thus the manual gate across the Hickersons' entrance violated their easement rights. The trial court added that if the easement terms are ambiguous, it found the necessary facts to reach the same conclusions.
The Rices contend the easement terms contain both patent and latent ambiguities. According to the Rices, a patent ambiguity exists because the easement does not expressly addressgates, and a latent ambiguity exists because the Rices' use of the easement to raise livestock conflicts with the "free and unobstructed ingress [and] egress" term.
The Hickersons argue the easement's terms are not ambiguous, the plain language grants them "free and unobstructed" access to the easement, and the trial court properly decided that the manual gate was an unauthorized obstruction.
Before we analyze the arguments, we recite the standards of review and the applicable law for construing the easement language.
For questions of law, such as construction of an unambiguous deed, we review the trial court's ruling de novo. Godoy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 575 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tex. 2019); Kardell v. Acker, 492 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).
If a party challenges the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial court's findings of fact, we use the same standards for reviewing a jury's verdict. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994); see Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, No. 17-0736, 2020 WL 499243, at *6 (Tex. Jan. 31, 2020).
For legal sufficiency, we determine "whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review." Teal Trading, 2020 WL 499243, at *6 (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)). "[We] consider evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and [we] indulge every reasonable inference that would support it." City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822; accord Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Tex. 2017).
"For legal sufficiency points, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the no evidence challenge fails." BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002); accord Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. OwnersAss'n, 534 S.W.3d 558, 582 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017), aff'd, No. 17-0736, 2020 WL 499243 (Tex. Jan. 31, 2020).
When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on which the party did not have the burden of proof at trial, we consider and weigh all the relevant evidence, and we will "set[] aside the finding only if . . . [we] determine that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak . . . that the answer should be set aside and a new trial ordered." Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 615 (Tex. 2016); see W. Wendell Hall & Ryan G. Anderson, Standards of Review in Texas, 50 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1099, 1135 (2019).
"A deed is subject to the same rules of interpretation and construction as a contract." Cooke v. Morrison, 404 S.W.3d 100, 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Tex. 1991)); accord Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 700 (Tex. 2002) ().
"Whether a [deed] is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide by looking at the [deed] as a whole in light of the circumstances present when the contract was entered." Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1983); accord Rico v. Judson Lofts, Ltd., 404 S.W.3d 762, 767 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). "If a deed is worded in such a way that it can be given a definite or certain legal meaning, then the deed is not ambiguous." Combest v. Mustang Minerals, LLC, 502 S.W.3d 173, 185 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016...
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