Rice v. Metro. Life Ins. Co

• Decision Date: 19 February 1919
• Docket Number: (No. 15.)
• Citation: 98 S.E. 283
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: RICE . v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

98 S.E. 283

RICE .

v.METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

(No. 15.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 19, 1919.

Appeal from Superior Court, Beaufort County; Devin, Judge.

Action by Lina Rice against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Two causes of action are stated in the complaint. The first alleges that the defendant issued to the plaintiff a policy of Insurance on the 3d day of October, 1904, and that the plaintiff was induced to accept the policy and pay the premiums thereon by false and fraudulent representations of the agent of the defendant that, If she would pay theweekly premiums for a period of 12 years or more, she could then get back all the premiums paid, and the second alleges the right of the plaintiff to have a paid-up policy of insurance issued to her.

The defendant denied that any false representations were made by its agent, but agreed to issue a paid-up policy as demanded in the second cause of action.

The action was tried before a jury on the first cause of action, and the jury returned the following verdict:

"(1) Did defendant's agent at the time of delivering the policy of insurance, and as a part of the transaction of its execution, falsely and fraudulently represent to the plaintiff that, if she would take the policy and pay the premiums 12 years, she would under the terms of the policy be entitled to receive her premiums if she so elected? A. Yes.

"(2) If so, was the plaintiff reasonably deceived thereby, and caused to rely on said statement and unable to understand from the policy that the representation was false? A. Yes.

"(3) Did defendant's agent wrongly and incorrectly read the policy to the plaintiff, and, if so, was she deceived thereby and caused to take out the policy? A. Yes.

"(4) Did the plaintiff more than three years prior to the commencement of the action discover, or would she in the exercise of reasonable care have discovered, that any statement alleged to have been made by the agent that she could get her premiums back at the end of 12 years was untrue and contrary to the provisions of the policy? A. No.

"(5) What damage, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover? A. $312."

Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed, presenting in several exceptions the contention that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover upon her own evidence.

Small, McLean, Bragaw & Rodman, of Washington, N. C, for appellant.

Ward & Grimes, of Washington, N. C., for appellee.

ALLEN, J. [1, 2] The policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff is singularly free from ambiguous and uncertain language, and it contains express provision that it may be surrendered within two weeks of its date and the premiums paid recovered, if not satisfactory, thus affording opportunity to become familiar with its terms.

The plaintiff testified that the agent who sold the policy read it to her, and she does not say it was read incorrectly. She also says she did not think the agent understood the policy himself, and that he told her to get others to read it for her. He "didn't do anything to keep me from reading it, and he suggested to me to get other people to read it to me." The plaintiff can read and write. She read the policy, and others read it to her. Seven months after the policy was issued she told the agent she did not believe it was "any good." In 1908, four years after the date of the policy, she demanded of the defendant the return of the premiums paid, claiming that the agent of the defendant represented to her that she could get her money back at any time, and this demand was refused, and in 1912, desiring to change the beneficiary, she had Mr. Cave, whom she said she had found correct in all his dealings, to read the policy to her. She continued to pay the premiums until 1916.

These facts are disclosed by the evidence of the plaintiff, and they preclude a recovery upon the ground of false representations, because an investigation of the contents of the policy was not only not prevented, but was invited, and the means of information were equally open to both parties.

"The misrepresentation which will vitiate a contract of sale, and prevent a court of equity from aiding its enforcement, must not only relate to a material matter constituting an inducement to the contract, but it must relate to a matter respecting which the complaining party did not possess at hand the means of knowledge; and it must be a misrepresentation upon which he relied, and by which he was actually misled to his injury. A court of equity will not undertake, any more than a court of law, to relieve a party from the consequences of his own inattention and carelessness. Where the means of knowledge are at hand and equally available to both parties, and the subject of purchase is alike open to their inspection, if the purchaser does not avail himself of these means and opportunities, he will not be heard to say that he has been deceived by the vendor's misrepresentations. If, having eyes, he will not see matters directly before them, where no concealment is made or attempted, he will not be entitled to favorable consideration when...