Rice v. State

• Decision Date: 30 September 1830
• Citation: 9 Tenn. 432
• Parties: WILLIAM P. RICE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

9 Tenn. 432

WILLIAM P. RICE

v.STATE OF TENNESSEE.

Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee.

September, 1830.

Opinion of the court delivered by Judge PECK.

The first count charges Rice, that with force and arms he wilfully, wickedly, unlawfully, feloniously and falsely did make, forge and counterfeit, and did cause to be, &c., a certain acquitance and receipt for money, to wit, for all demands that a certain John B. Kelly and a certain William Porter had against him, the said Rice; which receipt is in these words, &c.

The second count charges, that the said Wm. P. Rice was indebted to John B. Kelly and Wm. Porter in a large sum, for work and labor by them done and performed; and being indebted, as aforesaid, with intention to defraud the said Kelly and Porter, with force and arms, did falsely, &c., make, forge and counterfeit a certain receipt or aquittance, purporting to be executed by the said Kelly and Porter; by writing said receipt over the signature of the said Kelly and Porter, &c., in these words: “Received payment in full of all demands that we have against William P. Rice, up to this day. July, 14, 1829.

JOHN B. KELLY,

WILLIAM PORTER.”

And the grand Jury aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do say that the said William P. Rice, at, to wit, &c., on the day, &c., by the means aforesaid, the said paper writing, commonly called a receipt, feloniously, did then and there falsely make, forge and counterfeit to the damage of the said John B. Kelly and William Porter, contrary to the form of the statute, &c.

The defendant pleaded not guilty, and was put upon his trial.

The bill of exceptions shows these facts, in relation to selecting a traverse jury: In trying the panel, when the jurors declared that they had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the court refused to discharge them, but propounded the following questions successively to them:

1. Have you expressed that opinion?

2. Was that opinion formed from conversing with, or hearing, the witnesses converse upon the subject?

3. Do you think, notwithstanding that opinion, you are in a condition to try the cause impartially?

All of these questions being answered in the affirmative, the jurors were presented to the prisoner for election; to which the defendant objected, and as such, insisted on his right of peremptory challenge; but was overruled.

The first count in the indictment, we are inclined to think, is not sufficient in law, omitting as it does to charge any debt due from the defendant to Kelly and Porter. For the want of this averment the receipt might be harmless. The second count, for the present, may be taken as sufficient; though certainly inartificially drawn.

The question raised in the record, touching the manner of testing the qualification of jurors, is one of great importance. The right of trial by an impartial jury is guaranteed to every man. The mode of arriving at that degree of impartiality contemplated by the constitution, should be fixed and uniform. Most persons who have witnessed the trial of an accused for crime, in counties of small population, can scarcely have failed to observe how few, called as jurors, stand indifferent...