Rice v. State
| Decision Date | 16 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 45S00–1206–CR–343.,45S00–1206–CR–343. |
| Citation | 6 N.E.3d 940 |
| Parties | Ronnie Jamel RICE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Thomas W. Vanes, Crown Point, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, James B. Martin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Ronnie Jamel Rice appeals the trial court's sentencing order, arguing it improperly relies on non-statutory aggravators as a basis for imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Because we believe the order as revised comports with our precedent and does not represent an abuse of the trial court's discretion, we affirm.
Rice pled guilty to murder, murder in the perpetration of a robbery, and robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole and exercised his right to direct appeal to this Court. On appeal, Rice argued the trial court erred in considering non-statutory aggravating circumstances to support the sentencing order, and that his sentence was inappropriate and should be revised.
This Court held oral argument in February 2013 and thereafter issued an order directing the trial court to revise the sentencing order to comport with prior case law and to clarify “whether the trial court relied on non-capital aggravators when imposing sentence.” Rice v. State, No. 45S00–1206–CR–343, Order Remanding for Revised Sentencing Order (Ind. Feb. 12, 2013). The trial court issued a revised sentencing order of life without parole on March 5, 2013, and Rice appeals again, arguing the order remains deficient.
In 2005, the Indiana General Assembly amended our sentencing statutes in response to a series of United States Supreme Court decisions that limited the discretion of trial court judges.1 Important to this discussion, the amended statute includes a non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances trial courts may consider, and provides in part: “A court may impose any sentence that is: (1) authorized by statute; and (2) permissible under the Constitution of the State of Indiana; regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances.” Ind.Code § 35–38–1–7.1(d) (2008 & Supp.2013) (emphasis added). However, the Legislature left intact Ind.Code § 35–38–1–3, which provides:
Before sentencing a person for a felony, the court must conduct a hearing to consider the facts and circumstances relevant to sentencing. The person is entitled to subpoena and call witnesses and to present information in his own behalf. The court shall make a record of the hearing, including: (1) a transcript of the hearing; (2) a copy of the presentencereport; and (3) if the court finds aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances, a statement of the court's reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes.
After these enactments, we decided Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind.2007) in which we reiterated that “sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 490 (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind.2002)). And, while we held the trial court is no longer required to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors against each other, id. at 491, the trial court is required to issue “a statement of facts, in some detail, which are peculiar to the particular defendant and the crime, as opposed to general impressions or conclusions.” Id. at 490 (quoting Page v. State, 424 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (Ind.1981)). Without the trial court's reasons for imposing the sentence, appellate courts would be unable to carry out their function of reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion in sentencing. Id.
In Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246 (Ind.2008), we held that trial judges exercising discretion over the sentence imposed for the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole must comply with the requirements outlined in Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1262 (Ind.1995). Pittman, 885 N.E.2d at 1253–54. Thus, trial court judges are held to the same standard today when exercising discretion on sentencing decisions as they were before the sentencing amendment revisions.
In Harrison v. State we required sentencing findings in capital cases:
(i) must identify each mitigating and aggravating circumstance found, (ii) must include the specific facts and reasons which lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance, (iii) must articulate that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in determination of the sentence, ... and (iv) must set forth the trial court's personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and this crime.
644 N.E.2d at 1262 (internal citations omitted). This specificity is required to “insure the trial court consider[s] only proper matters when imposing sentence, thus safeguarding against the imposition of sentences which are arbitrary or capricious, and to enable the appellate court to determine the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.” Id. (citing Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487, 491 (Ind.1990) (internal citations omitted)).
A trial court's sentencing order will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490. Such abuse occurs only if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538 (Ind.2006) (internal citations omitted)). A trial court may abuse its discretion by
entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.
The trial court's original sentencing order said, in part:
The Court now enters the following findings and sentence:
Mitigating Circumstances:
1. The defendant has pled guilty and admitted his guilt.
2. The defendant has expressed remorse.
3. The defendant's youthful age.
Aggravating Circumstances:
1. The nature and circumstances of the offense: The brutal nature of the crime; the victim trusted the defendant; the defendant returned to the scene of the crime.
2. Totality of the circumstances: The defendant's history of stealing from his employers; the defendant's lack of violent behavior in the past; the escalating nature of his behavior at this time.
3. The Court's character assessment of the defendant: He is likely to commit another violent crime due to his gambling addiction, and it is likely to be another violent crime as he can befriend a person and then turn on them.
Cause submitted for sentencing. After considering the above along with the Pre–Sentence Investigation Report, the Court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and having found the defendant guilty in Count II, Murder in the Perpetration of Robbery, and having found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the killing was intentional the Court now sentences the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Appellant's Br. at 13–14. In his first appeal, Rice claimed the trial court identified “the brutal nature of the crime, the faith and trust the victim had placed in Rice (as [indicated] by her promotion of Rice on the job), and his return ‘to the scene of the crime’ to face the victim ... and what that conduct said about his character.” Appellant's Br. at 6–7. This Court remanded the case back to the trial court to revise the sentencing order because we could not determine whether the trial court had improperly relied on non-capital aggravators. Rice v. State, No. 45S00–1206–CR–343, Order Remanding for Revised Sentencing Order (Ind. Feb. 12, 2013). We concluded, “the interests of justice and judicial economy would best be served by the trial court having an opportunity to revise the sentencing order before we proceed with appellate review.” Id.
The trial court's revised order reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Findings:
1. Maxine Urbanczyk died December 10, 2007 in Merrillville Lake County Indiana;
2. That the cause of her death was blunt force trauma to the face and head;
3. That at the time of her death, she was at her place of employment and that money was taken from the business contemporaneous to her death;
4. That in his Statement of Facts Re: Guilty Plea, the defendant admits to entering the business on the morning of December 10, 2007, knowing that Ms. Urbanczky [sic] was present, with the intention of taking money from the safe. That in furtherance of that crime, he took Ms. Urbancyk [sic] code to the safe to get the money and hit her in the head with a hammer to prevent her from reporting the crime.
5. That in support of the request to impose the sentence of Life Without Par [o]le, the State alleges one Statutory Aggravator: that the defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing Maxine Urbanczyk while committing robbery ( [Ind.Code § 35–50–2–9(b)(1)(G) (2008 & Supp.2013) ] ).
6. The Court finds that based on the above stated facts submitted at the sentencing hearing and contained in the defendant's Statement of the Facts RE: Guilty Plea the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the sole Statutory Aggravator alleged.
7. Mitigators:
The Court finds the following mitigators:
a. The defendant has pled guilty and admitted his guilt. However, as an employee, the defendant was in a position of trust with the victim.
b. The defendant has expressed remorse. However, he returned to the scene of the...
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