Rice v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 27 June 1894
• Citation: 37 P. 440,9 Wash. 298
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: RICE v. STEVENS ET AL. (REESE ET AL., INTERVENERS.

37 P. 440

9 Wash. 298

RICE v. STEVENS ET AL. (REESE ET AL., INTERVENERS.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 27, 1894

Appeal from superior court, Pierce county; W. H. Pritchard, Judge.

Action by Stuart Rice against Calvin Stevens and others, defendants and Reese, Crandall & Redman, interveners, to quiet title to land. From a judgment for the interveners, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Wickersham & Reid and Geo. Herriott, for appellant.

Sharpstein & Blattner and Remington & Reynolds, for respondents.

SCOTT J.

Appellant commenced this action to remove an alleged cloud upon his title to premises conveyed to him by the Sumner Lumber Company. Respondents herein (defendants and interveners below) are judgment creditors of said lumber company. They filed cross-complaints asking, as affirmative relief against appellant, that the deed to said premises from the lumber company to appellant be set aside as fraudulent and void. A trial was had on November 7, 1893, and the cause was taken under advisement by the court until December 5th following when findings of fact and conclusions of law were duly made and filed, and judgment entered thereon that same day. Notice thereof was served on appellant's attorney on the next day, and, on the 30th of said month, appellant served notice of appeal "from each and every part of said decision and the whole thereof."

The appeal involves the court's findings upon the evidence. The respondents contend that the evidence is not before this court for review, because the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the lower court were not excepted to by appellant. Under the former statutes of the state and territory, when a cause had been tried by the court or referee, and the decision was not made immediately after the close of the testimony, the decision of the court was deemed excepted to. This continued to be the law, except as supplemented by the act of February 25, 1891 (section 398 vol. 2, of the Code), which provided that no exception need be taken with respect to any decision or ruling upon a matter of law, when the same was entered in the journal or made wholly on matters in writing and on file in the cause, until chapter 60 of the Laws of 1893 was enacted. Section 2, at page 112, of said act, provides that it shall not be necessary to take exceptions in certain cases, with this proviso: "But this section shall not apply to the report of a referee or commissioner or to findings of fact or conclusions of law, in a report or decision of a referee or commissioner, or in a decision of a court or judge upon a cause or part of a cause, either legal or equitable, tried without a jury." The next section provides how exceptions to such findings may be taken: "Either by stating to the judge, referee or commissioner when the report or decision is signed, that such party excepts to the same, specifying the part or parts excepted to (whereupon the judge, referee or commissioner, shall note the exceptions in the margin or at the foot of the report or decision); or by filing like written exceptions within five days after the filing of the report or decision, or, where the report or decision is signed subsequently to the hearing and in the absence of the party excepting, within five days after the service on such party of a copy of such report or...