Ricee' v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown

• Decision Date: 21 July 2021
• Docket Number: J-81-2020,3 WAP 2020
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: RENEE' A. RICE v. DIOCESE OF ALTOONA-JOHNSTOWN, BISHOP JOSEPH ADAMEC (RETIRED), MONSIGNOR MICHAEL E. SERVINSKY, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF BISHOP JAMES HOGAN, DECEASED, AND REVEREND CHARLES F. BODZIAK APPEAL OF: DIOCESE OF ALTOONA-JOHNSTOWN, BISHOP JOSEPH ADAMEC (RETIRED), MONSIGNOR MICHAEL E. SERVINSKY, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF BISHOP JAMES HOGAN, DECEASED

RENEE' A. RICE
v.
DIOCESE OF ALTOONA-JOHNSTOWN, BISHOP JOSEPH ADAMEC (RETIRED), MONSIGNOR MICHAEL E. SERVINSKY, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF BISHOP JAMES HOGAN, DECEASED, AND REVEREND CHARLES F. BODZIAK

APPEAL OF: DIOCESE OF ALTOONA-JOHNSTOWN, BISHOP JOSEPH ADAMEC (RETIRED), MONSIGNOR MICHAEL E. SERVINSKY, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF BISHOP JAMES HOGAN, DECEASED

No. 3 WAP 2020

No. J-81-2020

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

July 21, 2021

ARGUED: October 20, 2020

Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered June 11, 2019 at No. 97 WDA 2018, reversing the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County entered December 15, 2017 at No. 2016 GN 1919, and remanding.

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

DONOHUE, JUSTICE

In this appeal, we address the proper application of the statute of limitations to a tort action filed by Renee' Rice ("Rice") against the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown and its bishops (collectively, the "Diocese") for their alleged role in covering up and facilitating a series of alleged sexual assaults committed by the Reverend Charles F. Bodziak. Rice alleged that Bodziak sexually abused her from approximately 1974 through 1981. She did not file suit against Bodziak or the Diocese until June 2016, thirty-five years after the alleged abuse stopped.

For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that a straightforward application of Pennsylvania's statute of limitations requires that Rice's complaint be dismissed as untimely. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Superior Court and reinstate the trial court's dismissal of the case.

I. Procedural History

A. Rice's Complaint

Rice filed her initial complaint on June 20, 2016, asserting multiple claims, including breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conspiracy. Rice (born in 1967) and her family were members of St. Leo, a parish within the Altoona-Johnstown Diocese and she attended the affiliated Catholic school. First Amended Complaint, 8/16/2016, ¶¶ 21-23. Rice alleges that Father Bodziak was assigned to St. Leo's and began a "grooming" process which included taking Rice and other children on various youth activities. Id. ¶ 25. She contended that he first sexually assaulted her in 1974 when she was between eight or nine years old, placing his hand between her legs while the two were seated in a vehicle following one of these outings. Id. ¶ 26. She averred that he would routinely touch her private areas during subsequent outings, and on one occasion he kissed her and inserted his tongue into her mouth. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. At some unspecified point in time, Bodziak allegedly spoke to Rice's parents, requesting and receiving their permission to have Rice perform various chores at the rectory, where Bodziak resided. According to Rice, the assaults escalated at this point, as Bodziak would supply Rice with alcohol and then fondle her genitalia and kiss her. On one occasion, he allegedly inserted his fingers into her vagina. Id. ¶ 29. Bodziak assured Rice that the activities "were acceptable because he liked her and she was 'special.'" Id. ¶ 32. In her complaint, Rice alleged that these assaults initially occurred once or twice a month, and later rose to the level of approximately twice a week through 1981. Id. ¶ 33. Rice's complaint further alleged that Bishop Joseph Adamec served "as the Bishop or leader" of the Altoona-Johnstown Diocese from 1987 until 2011, while Bishop James Hogan filled that same role from 1966 through 1986. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Rice alleged that both men were empowered to supervise and control all priests assigned to the diocese, including parish assignments. Id. ¶ 6.

Rice did not report Bodziak's abuse to the authorities until "the first half of 2006" when she "reported her history of sexual abuse by Bodziak to Defendants Adamec and the Diocese." Id. ¶ 43. By letter dated July 17, 2006, Bishop Adamec "invite[d] [Rice] to share that information through our diocesan process for reviewing allegations." Exhibit A to Complaint. The letter explained that Rice could seek assistance from Sister Marilyn Welch as a designated victims' advocate, who would help present the cases to the Diocesan Allegation Review Board. Rice did not respond.

In early 2014, the District Attorney of Cambria County issued a referral to the Office of Attorney General regarding reports of sexual abuse occurring within the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown. On March 1, 2016, the 37th Investigating Grand Jury issued a report finding that hundreds of children were victimized by over fifty individual priests or religious leaders. The grand jury determined that "Bishops James Hogan and Joseph Adamec ... took actions that further endangered children" by returning priests to the ministry/parishes "with full knowledge they were child predators." Grand Jury Report at 6. The report discussed the existence of" 'secret archives' … used to hide scandalous information, such as sex abuse by priests." Id. at 8 (quoting news coverage from the Tribune-Democrat newspaper). With respect to Bodziak in particular, the Report indicated that Bodziak had sexually abused other victims and that the Diocese had been made aware of these incidents. In her complaint, Rice averred that upon reading the Report, she learned for the first time "that the [Diocese] ha[s] a long history of protecting child predators at the expense of innocent and vulnerable children, and knew or should have known of Bodziak's sexual attraction to young children and his inappropriate physical contact with them." First Amended Complaint, 8/16/2016, at 46 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

B. The Trial Court and Superior Court Opinions

The Diocese filed an answer and new matter followed by a motion for judgment on the pleadings, raising the statute of limitations as a defense. The Diocese argued that as Bodziak's last alleged assault occurred in 1981 the statute of limitations expired long ago. In support, the Diocese relied on a line of cases stemming from the Superior Court's decision in Meehan v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 870 A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. 2005), which reasoned, in relevant part, that

The child abuse is the injury in this matter, not the alleged cover-up by the Archdiocese (otherwise, any member of the Catholic Church could conceivably bring suit against the Archdiocese, absent any abuse, alleging injury from the Archdiocese's general conduct). Unlike traditional discovery rule cases where the injury, itself, is not known or cannot be reasonably ascertained, the plaintiffs' injuries, here, were known when the abuse occurred

The [Plaintiffs] are really claiming that they were unaware not of their injury, but of a secondary cause of their injury (the primary cause being the individual who committed the abuse). The plaintiffs claim that a jury should determine if the plaintiffs should have investigated these secondary parties during the limitations period or if the plaintiffs were unable, despite reasonable diligence, to bring suit against these secondary parties until 2002

Id. at 920. Accord Baselice v. Franciscan Friars Assumption BVM Province, Inc., 879 A.2d 270, 277 (Pa. Super. 2005) ("As in Meehan, appellant, here, is really claiming that he was unaware, not of his injury, but of a secondary cause of his injury[.]"). The trial court granted the motion, agreeing that "as in Meehan and Baselice, it was always known to the Plaintiff that the causes of her alleged injury were the actions of Defendant Bodziak and the Diocese overseeing him." Trial Court Opinion and Order, 12/15/2017, at 10.

The Superior Court reversed. Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 212 A.3d 1055 (Pa. Super. 2019). The court concluded that the "discovery rule" and "fraudulent concealment" both applied and reversed the trial court. For the discovery rule analysis, the court held that Rice alleged sufficient facts to place the issues of notice and diligence to the jury. The Superior Court accepted that the relevant chronological event was when Rice could have learned of the cover-up, and not simply knowledge of the abuses as held by Meehan. The Superior Court concluded that "Meehan, Baselice, and their progeny reviewed child-sexual-abuse allegations in [a] vacuum[, ]" a practice forbidden by Nicolaou v. Martin, 195 A.3d 880 (Pa. 2018), according to the Superior Court. Id. at 1064-65.

The panel proceeded to "apply Nicolaou to Ms. Rice's discovery-rule theory and alleged facts." Id. at 1066. The Superior Court established what it perceived as dueling sets of facts that must be submitted to the jury for fact-finding. On the one hand, the Diocese argued that the facts as pled in the complaint indicated that Rice knew of the injuries inflicted by Bodziak, that Bodziak was employed by the Diocese, and that the abuse occurred on church grounds. On the other, Rice argued "no reasonable person would have suspected, much less investigated, the Diocesan Defendants for the torts she has alleged until the Grand Jury Report became public." Id. Extrapolating from its reading of Nicolaou, the Superior Court determined that applying the statute of limitations based on the Diocese's argument required viewing the Diocese's facts in a vacuum. The panel characterized the Meehan line of cases as "credit[ing] the facts favorable to the archdiocese and its hierarchy." Id. at 1065. According to the Superior Court, pursuant to Nicolaou, courts could no longer ignore inferences favorable to the plaintiffs' discovery-rule theory, which included, inter alia, Rice's assertion that she had no basis to suspect that the Diocese would cover up abuse and the massive investigative efforts needed to ultimately uncover the Diocese's transgressions. Id. at 1065-66. Accordingly, the panel determined that the jury must resolve the competing facts.

The Superior Court next addressed the fraudulent concealment argument. According to Rice she had a "special, confidential relationship"...