Baselice v. Franciscan Friars Assumption

• Decision Date: 01 July 2005
• Citation: 879 A.2d 270
• Parties: Arthur BASELICE, III, Appellant v. FRANCISCAN FRIARS ASSUMPTION BVM PROVINCE, INC., Reverend Thomas Luczak, OFM, Archdiocese of Philadelphia, Archbishop Ryan High School, Cardinal Justin Rigali, and Cardinal Anthony Bevilacqua, Appellees (Two Cases).
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

879 A.2d 270

Arthur BASELICE, III, Appellant v. FRANCISCAN FRIARS ASSUMPTION BVM PROVINCE, INC., Reverend Thomas Luczak, OFM, Archdiocese of Philadelphia, Archbishop Ryan High School, Cardinal Justin Rigali, and Cardinal Anthony Bevilacqua, Appellees (Two Cases).

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 25, 2005.

Filed July 1, 2005.

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Jay N. Abramowitch, Wyomissing, for Baselice, appellant.

C. Clark Hodgson, Jr., Philadelphia, for Archdiocese, appellee.

Dennis R. Suplee, Philadelphia, for Franciscan Friars and Luczak, appellees.

Before: DEL SOLE, P.J., BENDER and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.

OLSZEWSKI, J.:

¶ 1 Appellant, Arthur Baselice, III, challenges the orders of October 13, 2004, granting motions for judgment on the pleadings in favor of appellees, the Franciscan Friars Assumption BVM Province, Inc., Reverend Thomas Luczak, OFM, the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, Archbishop Ryan High School, Cardinal Justin Rigali, and Cardinal Anthony Bevilacqua. The motions for judgment on the pleadings were granted primarily on the basis of the statute of limitations. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the motions, arguing that the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment exceptions to the statute of limitations are applicable and that jury determinations are necessary with regard to his issues. Additionally, appellant challenges the dismissal of his additional claims against appellees (based on conduct occurring after the original sexual abuse), for which appellant filed his complaint within the time period of the applicable statute of limitations. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the motions with regard to these claims, arguing that factual questions remain with regard to whether appellees committed torts against appellant within two years of the filing of appellant's complaint. We affirm.

¶ 2 The relevant factual history is as follows. Appellant initiated the present action on June 22, 2004. Trial Court Opinion, 1/18/2005, at 1. The allegations of appellant's complaint, deemed true for purposes of this appeal, include claims of improper sexual contact between Father Newman, a priest, and appellant, a student at Archbishop Ryan High School from 1992 to 1996. Id. at 1-2. Appellant also claims that Father Newman introduced appellant to and supplied appellant with drugs and alcohol, resulting in appellant's current addictions to drugs and alcohol. Id. at 2. Appellant, now twenty-six years of age, was admitted to an in-patient drug and alcohol treatment facility in 2004, per a recommendation by the Archdiocese of Philadelphia. Id. While appellant was admitted at this facility, the Archdiocese attempted to contact appellant with regard to a settlement agreement. Id.

¶ 3 Appellant's complaint contains claims for statutory violation/negligence per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, common law duty of reasonable care, breach of fiduciary duty, failure to provide a safe and secure environment, negligent supervision, persons acting in concert, negligent misrepresentation, failure to protect against foreseeable risk, duty to warn of an unreasonable risk of harm, negligent supervision or use of improper persons as agent, use of incompetent persons, fraudulent concealment, intentional failure to supervise, intentional failure to warn, and punitive damages. Appellant's Complaint, at 28-55. On August 26, 2004, appellees filed motions for judgment on the pleadings; and on October 13, 2004, the lower court granted the motions and dismissed the case. Docket Report, at 4, 6. This appeal follows.

¶ 4 Our scope of review on an appeal from the grant of judgment on the pleadings "is plenary . . . we must determine if the action of the court below was based on clear error of law or whether there were facts disclosed by the pleadings which should properly go to the jury." Citicorp North America, Inc. v. Thornton, 707 A.2d 536, 538 (Pa.Super.1998). Entry of judgment on the pleadings is permitted under Pa.R.C.P. 1034, "which provides for such judgment after the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay trial . . . it may be entered when there are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. Additionally, the standard to be applied on review "accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true." Tucker v. Philadelphia Daily News, 577 Pa. 598, 848 A.2d 113, 131 (2004).

Statute of Limitations Issue

¶ 5 Appellant's first contention is that the trial court erred by entering judgment on the pleadings based on the statute of limitations where the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment exceptions and analyses were applicable so as to warrant a jury determination.¹ Appellant's Brief, at 5. In support of his claims, appellant cites decisions of the court of common pleas² in which the lower courts denied preliminary objections or motions for judgment on the pleadings based on the statute of limitations. These courts found that there were fact questions for the jury to determine whether the plaintiffs knew or should have known that they were injured or that the Archdiocese could have been responsible for their injuries. Appellant claims that similarly, the jury must resolve the issues here. Appellant's Brief, at 23-26.

¶ 6 Appellant emphasizes that his claims against appellees are independent causes of action from any claims against Father Newman. And, while stating that at the time of the sexual assault he knew that he had suffered an injury at the hands of Father Newman, appellant contends that he was unaware until recently that appellees were possible causes of his injuries. Appellant's Brief, 31-38; Appellant's Complaint 24-26.

¶ 7 Additionally, appellant argues that the special relationship between the parties, as well as the conduct of appellees, caused appellant to relax his vigilance in bringing suit and contributed to appellant's lack of knowledge with regard to the causes of his injuries. Appellant argues that his general relationship to the church amounts to the specific level of a fiduciary duty, no different from an attorney-client relationship. Appellant's Complaint 24-26; Appellant's Brief, 20-23.

¶ 8 Ultimately, appellant's discovery rule exception claim is that he did not know he was injured by appellees at the time of the abuse and that because of appellees' conduct, he could not have known that appellees injured him or caused his injury at the time of the abuse. Appellant's fraudulent concealment claim is that because of the nature of his relationship to appellees, and due to the systematic pattern of conduct exhibited by appellees, the statute of limitations should be tolled since appellant relaxed his vigilance in bringing suit and appellees' conduct prevented him from discovering his injury or its cause within the prescribed period of time. We are constrained to disagree.

¶ 9 Under Pennsylvania law, tort claims for intentional conduct, negligence, and conduct based in fraud are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524 states, in pertinent part, "the following actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years: an action for assault, battery, false imprisonment . . . an action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another . . . [and] any other action or proceeding to recover damages for injury to person or property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or otherwise tortious conduct or any other action or proceeding sounding in trespass, including deceit or fraud." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(1), (2), (7).

¶ 10 The statute begins to run "as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises; lack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding do not toll the running of the statute of limitations." Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 503 Pa. 80, 468 A.2d 468, 471 (1983). A person asserting a claim "is under a duty to use all reasonable diligence to be properly informed of the facts and circumstances upon which a potential right of recovery is based and to institute suit within the prescribed statutory period." Id.

¶ 11 The statute of limitations requires "aggrieved individuals to bring their claims within a certain time of the injury, so that the passage of time does not damage the defendant's ability to adequately defend against claims made . . . the statute of limitations supplies the place of evidence lost or impaired by lapse of time, by raising a presumption which renders proof unnecessary." Dalrymple v. Brown, 549 Pa. 217, 701 A.2d 164, 167 (1997). Statutes of limitations "are designed to effectuate three purposes: (1) preservation of evidence; (2) the right of potential defendants to repose; and (3) administrative efficiency and convenience." Kingston Coal Company v. Felton Min. Co., Inc., 456 Pa.Super. 270, 690 A.2d 284, 288 (1997).

¶ 12 Here, almost ten years have passed since the latest instance of alleged abuse. It is clear that unless an exception is applicable, appellant's claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

¶ 13 Appellant argues that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations. The discovery rule is an exception to the requirement that a complaining party must file suit within the statutory period. The discovery rule provides that "where the existence of the injury is not known to the complaining party and such knowledge cannot reasonably be ascertained within the prescribed statutory period, the limitations period does not begin to run until the discovery of the injury is reasonably possible." Id. The statute begins to run in such instances when the injured party "possesses sufficient critical facts to put him on notice that a wrong has been committed and that he need investigate to determine whether he is...