Rich Land Seed Co. v. BLSW Pleasure Corp.
| Docket Number | Civ. ACTION 3:21-01070 |
| Decision Date | 31 May 2022 |
| Parties | RICH LAND SEED CO., INC., ET AL. v. BLSW PLEASURE CORP., ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, are two motions to dismiss filed by Defendants, Chevron Pipe Line Company (“Chevron”) [doc. # 47] and Marathon Oil Company (“Marathon”) [doc. # 53], which seek to dismiss certain claims of Plaintiff, Rich Land Seed Company (“Rich Land”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motions are opposed. [doc. # 61]. For reasons explained below, it is recommended that the motions be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
On March 9, 2021, Plaintiff Rich Land filed the instant oilfield contamination a/k/a “legacy” lawsuit[1] on its own behalf, and as relator on behalf of the State of Louisiana and the Commissioner of Conservation, [2] in the Fifth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Richland State of Louisiana against fourteen named Defendants, plus an unknown insurance company, [3]arising out of decades-long oil and gas exploration and production activities conducted on Rich Land's property by the Defendants and/or their predecessors. (Petition).[4] Specifically, Rich Land alleged that it is the owner of three tracts of land in Richland and Morehouse Parishes (sometimes referred to as “the Property”) that Defendants, or their predecessors-in-interest, contaminated or otherwise damaged via their oil and gas exploration and production activities which included the construction, and subsequent abandonment of wells, sumps, flowlines, pipelines, tank batteries wellheads, and unlined earthen pits. (Petition). Rich Land asserted a comprehensive compilation of theories of recovery against Defendants and seeks to recover compensatory, punitive, and/or exemplary damages associated with restoring the lands to their original, unpolluted state, the diminution of property value, and resulting stigma. See Petition, Prayer. Rich Land also seeks injunctive and equitable relief, plus an award of attorney's fees. Id.
On April 21, 2021, Defendants, Memphis, Marathon, and Chevron, removed the suit to federal court on the sole basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Notice of Removal). On May 21, 2021, Rich Land filed a motion to remand, which the court ultimately denied, and, in so doing, dismissed the claims brought by Rich Land as relator on behalf of the State of Louisiana and the Commissioner of Conservation, plus Rich Land's claims against Defendants, BLSW Pleasure Corporation; Bryson Oil & Gas, Inc.; C H Cuatro; Equitable Petroleum Corporation; Lo-Ho-Fi Corporation; Loe Oil & Gas Corporation; Marlog, Inc.; Quad Drilling Corporation; S. H. Loe Oil Corporation; WG Gas LLC; and WG Gas, LLC. [doc. #s 16-18].
On November 16 and December 1, 2021, Chevron and Marathon, respectively, filed the instant motions, apparently seeking partial dismissal of Rich Land's petition/complaint, as amended, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rich Land filed an omnibus opposition to all pending motions to dismiss[5] on January 12, 2022. [doc. # 61]. Chevron and Marathon filed reply briefs in support of their motions on February 8 and 9, 2022. [doc. #s 64, 66]. Rich Land filed a sur-reply on February 17, 2022. [doc. # 72]. Accordingly, the matter is ripe.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim for relief when, inter alia, it contains a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. See Iqbal, supra. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, supra (citation omitted). A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable, and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly.
Although the court must accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the complaint, the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. Moreover, courts are compelled to dismiss claims grounded upon invalid legal theories even though they might otherwise be well-pleaded. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989). Furthermore, “a complaint may be dismissed if it clearly lacks merit-for example, where there is an absence of law to support a claim of the sort made.” Thurman v. Med. Transp. Mgmt., Inc., 982 F.3d 953, 956 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, “[t]he notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and case law do not require an inordinate amount of detail or precision.” Gilbert v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida Inc., 295 Fed. App'x. 710, 713 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “a complaint need not pin plaintiff's claim for relief to a precise legal theory. “Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires only a plausible ‘short and plain' statement of the plaintiff's claim, not an exposition of [its] legal argument.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011) (citing C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC., § 1219, pp. 277-78 (3d ed. 2004 and Supp. 2010)). Indeed, “[c]ourts must focus on the substance of the relief sought and the allegations pleaded, not on the label used.” Gearlds v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 709 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl., 127 S.Ct. at 1958).
Finally, when considering a motion to dismiss, courts generally are limited to the complaint and its proper attachments. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5thCir. 2008) (citation omitted). However, courts may rely upon “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice” - including public records. Dorsey, supra; Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n9 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (proper to take judicial notice of matters of public record). Furthermore, “[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [her] claim.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-499 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Discussion[6]
Both Chevron and Marathon seek dismissal of eleven common claims, theories of recovery, and/or forms of damages. However, Marathon's motion encompasses four additional claims: fraud; § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts; continuing tort, continuing trespass, and continuing nuisance; and third-party beneficiary. Even though Chevron did not seek dismissal of these additional claims, given Rich Land's “group pleading, ” the court will treat the motion as if it had. See Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768, 236 F.3d 766 (5th Cir. 2001) ().[7] Because Marathon's motion is the more comprehensive submission, the court, with one exception, will discuss the issues in the order that they appear in Marathon's brief.
According to Marathon, the only allegations linking it to Rich Land's cause of action are found in the “Operator History” attached to the Petition, which provides that Marathon's alleged predecessor, Transcontinental Oil Company, operated two wells on the subject property one-hundred years ago, between 1920 and 1924: the Chess-Wymond #1 (Serial No. 2462) that was plugged and abandoned in 1922, and the Chess-Wymond #2 (Serial No. 7642) that was drilled as a dry hole in 1924. (Petition, Exh. B, Operator History, pg. 1 [doc. # 1-4]).
According to Chevron, the “Operator History” indicates that its alleged predecessor is Gulf Refining Company of Louisiana, which operated two wells on the subject property between 1927 and 1928: the Chess & Wymond # A-1 (Serial No. 11631), which was a dry hole, and the Chess Wymond Company #1 (Serial No. 11393), which was plugged and abandoned less than one year after it was completed. .
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