Rich v. Bray

• Decision Date: 14 January 1889
• Citation: 37 F. 273
• Parties: RICH et al. v. BRAY et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

37 F. 273

RICH et al. v. BRAY et al.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Missouri, Central Division.

January 14, 1889

D. B Henderson and J. C. Meredith, for complainants.

Smith Silver & Brown, for defendants.

PHILLIPS J.

This is a bill in equity. The petitioners are non-residents of the state, and the respondents are citizens of this district. The bill alleges, in substance, that William Bray, the maternal grandfather of complainants, died intestate at Macies county Mo., on or about the 15th day of February, 1883; that he died seised and possessed of a large amount of real estate and personal property, undisposed of by will or otherwise; that he left no widow; and that no letters of administration have ever been granted on his estate; that complainants and respondents, and other unknown heirs, citizens of the dominion of Canada, not made parties thereto, are his sole heirs at law; that on his death the respondent Thomas Bray took possession of the entire estate of decedent, consisting of large tracts of land and personal property, mill machinery, stores, and appliances, household furniture, horses, wagons, and implements of husbandry, farm products, live-stock, and other chattels, as also the rents, products, and profits of said mill and farm, moneys, notes, mortgages, and bonds, and has ever since continued to hold, use, and enjoy the same as his own property, to the exclusion of the other rightful heirs of the decedent; that he has made large profits out of said property, concealing from the complainants the fact of the existence of such property, whereby they have sustained great loss by the acts and misrepresentations of said Thomas Bray. The prayer of the bill is that said Thomas Bray be declared a trustee of said estate for the said heirs, and that he be required to render a full and true account of all properties, real and personal, that so came into his hands, and account for the increase and profits thereof; that distribution be decreed to be made of the entire estate among the lawful heirs; and for all proper relief. To this bill the respondent Thomas Bray demurs for various grounds of objection, which, so far as deemed essential, will be considered in their order.

1. It is objected that complainants have no standing in a court of equity, for the reason that they have an adequate and complete remedy at law. It may be conceded that if this action had been instituted in the state court, it would fail, so far as the personal property is concerned, for the reason that the probate system under the state statute has in this respect largely superseded the ancient equity jurisdiction of the chancery courts for discovering, marshaling and distributing the estates of decedents at the suit of the heir or creditor. The administration law of the state affords adequate remedies and facilities to accomplish the object sought by this bill, to have an executor de son tort disclose the assets in his hands, and for their summary recovery, administration, and distribution by either a private or public administrator, rendering a resort to a court of equity unnecessary. Titterington v. Hooker, 58 Mo. 596; Pearce v. Calhoun, 59 Mo. 274; Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 251; Davis v. Smith, 75 Mo. 228; French v. Stratton, 79 Mo. 562, 563. See, also, discussion in Rozelle v. Harmon, 29 Mo.App. 569. It cannot be questioned, however, that such a bill would have come within the cognizance of the court of chancery in England, as that jurisdiction was exercised at the time of the adoption of our federal constitution. In Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 105, Judge STORY observed: 'It has been for a great length of time settled that in cases of administration of assets courts of equity have a concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law. The original ground seems to have been that a creditor or other party in interest had a right to come into chancery for a discovery of assets; and, being once rightfully there, he should not be turned over to a suit at law for final redress. And for the purposes of complete justice, it became necessary to conduct the whole administration and distribution of the assets under the superintendence of the court of chancery, when it once interfered to grant relief in such cases.'

See Thompson v. Brown, 4 Johns.Ch. 619. The United States courts derive their equity as well as common-law jurisdiction from the federal constitution and laws. Eve; in states where there are no chancery courts the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts none the less obtains. The state legislature cannot by the adoption of any system of administering justice restrict the constitutional jurisdiction of the federal court. Lorman v. Clark, 2 McLean, 568; Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212. As said by Mr. Justice WAYNE in Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 592:

'It is no objection to equity jurisdiction in the courts of the United States that there is a remedy under the local law, for the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the same in all of the states, and is not affected by the existence or non-existence of an equity jurisdiction in the state tribunals. It is the same in nature and extent as the jurisdiction of England, whence it is derived.'

So it has been repeatedly held that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over controversies between citizens of different states cannot be impaired by the laws of the state which prescribes the modes of redress in their courts, or which regulate the distribution of their judicial power. Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 175; Suydan v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67. In Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 430, Mr. Justice DAVIS uses this language:

'If legal remedies are sometimes modified to suit the changes in the laws of the states and the practice of their courts, it is not so with equitable. The equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts is the same that the high court of chancery in England possesses; is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by state legislation; and is uniform throughout the different states of the Union.'

I do not wish to be understood as holding, by anything here said or maintained, that where an estate is in process of administration under the state statute, in the absence of any matters of fraud, and the like, which would call into action the special powers of courts of equity for the attainment of entire justice, that a party entitled to sue in this court on the grounds of citizenship could call upon it to arrest the jurisdiction of the state court, already acquired, and take upon itself the administration and distribution of the estate. And where relief is sought on the equity side of the court, the bill, of course, should present some of the exceptional facts which evoke and call into exercise the extraordinary powers of a court of chancery. The bill in this case shows that there has been no administration after the lapse of five years; that Bray has wrongfully appropriated the whole estate to his use, traded and speculated upon it, changed the original form of some of the property, made profits thereon, and been guilty of concealment, rendering a discovery and accounting necessary. These are matters coming within the customary jurisdiction of courts of equity.

2. It is also objected that it does not sufficiently appear that the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $2,000. As the amount in dispute is a jurisdictional fact, it should be made to appear affirmatively on the face of the bill. The only allegation from which any idea of the value of the property in controversy can be derived is contained in the following statement: 'The amount of which is unknown to said complainants, but much more than two thousand dollars over and above all just debts and funeral expenses. ' How much more than $2,000? This averment could be true if the amount were only $2,100, or less. Is this sufficient to give this court jurisdiction? There are a large number of heirs or distributees to share in this property; and it is manifest on the face of the bill that the interest of no one of them, nor the interest of all the complainants combined, amounts to the sum in suit. Some of the heirs who are admitted to the distributees, and whose respective shares would have to be reserved for them, are not made parties to this suit. Therefore the position necessarily assumed by complainants is, that their respective interests and rights are so far separable that any number of them may proceed with the litigation without the others. I understand the rule in such case to be that, where two or more parties may thus join, as a matter of convenience to prevent multiplicity of suits, in one action, for the ascertainment and distribution of their respective interests in a common fund, the interest of each independent of the others, must amount to the sum of $2,000, to give jurisdiction to this court. King v. Wilson, 1 Dill. 556-568; Massa v. Cutting, 30 F. 1; Woodman v. Latimer, 2 Fed.Rep. 842; Seaver v. Bigelows, 5 Wall. 208-210; Terry v. Hatch, 93 U.S. 44; Chatfield v. Boyle, 105 U.S. 231-234. The case presented by this bill is, in my opinion, quite distinguishable in principle from that involved in Davies v. Corbin, 112 U.S. 36, 5 S.Ct. 4. That was a proceeding by mandamus at the relation of several judgment creditors to compel the levy of taxes by the proper county officer to raise the fund...