Richard M., In re

• Decision Date: 05 August 1985
• Docket Number: No. 83-416,83-416
• Citation: 127 N.H. 12,497 A.2d 1200
• Parties: In re RICHARD M. (New Hampshire Division of Mental Health and Developmental Services).
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 1200

497 A.2d 1200

127 N.H. 12

In re RICHARD M. (New Hampshire Division of Mental Health and Developmental Services).

No. 83-416.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Aug. 5, 1985.

Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc., Concord (M. Elaine Beauchesne, Concord, orally, and Ronald K. Lospennato, Concord, on the brief), for Richard M.

Stephen E. Merrill, Atty. Gen. (Loretta S. Platt, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief and orally), for the Div. of Mental Health and Developmental Services.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

In this appeal from a ruling of the New Hampshire Division of Mental Health and Developmental Services (division), several issues have been raised with respect to the division's decision that the plaintiff, Richard M., is not developmentally impaired and, therefore, is not eligible for services under RSA chapter 171-A (1977 & Supp.1983). We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

In summarizing the lengthy procedural and factual history of this case, we refer only to those facts necessary to a determination of the issues raised in this appeal.

In 1971, at the age of 15, Richard M. was involved in an automobile accident and suffered a brain injury. In April 1982, he began receiving services from the Lakes Region Community Services Council, an area agency established for the purpose of administering area-wide programs and services for the developmentally impaired. See RSA 171-A:18 (Supp.1983). In February 1983, the area agency informed Richard's guardian, Peggy Goodwin, that it did not believe that Richard qualified for services under RSA chapter 171-A (1977 & Supp.1983), but it agreed to continue to provide services until the question of eligibility was resolved. On March 29, 1983, a client centered conference was held for the purpose of resolving the eligibility issue.

Thereafter, Ms. Goodwin wrote to the area agency requesting emergency placement services for Richard. In a letter dated April 20, 1983, the area agency informed Ms. Goodwin that it had determined that Richard was not eligible for services under RSA chapter 171-A (1977 & Supp.1983) and that services would be terminated on May 20, 1983.

Richard's counsel then sought a review of the decision to terminate services and requested an appeal before the division director. See Div. Mental Health & Dev. Servs. R. (hereinafter "Div. R.") He-M 503.17 (1982). On May 24, 1983, a hearing was held, at which time Richard's counsel argued that Richard is developmentally impaired within the meaning of RSA 171-A:2, V (1977 & Supp.1983) because, as a result of the brain injury received in 1971, he suffers both from a specific learning disability and a condition closely related to mental retardation. On August 10, 1983, the division director, Ronald C. Andrews, upheld the decision of the area agency, reasoning that Richard is not developmentally impaired either as the result of a specific learning disability or as the result of any other condition closely related to mental retardation.

Richard then appealed the director's decision to this court. By order dated April 19, 1984, we granted the State's motion to remand the case to the division for further agency review under a recently promulgated regulation defining "specific learning disability." See Div.R. He-M 503.02 (rr) (1984).

On remand, the division director determined that the regulatory definition of "specific learning disability" includes a brain injury. See Div.R. He-M 503.02 (rr) (1984). The director then stated, however, that the question was whether the specific learning disability meets the definitional criteria of "developmental impairment" set forth in Div. R. He-M 503.02(p)(1984). He determined that Richard's brain injury does not constitute a severe handicap as required by Div.R. He-M 503.02(p)(1)c (1984) and thus upheld the decision of the area agency that Richard is ineligible for services under RSA chapter 171-A (1977 & Supp.1983). In this appeal, Richard raises four issues with respect to the director's original decision and his decision on remand.

We first address Richard's claim that the director erred on remand when, after finding that a brain injury is a specific learning disability, he applied the regulatory definition of "developmental impairment," see Div.R. He-M 503.02(p)(1984), in determining that Richard is not developmentally impaired within the meaning of RSA chapter 171-A (1977 & Supp.1983).

The legislature has defined the term "developmental impairment" in RSA 171-A:2, V (1977 & Supp.1983). That statute provides:

" 'Developmental impairment' means [an impairment] which is attributable to:

(a) mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism or a specific learning disability; or (b) any other condition of an individual found to be closely related to mental retardation as it refers to general intellectual functioning or impairment in adaptive behavior or to require treatment similar to that required for mentally retarded individuals which disability: (1) originates before such individual attains age 18, (2) which has continued or can be expected to continue indefinitely, and (3) which constitutes a severe handicap to such individual's ability to function normally in society."

By regulation promulgated pursuant to RSA 171-A:3 (Supp.1983), the division has established the following definition of that same term:

" 'Developmental impairment' means a disability which is attributable to:

(1) Mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism, a specific learning disability, or any other condition of an individual which is found to be closely related to mental retardation as it refers to general intellectual functioning or impairment in adaptive behavior or to require treatment similar to that required for mentally retarded individuals which disability:

a. Originates before such individual attains age 18;

b. Has continued or can be expected to continue indefinitely; and

c. Constitutes a severe handicap to such individual's ability to function normally in society. A severe handicap describes a developmentally impaired individual whose needs cannot be met adequately from participating in and benefiting from those social, vocational, recreational, medical, or other resources which generally are expected to be available to other non-handicapped individuals in the community."

Div.R. He-M 503.02(p) (1984).

Richard argues that the three requirements outlined in the regulatory definition impermissibly modify the entire statutory definition, see RSA 171-A:2, V (1977 & Supp.1983). These requirements in the regulatory definition are that the developmental impairment be attributable to an impairment that: (1) originates before age 18, Div.R. He-M 503.02(p)(1)a (1984); (2) is expected to continue indefinitely, Div.R. He-M 503.02(p)(1)b (1984); and (3) constitutes a severe handicap to the individual's ability to function normally in society, Div.R. He-M 503.02(p)(1)c (1984). Basically, Richard takes the position that the legislature did not intend that the above-mentioned requirements apply where the impairment is attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism or a specific learning disability under RSA 171-A:2, V(a) (1977 & Supp.1983), but, rather, that the legislature intended that the requirements apply only where the impairment is one closely related to mental retardation under RSA 171-A:2, V(b) (1977 & Supp.1983). The division argues that its regulation comports with the legislative intent and that it has used its rulemaking authority to fill in the details and to clarify the statute in a manner which effectuates the purpose of the act. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Whaland, 121 N.H. 400, 404, 430 A.2d 174, 177 (1981).

At the outset, we note that although RSA 171-A:3 (Supp.1983) authorizes the director of mental health and developmental services to adopt rules to implement RSA chapter 171-A (1977 & Supp.1983), "administrative officials do not possess the power to contravene a statute." Woodman v. Perrin, 124 N.H. 545, 549, 474 A.2d 999, 1002 (1984); see Kimball v. N.H. Bd. of Accountancy, 118 N.H. 567, 568, 391 A.2d 888, 889 (1978); Reno v. Hopkinton, 115 N.H. 706, 707, 349 A.2d 585, 586 (1975). "It is the responsibility of this court to insure another will is not substituted for that of the legislature when, out of necessity, it delegates certain limited powers." Kimball v. N.H. Bd. of Accountancy, supra, 118 N.H. at 569, 391 A.2d at 889. "If a board, in making a rule, acts beyond the limited discretion granted by a valid enactment, the rule is invalid." Id. at 568, 391 A.2d at 889.

"It is well established that the words in the statute itself are the touchstone of the legislature's intention." Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982). "We will examine the legislative intent and the legislation's objectives only when construing an ambiguous statute." Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv., 125 N.H. 540, 542, 484 A.2d 1101, 1102 (1984). Because we conclude that RSA 171-A:2, V (1977 & Supp.1983) is unambiguous, we confine our review to the actual words of the statute. Merrill v. Great Bay Disposal Serv. supra.

"Although the legislature is not compelled to follow technical rules of grammar and composition, a widely accepted method of statutory construction is to read and examine the text of the statute and draw inferences concerning its meaning from its composition and structure." State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 462, 464 A.2d 268, 271 (1983). In so doing, we will interpret the words of RSA 171-A:2, V (1977 & Supp.1983) according to their plain and ordinary meaning. See RSA 21:2.

We conclude that RSA 171-A:2, V (1977 & Supp.1983) unambiguously establishes two distinct classes of developmental impairments: (1) those attributable to the specific conditions mentioned in RSA 171-A:2, V(a) (1977 & Supp.1983); and (2) those attributable to any other condition closely related to mental retardation which (a)...