Richards ex rel. A.R. v. Soc. Sec. Admin.
| Decision Date | 31 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | 15-cv-1528 (ENV) |
| Parties | GUILLERMINA RICHARDS, individually, and on behalf of A.R., Plaintiff, v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
On March 19, 2015, plaintiff Guillermina Richards filed this civil rights action against the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), claiming that, at an unspecified time in 2014, she and her son, a minor identified by the initials A.R., were "informally banned from all social security offices" without due process of law. Compl., Dkt. No. 1, at 2.1 She seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order lifting this alleged ban, as well as $100,000 in damages. Id. SSA now moves to dismiss the complaint.2 For the reasons set forth below, SSA's motion is granted.
To say that the complaint is sparse would be an understatement. It fails to state any facts other than those recited in the preface. SSA has supplied the details from their records of the occurrences at the heart of the complaint which follow below. They are properly before the Court. The record as so supplemented is more than sufficient for decision.
The seeds of this action were planted on July 17, 2014, when SSA issued a letter to another of plaintiff's sons, Lyle Steele, Jr., notifying him that he could no longer appear in person at the agency's offices. Def. Br., Dkt. No. 11, at 1; see also Letter to Lyle Steele, Jr., Dkt. No. 11-2. As described in that letter, SSA imposed the subject ban because Steele had engaged in a pattern of aggressive and hostile behavior, in violation of SSA's regulations prohibiting threatening or disorderly conduct directed at agency personnel or at federal property. Def. Br. at 1; Letter to Lyle Steele, Jr. Importantly, SSA did not send a similar letter to plaintiff or A.R. Def. Br. at 2.3 It did, however, commit an error that embroiled Richards in a short-lived annoyance. In response to inquiries made on behalf of Steele, SSA sent letters to New York State Senator Kevin Parker and to United States Representative Yvette Clark that mistakenly stated that both Steele and plaintiff had been banned from appearing in person at SSA's offices. Id. Similarly, notes were placed on plaintiff's and Steele's electronic internal agency records indicating, erroneously, that Richards had been banned from SSA's offices. Id. Upon realizing its mistake, in August 2015, SSA removed these notes, thus, lifting the unintended ban on her. Id.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action where the court is satisfied that the action is "(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when, taking all allegations contained in the complaint to be true, it appears beyonddoubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle her to relief. Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004).
In making this assessment before opening the courthouse doors, the trial court must construe a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally, see Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2010), especially when those pleadings allege a violation of constitutional rights. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant # 1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008). A pro se complaint, moreover, should not arbitrarily be dismissed without granting a pro se plaintiff leave to amend at least once, but only when a liberal reading of the complaint gives some indication that a valid claim might be stated if amended. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1999).
Although courts must read pro se complaints with "special solicitude" and interpret them to raise the "strongest arguments that they suggest," Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-76 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotations omitted), a complaint filed by a pro se, like any other, must still plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausibly on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). While "detailed factual allegations" are not required, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Similarly, a complaint is insufficient to state a claim "if ittenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
It is plain that SSA erred in temporarily designating Richards as one banned from appearing in person at its offices. Yet, there is not the slightest suggestion in the complaint, nor on the SSA records, that any substantive adverse action was ever taken against Richards or A.R. or that plaintiff was denied any opportunity to raise grievances with SSA. At worst for SSA, the pleadings suggest that plaintiff and A.R. suffered a temporary inconvenience, which was quickly remedied when SSA removed the erroneous ban on Richards from its internal records. Given this record, it is hardly surprising that plaintiff has pleaded no facts indicating that she or A.R. suffered any damages as a result of SSA's mistake and the brief ban.4
Normally, as previously noted, a pro se plaintiff should be given the opportunity to fill in factual pleading gaps by amending her complaint at least once. Gomez, 171 F.3d at 795. At this point, futility militates against the grant of leave. Simply put, plaintiff cannot state a claim as a matter of law.
More than a year ago, SSA voluntarily lifted the ban. Assuming jurisdiction, any injunctive relief to lift the ban has become moot. As such, it must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Jefferson v. Abrams, 747 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1984) () (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Bibicheff v. Holder, 55 F. Supp. 3d 254, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ().
Most critically, moreover, neither the Civil Rights Act nor styling the claim in any other fashion would afford a right of action against federal agencies like SSA or its employees. SSA is shielded from suit by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 517-18, 104 S.Ct. 2549, 2552-53, 81 L.Ed.2d 446 (1984); Hines v. Irvington Counseling Ctr., 933 F. Supp. 382, 388 (D.N.J. 1996) () (internal citations omitted).
Substantively, furthermore, plaintiff would fare no better. The ability to enter a federal building is not, in itself, a cognizable liberty or property interest. See Small v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-01864, 2009 WL 2134345, at *8 (D. Colo. July 14, 2009) () (citing Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 74-76 (2d Cir. 2008) (). Nor, as previewed earlier, has Richards or A.R. suffered any conceivable damages. See note 4, supra.
Any attempted amendment of the complaint would be futile and needlessly prolong the...
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