Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. C027848.,C027848.
• Citation: 79 Cal.App.4th 570,94 Cal.Rptr.2d 228
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Lachi Delisa RICHARDS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CH2M HILL, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

94 Cal.Rptr.2d 228

79 Cal.App.4th 570

Lachi Delisa RICHARDS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CH2M HILL, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

No. C027848.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

March 30, 2000.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 1, 2000.

Review Granted June 28, 2000.

Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Mark H. Van Brussel and Mark P. Grajski, Sacramento; Sherman & Howard, and Theodore A. Olsen, Denver, CO, for Defendant and Appellant.

Christopher H. Whelan, Inc., Gold River, Law Offices of Ellen Lake, and Ellen Lake, Oakland, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

KOLKEY, J.

A jury awarded $1.4 million to plaintiff Lachi Richards against her former employer, defendant CH2M Hill, Inc., for disability discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA or Act) (Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq.). Most of the acts of discrimination upon which her claims were based, however, occurred outside of the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Act, which requires that an employee file an administrative complaint within "one year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful [employment] practice .... occurred, except that this period may be extended ... for not to exceed 90 days ... if a person allegedly aggrieved ... first obtained knowledge of the facts of the alleged unlawful practice after the expiration of one year from the date of their occurrence...." (Gov.Code, § 12960.) The trial court ruled that the "continuing violation" doctrine permitted plaintiff to assert all of her claims arising over a five-year period.

We conclude that a series of claims that an employee knowingly permits to expire cannot be revived by characterizing them singularly as a "continuing violation" once a new claim arises within the limitations period. The view that a timely claim can resuscitate expired claims simply cannot be reconciled with the distinctive language of the one-year statute of limitations here, which only offers a limited, 90-day grace period in those instances where the aggrieved party did not have knowledge of the facts of the alleged unlawful practice. Instead, as explained herein and consistent with the weight of federal authority, we conclude that the continuing violation doctrine, where it is premised on a series of discrete, discriminatory acts (as here) and not on an express policy of the employer, can only be reconciled with the one-year limitations period if the discriminatory nature of the acts was not cognizable when they were committed but became so when viewed cumulatively in light of later acts committed during the actionable period. In essence, the continuing violation doctrine allows an employee to reach back and premise liability on acts that occurred, in part, outside of the limitations period only because it is the cumulative nature of the allegedly discriminatory acts which gives rise to a cognizable unlawful employment practice within the actionable period, as in the case of a hostile work environment claim. However, the continuing violation doctrine is not a doctrine of continued violations by which the most ancient claims can hijack more recent claims to ride through the courtroom door in the face of statutory language that bars claims that knowingly occurred outside the one-year limitations period.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was hired by defendant, a nationwide engineering firm, as a civil engineer and began work in 1984 in the water resources division at its Redding office. By all accounts, plaintiff was an outstanding engineer, who consistently generated favorable performance evaluations.

In late 1987, however, plaintiff began experiencing tremors and difficulty walking. Although she could still walk, plaintiff began using a wheelchair in April 1988 as a means of conserving energy. In October 1988, plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS).¹ Plaintiffs supervisors agreed to her request that she be given a part-time schedule, that she not be required to perform any fieldwork, and that she be permitted to work out of the Sacramento office.

Plaintiffs symptoms continued to worsen. On her doctor's advice, plaintiff took an indefinite leave of absence, which ultimately lasted 10 months, beginning in March 1989.

On January 2, 1990, plaintiff returned to work in the Sacramento office. As her condition improved, plaintiff eventually worked an average of 20 to 25 hours per week. Plaintiff performed some of her work at the office and some of her work at home—a routine that continued until February 1993, when plaintiff tendered her resignation.

Both before and after plaintiff was diagnosed with MS, a number of issues arose regarding defendant's accommodation of plaintiffs disability. We summarize these issues below.²

A. Plaintiff's transfer

When plaintiff commenced her 10-month leave of absence in March 1989, she requested a formal transfer from the Redding office to the Sacramento office, both because it offered her closer proximity to her doctors, and because the Redding office was not wheelchair accessible.

Although the transfer approval process normally takes 60 to 75 days, approval of plaintiffs transfer took 11 months. It was not formally approved by the regional district manager, Robert Harding, until February 1990—one month after plaintiffs return from her leave of absence. Despite this delay, however, plaintiff reported to work at the Sacramento office when she returned from her leave on January 2, 1990—and in fact, had been working there prior to her leave of absence.

Plaintiffs evidence suggested that the approval of her transfer was delayed primarily because Harding believed plaintiff had lied on her employment application about her medical condition. Harding was not inclined to accommodate an employee whose candor he questioned, a viewpoint he unhesitatingly expressed to some of the supervisors in the Redding and Sacramento offices. In 1990, Mike Kashiwagi, the civil department manager, told plaintiff that despite her good work, Harding and those in the corporate office wanted plaintiff to quit.

B. Computer Issues

During her 10-month leave of absence, plaintiff undertook to teach herself new computer software. To assist plaintiff in this endeavor, Grant Davids, plaintiffs Sacramento office supervisor, would bring a company computer to her home on the weekends. In August 1989, plaintiff asked Davids if the company would loan her a computer to keep at home following her return to work.

Davids informed her that defendant was not likely to loan her a computer and encouraged her to buy her own. He did, however, give his approval to plaintiff to work at home part-time following her return from her leave of absence.

Plaintiff proceeded to contact the California Department of Rehabilitation and several private organizations, seeking funding to purchase a computer. When two private organizations distributed flyers asking for contributions in plaintiffs name and identifying defendant as her employer, plaintiffs other supervisors told her that the solicitations had embarrassed the company. Plaintiff was requested to ask the private organizations to withdraw the solicitations.

In November 1989, at the urging of one of defendant's managers, plaintiff met with Stan Smith, the Redding regional manager, to seek authorization to perform computer work at her home and to ask that defendant provide her with a computer. Smith told plaintiff that while the company was not asking her to resign, it was having difficulty comprehending how it could accommodate her disability. By the end of the meeting, Smith told plaintiff that the Sacramento office would have to make the decision on the computer.

In fact, plaintiff never received an answer. As a result, in December 1989— while still on her leave—plaintiff informed defendant it "no longer need[ed] to consider the issue of providing [her] with a computer" because she had secured funding assistance from the Department of Rehabilitation. Plaintiff then purchased her own computer.

During the August-December 1989 period in which plaintiff was seeking a computer, plaintiff sought legal advice from a lawyer and a private organization which advocates for the disabled, Resources for Independent Living, in an effort to determine whether her computer request was "reasonable," as well as to determine her rights in general to "reasonable accommodation" under the law.³

C. The Lot

In November 1988, while she was already working out of the Sacramento office, plaintiff, acting on her doctor's advice, requested Carol Uhouse, the regional administrative manager responsible for facilities in the Sacramento office, to purchase a bed so that she could rest during the day.

Instead of purchasing a bed, the company purchased a folding army cot. Uhouse insisted that plaintiff help pay for items such as a mattress and sheets, while the company paid for blankets and a pillow.

Uhouse vetoed plaintiff's request that the cot be placed in any of several vacant offices, believing that the cot would be visible to, and look unprofessional to, clients and other visitors. Uhouse suggested that the cot be placed in an unheated and uncooled storage area known as the "black hole." Plaintiff vetoed that suggestion.

Following plaintiff's return from her leave of absence in January 1990, the cot was set up in a drafting room next to plaintiffs office. However, Uhouse would periodically move the cot without notice when the space was needed for other purposes. The musical-cot scenario continued until the spring or summer of 1990, when plaintiffs department manager, Loren Bottorff, moved the cot to a vacant office next to a new office into which plaintiff had recently moved.

Plaintiff considered the new location unsatisfactory, primarily because the room had a pole in the middle that prevented her from closing the...