Richards v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 March 1899 |
| Citation | 33 S.E. 193,106 Ga. 614 |
| Parties | RICHARDS et al. v. EAST TENNESSEE, V. & G. RY. CO. et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The jurisdiction of equity over the estates of wards of chancery is broad, comprehensive, and plenary.
2. When one holds title to realty in trust for the benefit of a mother and her minor children during the life of the mother but is not clothed with the title to the legal fee in remainder, which vests in the children, he may apply to a court of equity for a sale of the entire property, including the legal as well as the equitable estate; the purpose of the application being for the benefit of the children as well as the mother. The moment such an ex parte petition comes before the chancellor, and discloses the fact that the legal as well as equitable estate of infants is involved, they become his wards, and the case is one concerning "an estate of the wards of chancery"; and accordingly the chancellor has jurisdiction to grant, in term, an order to sell the entire property, the minors being properly made parties and represented before him.
3. The petition of the trustee for the sale of the premises in dispute having been made and passed upon prior to the act of 1876 requiring personal service on minors, the appointment of a guardian ad litem for them, and his appearance and answer to the petition, were sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of their rights.
4. Where such a trustee petitions for the sale of the entire property embraced in the conveyance to him for the purpose of supplying the immediate necessities of all the beneficiaries including the children, and of making permanent investments for their benefit, an order granted to sell the property in accordance with the petition in effect directs an absolute sale of the entire estate, both legal and equitable. This is true notwithstanding the fact that the order of the judge appointing a guardian ad litem states the case as an "application to sell trust property."
5. Since the first Code went into effect, on the 1st of January 1863, it has never been necessary, in order to give the chancellor jurisdiction to direct a sale of the legal and equitable estate of minors in the same property, that a regular proceeding in equity be instituted: but such a sale may be ordered by the judge without a jury upon an ex parte petition, and at the term of the court when the petition is filed or presented. (a) In the absence of any legislative provision to the contrary, it would seem that equity has inherent jurisdiction to order a sale of the legal estate of minors for reinvestment whenever to the minors' interest. Be this as it may, the present case is distinguishable from one where the sole purpose is to sell such an estate for reinvestment. This is so because the petition for sale now under consideration involved equitable rights, over which the superior courts of this state clearly had jurisdiction.
6. Where such a petition had entered thereon "January Adjourned Term, 1871," and the order of sale had entered on it, at the place of the judge's signature, "January Adjourned Term, May, 1871," and it appeared that the judge was actually on that day holding a regular session of such adjourned term, this was sufficient to authorize the presumption that the order in question was granted in open court, during its regular session in the transaction of term business, and was therefore a proceeding in term, and not at chambers. The facts that the petition was not filed, that the case was not entered on the regular docket of causes for trial, that no process was attached to the petition, and that the order of the sale directed a record of the proceedings on the minutes, as is usually the case when such orders are granted at chambers, were not sufficient to overcome this presumption, especially in view of the principle that the court should adopt that construction which treats the order as completely legal, and not as partially illegal, and to that extent void.
7. Even if the proceedings to sell the property were defective on account of the omissions to file the petition, attach process, and docket the case, these were mere irregularities, which did not render void the judgment of a court that had jurisdiction over the persons and subject-matter of the suit, especially where the interests of innocent purchasers are involved, with whose rights equity is always loath to interfere.
8. Where one, for value, purchases land, and thereby acquires all title thereto owned by a mother, who held the same under her father, and whose equitable title thereto was superior to any equity which her minor children had therein at the time of the purchase, the vendee's title cannot be defeated by a decree in favor of the children rendered upon a suit subsequently brought in their interest by the mother against the estate of her father for the recovery of the premises; the purchaser from the mother not being a party to this suit, and therefore not bound by the decree.
1. A deed which conveyed to a named trustee for a married woman, and her present and any future children of hers, free from the debts, contracts, and control of her present or any future husband, and, "after the death of the mother, to her children, free and relieved of the trust," conveyed to the mother and her children an equitable estate, as joint usees, and to the children, after the death of the mother, a legal estate in remainder. This legal remainder vested in the children living at the date of the deed, subject only to open and take in any child or children born thereafter. Per Simmons, C.J., dissenting.
2. The trust estate, therefore, so far as the children were concerned, was confined to the estate in common, which was held by them as joint usees with their mother during her life. Consequently the estate of the trustee was less than the fee. It did not include the remainder. Per Simmons, C.J., dissenting.
3. A court of equity, in this state, in the year 1871, had no inherent power, either in term or at chambers, to order or decree the sale of the legal estate of infants for the purpose of reinvestment. Where, therefore, in 1871, upon the application of the trustee described in the first headnote for leave to sell the trust estate of the mother and children, and also the legal estate of the latter as described above, a guardian ad litem was appointed, and consented to the order, and the court thereupon ordered the sale for reinvestment, the order was void as to the legal estate, and upon the death of the mother the children had a right to recover the same from those in possession under the sale. (a) The fact that the court had the power to order the sale of the trust property did not give it the power to order the sale of the legal estate, although the infants had a joint interest in the former, and although the petition prayed for both. (b) The fact that it was difficult to sell one without the other would not confer the power upon the court; nor would the fact that the mother and children were suffering for want of means for their support. The court only having power to order the sale of the trust property, the above-recited facts could not possibly give it power to order the sale of the legal estate for the purpose of reinvestment. Per Simmons, C.J., dissenting.
Error from superior court, Floyd county; W. M. Henry, Judge.
Action by Mary S. Richards and others against the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway Company and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error. Affirmed.
T. W. Alexander and Hooper Alexander, for plaintiffs in error.
McCutchen & Shumate, Shumate & Maddox, and C. N. Featherston, for defendants in error.
On March 30, 1890, Virginia Henderson, Pauline Floyd, Charles Ralls, and Mary Ellis, all and the whole surviving children of Sarah A. C. Ralls, who died in 1888, sued the railway company for a tract of land in the Coosa division of Rome, known as those parts of city lots 156 and 157 lying back of a line parallel with, and 120 feet from, the front of said lots, on formerly South street, but now First avenue, together with the improvements thereon, and for rents, etc., since January 1, 1888. There was a verdict for the plaintiffs for the premises in dispute, and rents at the rate of $75 per month, whereupon defendant moved for a new trial, which was granted, and the plaintiffs excepted.
It appears from the record that the legal title to the premises was originally in James C. Branch, of Clarke county, who was the father of Mrs. Sarah Ann C. Ralls, and that the latter with her husband, was put in possession of the land by Branch about the year 1849. They remained in possession until 1869, or, at least, while it appears that during a portion of the period between 1849 and 1869 they were not actually living on the premises, it does not appear that any one during this whole time had any control or dominion over the land except Sarah Ann C. Ralls or her husband. During such possession valuable improvements were placed by them upon the land. In 1869 Mrs. Sarah Ann C. Ralls brought her petition, beginning: The recitals in the petition were in substance as follows: That petitioner is the daughter of James C. Branch; that her husband, for three years, from depression and weakness of mind, had been wholly unable to attend to any business; that J. C. Branch had held in trust for her separate use lots 156 and 157 in Rome, which he had given her in the year 185-, and which she had resided upon and improved ever since as her separate estate; that her father, said Branch, who had held the title...
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