Richards v. Harpe, 20038.
| Decision Date | 02 October 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 20038.,20038. |
| Citation | 42 Ga.App. 123,155 S.E. 85 |
| Parties | RICHARDS. v. HARPE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Error from Superior Court, Gordon County; C. C. Pittman, Judge.
Action by Martha Richards, by next friend, against S. M. Harpe. Judgment for defendant, plaintiff's motion for new trial was overruled, and plaintiff brings error.
Reversed.
Joe M. Lang, of Calhoun, for plaintiff in error.
J. G. B. Erwin, Jr., of Calhoun, for defendant in error.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court.
1. "The right of cross-examination, thorough and sifting, belongs to every party as to the witnesses called against him." Civil Code 1910, § 5871. "It is a substantial right, the preservation of which is essential to a proper administration of justice, and extends to all matters within the knowledge of the witness, the disclosure of which is material to the controversy." News Publishing Co. v. Butler, 95 Ga. 559, 22 S. E. 282. Upon the trial of a suit to recover damages from a physician, arising out of the alleged malpractice of the defendant in failing to exercise the "reasonable degree of care and skill" required of him as a physician (Civil Code 1910, § 4427) in treating the plaintiff's arm for a fracture at the elbow joint, where the issue presented by the evidence was whether the failure of the plaintiff's arm to properly heal after it had been set by the defendant was due to the defendant's failure to use an X-ray in diagnosing the trouble, and in falsely diagnosing the trouble as being a dislocation of the elbow joint, when in fact it was a fracture, or was due to other causes arising after the defendant's connection with the case had been properly severed, and where the defendant admitted that the arm had been fractured, but contended that he exercised the required care and skill in the treatment of the arm and properly diagnosed and treated it, although he had not employed the X-ray, and where, as a witness in his own behalf, he testified on direct examination that, before treating the plaintiff's arm, he "had never experienced any trouble in reducing broken bones, " and on cross-examination testified that he "had never had any trouble before this or since, " it was error for the court to refuse to permit counsel for the plaintiff to ask the defendant, on cross-examination, immediately after the rendition of the last part of the defendant's testimony, if he had not had bad results in treating the limbs of other designated persons. For the same reason it was error for the court to refuse to permit counsel for the plaintiff, on cross-examination of another physician who was introduced as a witness for the defendant, to ask whether modern practice and surgery required the use of the X-ray and anaesthesia in the treatment of cases similar to that of the plaintiff.
2. The fact that another physician who had been consulted in behalf of the plaintiff, after the defendant's connection with the case had been severed, based a refusal of his professional services in the treatment of the plaintiff's arm upon the ground that another physician had been called in to the case, was irrelevant and incompetent as tending to establish the fact that the bad results to the plaintiff's arm were not due to causes beyond the defendant's control.
3. Since the case of the plaintiff's father against the defendant, to recover damages arising out of the same transaction, was tried contemporaneously with the case of the plaintiff, evidence that the father, after the defendant's connection with the case had been severed, received information from another physician that the use of the X-ray was the best method to determine whether the plaintiff's arm had been properly set, was relevant and competent as a circumstance tending to charge the father with negligence in respect to the condition of the plaintiff's arm after the defendant had severed his connection with the case. The evidence being relevant and competent as respects an issue presented by the evidence, although it may have been relevant and competent only as against the father, and not being objected to by the plaintiff upon the ground of irrelevancy and incompetency as to any issue presented as to her case, it was not subject to objection by her solely upon the ground that it was hearsay. The court therefore did not err in admitting the evidence over objection by plaintiff's counsel that it was hearsay.
4. Advice by another physician given to the plaintiff's father after the defendant had severed his connection with the case, to follow whatever instructions the defendant had given with respect to the plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Weaver v. Ross
...give false or misleading testimony in court. The issue before us is controlled by the legal principles found in Richards v. Harpe, 42 Ga.App. 123(1), 155 S.E. 85. Although the testimony to be directly rebutted initially was given during appellant's cross-examination as opposed to direct exa......
-
Gunthorpe v. Daniels
...a malpractice case, should Dr. Daniels, on direct examination, testify, "as the defendant in a malpractice case did in Richards v. Harpe, 42 Ga.App. 123(1), 155 S.E. 85, that he had never had similar difficulty before or since, the statement is subject to contradiction by cross examination ......
-
Mull v. Emory University, Inc.
...Hinkle v. Smith, 12 Ga.App. 496, 77 S.E. 650; Grubbs v. Elrod, 25 Ga.App. 108, 102 S.E. 908; McLendon v. Daniel, supra; Richards v. Harpe, 42 Ga.App. 123(11), 155 S.E. 85; Chapman v. Radcliffe, 44 Ga.App. 649(1), 162 S.E.2d 651. The true rule is that the reasonable degree of care and skill ......
-
Garner v. Driver
...this charge has been approved in such cases as Southern R. Co. v. Smalley, 116 Ga.App. 356, 358 (3), 157 S.E.2d 530; Richards v. Harpe, 42 Ga.App. 123, 126 (12), 155 S.E. 85; Ga. Power Co. v. Smith, 94 Ga.App. 166, 169 (5), 94 S.E.2d 48. The charge as given was applicable to the facts of th......