Richards v. Richards, 666--I
| Decision Date | 18 October 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 666--I,666--I |
| Citation | 5 Wn.App. 609,489 P.2d 928 |
| Parties | Theodore R. RICHARDS, Appellant, v. Doris RICHARDS, Respondent, Mary Richards, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Bernard D. Greene, Seattle, for Theodore Richards.
James R. Young, Charles F. Diesen, Redmond, for Mary Richards.
Nickell, Quinn & Mah, Norman Quinn, Seattle, for respondent.
The plaintiff, Theodore R. Richards, brought this action seeking a divorce from the defendant, Doris Richards. Mary Richards, Theodore's former wife, was permitted to intervene.
By her intervention, Mary seeks a decree determining her to be the owner of a residence acquired by Theodore and Doris. Mary contends that title should be vested in her by operation of the equitable doctrine of resulting trust. Theodore agrees, but makes no argument other than by 'adopting' Mary's brief. Doris asserts that the house is one of the community assets which should be awarded to Theodore as a part of his share of the community estate.
The trial judge rejected the resulting trust theory. He awarded the home to Theodore, subject to a lien in Mary's favor both for unpaid child support and for the total of the mortgage payments Mary made after this action was commenced.
The resulting trust doctrine which Mary relies upon is sometimes called a 'purchase-money resulting trust.' The rule of equity is that when property is taken in the name of a grantee who did not advance the consideration, there is a presumption that the grantee holds the legal title subject to the equitable ownership of the person who advanced the consideration. Lalley v. Lalley, 43 Wash.2d 192, 260 P.2d 905 (1953). However, the presumption can be overcome by evidence of contrary intention. Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash.2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
It follows, therefore, that the essential fact which must be proved by a claimant seeking to establish a resulting trust is that he in fact paid the purchase price. G. Bogert, Trust & Trustees § 455 (2d ed. 1964).
Mary's 1961 divorce decree required Theodore to pay her $210 a month for the support of their three minor children. In November, 1965, when Mary was living in Oregon with the children, she was experiencing problems which she felt would be lessened if the children could have a closer relationship with their father. At that time support payments were $3,000 or $4,000 in arrears. Mary testified that she asked Theodore for help and 'he said he would get (her) a place to live (in Seattle) and make the payments on the house.'
The evidence concerning the purchase of the house would permit a finding that the initial payment and all monthly mortgage payments thereafter were made with Doris-Theodore community funds. In fact, Doris made all of the payments for the community, including one payment after this action was begun. Doris testified,
Mary concedes that she made no direct payments until she learned that Doris would no longer pay. However, Mary contends that since Theodore was in arrears, the mortgage payments should be considered payments in lieu of child support. It follows, Mary contends, that these payments were Produced by her.
It is not necessary that a resulting trust claimant pay the purchase price Directly. But the claimant must carry the burden of proving that he Produced the consideration paid and that he did so At the time of the delivery of the instrument of conveyance. G. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 456 (2d ed. 1964). It is therefore Mary's burden to establish that the community funds were paid in her behalf.
The evidence clearly supports a finding that the house was not purchased for Mary's ownership. In fact, Mary testified as follows:
Q When you moved there, did you know who the owner of the house was?
A No, I assumed it was Mr. Richards.
Q Was any agreement made between you and Mr. Richards or Doris Richards about whether you had to pay rent for the house or whether he would continue to make child support payments to you?
A It was my understanding he would pay the mortgage on the house and that was it.
Q Did you make any agreements with him in regard to the child support of $210 a month?
A Well, I assumed that the rest of it would not be made since he was making the mortgage payments.
It is undisputed that Doris and Theodore considered the house as a community asset. Community funds were expended for taxes, insurance and repairs, as well as for the purchase payments. Further, Doris and Theodore treated the house as a community asset for income tax purposes.
Since the evidence would support a finding that the purchase payments were not made in Mary's behalf, and it was not intended that she be the owner of the house, the trial judge did not err in refusing to apply the resulting trust doctrine.
Concerning the primary action for divorce, Theodore contends that he should have been granted the decree. He offers no argument other than disagreeing with the trial judge's findings as to fault. The Thorndike principle precludes our questioning the findings because they are supported by substantial evidence. Thorndike v....
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Pollock v. Pollock
...the court, to eliminate the inequity, may require the husband to pay his wife's attorney's fees. As stated in Richards v. Richards,5 Wash.App. 609, 489 P.2d 928 (1971): (W)here property must be divided, a decision concerning the allowance of attorney's fees cannot be isolated. The trial jud......
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Diel v. Beekman
...Manning v. Mount St. Michael's Seminary of Philosphy and Science, 78 Wash.2d 542, 477 P.2d 635 (1970). Richards v. Richards, 5 Wash.App. 609, 611, 489 P.2d 928, 931 (1971), recently (W)hen property is taken in the name of a grantee who did not advance the consideration, there is a presumpti......
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Thor v. McDearmid
...P.2d 655 (1945); Scott v. Currie, 7 Wash.2d 301, 109 P.2d 526 (1941); Breske, 37 Wash.App. at 529, 681 P.2d 263; Richards v. Richards, 5 Wash.App. 609, 611, 489 P.2d 928 (1971). The burden of proof is on the party asserting the trust. Diel, 7 Wash.App. at 148, 499 P.2d 37. Although the resu......
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Henry v. Green, No. 26286-3-III (Wash. App. 2/14/2008)
...Manning v. Mt. St. Michael's Seminary of Philosophy & Science, 78 Wn.2d 542, 545-46, 477 P.2d 635 (1970); Richards v. Richards, 5 Wn. App. 609, 611, 489 P.2d 928 (1971). The Henrys argue that a constructive trust should be created for their benefit. However, this property was taken in the n......
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Table of Cases
...102 P. 884 (1909): 7.6(1)(b) Richards v. Redelsheimer, 36 Wash. 325, 78 P. 934 (1904): 17.3(2)(d)(i), 17.3(3)(b)(i) Richards v. Richards, 5 Wn.App. 609, 489 P.2d 928 (1971): 2.2(1)(b) Richardson v. Danson, 44 Wn.2d 760, 270 P.2d 802 (1954): 5.8(5) Richardson v. Harkness, 59 Wash. 474, 110 P......
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Table of Cases
...2d 452 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . .35.07[2][a] Richard; State v., 58 Wn. App. 357, 792 P.2d 1279 (1990) 77.13 Richards v. Richards, 5 Wn. App. 609, 489 P.2d 928 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.03[2] Richardson v. Pac. Power & Light Co., 11 Wn.2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (194......
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§32.03 Related Statutory Factors
...an equitable disposition of property." Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394, 407-08, 499 P.2d 231 (1972) (quoting Richards v. Richards, 5 Wn. App. 609, 614, 489 P.2d 928...
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§2.2 - Trusts-Creation of Interest
...evidence of contrary intent, when the person asserting the trust has paid the consideration for the property. Richards v. Richards, 5 Wn.App. 609, 611, 489 P.2d 928 (1971); Bucsko v. O'Farrell, 168 Wash. 388, 12 P.2d 405 (1932). Such a presumption does not exist, however, unless the person ......