Richards v. State
Decision Date | 17 November 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 90-2912,90-2912 |
Citation | 608 So.2d 917 |
Parties | 17 Fla. L. Week. D2595 Bryan K. RICHARDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Randolph Q. Ferguson, Miami, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Michael J. Neimand and Fariba N. Komeily, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Berger & Shapiro and Kenneth W. Shapiro, Ft. Lauderdale, for Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith, as amicus curiae.
Before HUBBART, COPE and GODERICH, JJ.
This is an appeal by the defendant Bryan K. Richards from final judgments of conviction and sentences for aggravated battery, as a reclassified first-degree felony, and simple battery, as a reclassified third-degree felony. The defendant contends that it was improper to reclassify these offenses under Section 775.085(1), Florida Statutes (1991), because, he asserts, this statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. He concedes, however, that he was properly convicted for aggravated battery, as a second-degree felony, and simple battery, as a first-degree misdemeanor.
The central issue which is, therefore, presented by this appeal is whether section 775.085(1), Florida Statutes (1991), which reclassifies and enhances the criminal penalties for any felony or misdemeanor if the commission of such felony or misdemeanor "evidences prejudice based on the race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or national origin of the victim," is unconstitutional as being void for vagueness. For the reasons which follow, we conclude that the statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness, and, accordingly, reverse and remand with directions to enter judgments of conviction and sentences against the defendant for aggravated battery, as a second-degree felony, and simple battery, as a first-degree misdemeanor. This decision necessarily allows the state to appeal our determination on this issue to the Florida Supreme Court, should it elect to do so. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
The defendant Bryan K. Richards was charged in a two-count information below with (1) an aggravated battery upon Vivian Pringle [Sec. 784.045(1)(a)(1), Fla.Stat. (1991) ], and (2) a simple battery on Marcel Bruff [Sec. 784.03, Fla.Stat. (1991) ]; both counts further charged that in committing the above offenses, the defendant [." (R.5-6). The defendant made a pretrial motion to strike the above-quoted allegations from the information or to limit its interpretation on the ground that section 775.085, Florida Statutes (1991), upon which such allegations rested, was unconstitutionally "vague and overly broad" in that the statute "contains no standards or definition of evidencing prejudice in the commission of a misdemeanor or felony." (R.20). The trial judge denied the motion (TR.110) and concluded that she would not, as requested, instruct the jury that prejudicial intent was an essential element of the punishment enhancement charged therein, (TR.115), nor would she allow either counsel to argue to the jury the issue of such intent or lack of intent with respect thereto. (TR.116).
At trial, the state introduced evidence from the two complainants which tended to show that Marcel Bruff, accompanied by his cousin Vivian Pringle and Pringle's two-year-old son, drove their car to an apartment complex in Miami to visit a friend named Cheryl Henry and parked in a marked parking place in the rear of the complex. Pringle got out of the vehicle and proceeded to wait for Henry while leaning on another car which was parked in front of Henry's apartment door; Bruff and the young boy remained in the car. At that point, the defendant Bryan K. Richards, with a beer in his right hand, approached Pringle, stood within six inches of the latter's face, and asked Pringle what he was doing there. Pringle apologized for leaning on the car, which he mistakenly assumed belonged to the defendant, got up from the car, and responded that he was there visiting a friend. The defendant is white; Pringle and Bruff are black.
The defendant then stated, (TR.151). Pringle was shocked at this outburst as he did not know the defendant and asked what was going on. The defendant continued the verbal abuse, "Why don't you get a f------ job," and thereupon pushed Pringle to the ground (TR.165-66). At that point, Bruff and Pringle's young son got out of the car to see what was going on. The defendant then pushed Bruff, and Bruff pushed the defendant back. By that time, Pringle had gotten to his feet and the defendant then punched Pringle in the face, knocking him down and rendering him semi-unconscious. Bruff and the defendant then engaged in a mutual fist fight, during which the defendant bear-hugged Bruff, slammed Bruff to the ground, and punched Bruff in the eye and neck.
The police were summoned; two Metro-Dade police officers were dispatched to the scene and spoke to the participants in the fight. According to the officers who testified below, the defendant told them that he "was tired of blacks being in the parking lot, selling drugs and playing loud music" where he lived (TR.136); the officers, however, were unable to locate a radio or any evidence of drugs in the area. The defendant further stated that the fight "was no big deal, that it was over[,] and he [didn't] see anything wrong with a redneck beating up a couple of blacks," (TR.146), a statement which he repeated two or three times. (TR.138). When the defendant was arrested, he further told the second police officer that the only reason he was being arrested was because the officer was black. (TR.147).
As a result of the defendant's punches in the fight, Pringle's jaw was fractured in three places and three of Pringle's teeth were knocked out. Pringle underwent two surgical operations on his knee which was twisted in the fight; also, his jaw had to be wired. Bruff suffered a swollen eye and sore neck as a result of the defendant's blows. The defendant himself was taken to Jackson Memorial Hospital and treated for scratches around his neck.
The defendant testified at trial and gave a significantly different account of the subject altercation than did Pringle and Bruff. According to the defendant, he was returning home by car from a banquet on the night in question when he encountered a parked car in the parking lot of his apartment complex; the parked car was blocking the parking spot where he usually parked. The defendant accordingly parked elsewhere and thereafter approached the man he later learned was Pringle who was sitting on a parked car, and asked why he was blocking the defendant's parking spot. Pringle came down off the car and said, "It's none of your f------ business what I'm sitting here for," (TR.217), and walked up to the defendant, telling him to mind his own business. The defendant replied that it was his business, that (TR.217-18).
The defendant then pushed away Pringle, who by that time was in his face. Pringle then pushed back and a fist fight ensued, during which time the defendant was grabbed from behind by a second man whom he later learned was Bruff. The defendant was struck several times by Pringle, once in the back of the skull; the defendant, in turn, struck Pringle as well as Bruff, who was wrestling with the defendant throughout the altercation. Finally, the defendant landed a hard punch to Pringle's jaw, knocking Pringle down, and thereafter a tenant in the apartment complex broke up the fight. The defendant testified that he didn't recall calling Pringle or Bruff any racial names, although he did in the heat of the argument say, "Why don't you get a job." (TR.222). The defendant further testified that he told the police officers who arrived on the scene that the other two men tried to beat him up, and that he didn't see anything wrong in what he did, that he just got the best of the fight; he told the officers he could be a bit of a "redneck," but denied saying that he had beat up the two men because they were black.
Conrad Meah, the tenant who broke up the fight, was also called as a witness by the defendant. He observed the initial pushing and shoving between the defendant and Pringle as Meah emerged from his apartment, but was unable to hear any of the words exchanged between the two men. Meah then saw a third man join the fight and also saw Pringle's young son. Meah rushed over to break up the fight saying, (TR.205). Meah saw the defendant strike Pringle in the jaw during the fight, but heard no racial epithets from anyone.
At the close of all the evidence and after closing argument of counsel, the trial court instructed the jury, over objection (TR.194-95), concerning the elements for enhanced punishment under section 775.085, Florida Statutes (1991):
"The punishment provided by law for the crimes of aggravated battery and battery is greater if the aggravated battery and battery were committed under certain circumstances.
Therefore, if you find the Defendant guilty of aggravated battery and battery, you must then consider whether the State has further proved that the commission of the aggravated battery and battery evidenced prejudice based on race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion or national origin of the victim.
If you find that the Defendant committed the aggravated battery and battery without any aggravating circumstances, you should find him guilty of...
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