Richards v. Town of Eliot

• Decision Date: 10 September 2001
• Citation: 780 A.2d 281,2001 ME 132
• Parties: Karen RICHARDS v. TOWN OF ELIOT et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

780 A.2d 281

2001 ME 132

Karen RICHARDS v. TOWN OF ELIOT et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs: December 20, 2000.

Decided: September 10, 2001.

Brian T. Stern, Esq., Portsmouth, NH, for plaintiff.

John J. Wall III, Esq., Christopher C. Dinan, Esq., Monaghan Leahy, LLP, Portland, for defendants.

Panel: WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.

CALKINS, J.

[¶ 1] Karen Richards appeals from the summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (York County, Fritzsche, J.) in favor of the Town of Eliot and Eliot Police Officers Michael Stacy and Wayne Godfrey on all counts of Richards' complaint alleging police misconduct. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Many of the facts are disputed. For the purposes of this appeal from the grant of a summary judgment motion, we recite the disputed facts in the light most favorable to Richards, the nonprevailing party.¹

[¶ 3] On October 2, 1996, Karen Richards' son, Daniel, left his three-year-old daughter at Richards' residence in the care of Richards' seventeen-year-old daughter, Kimberly. Daniel was separated from his wife, Jennifer, the mother of their three-year-old. Daniel often spent the night at Richards' house with the child.

[¶ 4] At around 11:30 P.M., Jennifer arrived at Richards' residence to pick up her daughter. Believing that Jennifer was intoxicated, Richards told Jennifer that she would have to wait until Daniel returned. After getting into a physical confrontation with Kimberly in the driveway, Jennifer left. Soon thereafter, Jennifer telephoned the Eliot Police Department and spoke with Officer Michael Stacy. Jennifer told Stacy that she went to Richards' residence to pick up her child, but Richards refused to give her the girl. Jennifer further told Stacy that Richards physically kicked her off the porch. In response to further questioning, Jennifer told Stacy that there was no custody order regarding her daughter.

[¶ 5] Stacy went to Richards' house accompanied by Eliot Police Officer Wayne Godfrey with the intention of retrieving the child. Neither Stacy nor Godfrey knew the age of the child, but it is undisputed that Godfrey knew that the child was not yet school age. Stacy and Godfrey knocked on the door for several minutes before Richards answered. Richards stepped onto the unlit porch, and Stacy used his flashlight to illuminate her. Richards had a cordless telephone with her. When Stacy asked Richards why she had not turned the child over to the child's mother, Richards told the officers that she was not responsible for the child, was not watching her, and did not have the authority to turn her over to anyone. She did not inform them that Kimberly was babysitting the child inside the house. For several minutes Richards asked the officers to try to contact her son, Daniel, but they refused. Richards then stepped off the porch and began walking toward her mother's house next door. As she walked, she dialed her boyfriend's number on her telephone.

[¶ 6] Richards had walked about seventy-five feet across the yard when one of the officers said, "If you don't stop right there, you will be under arrest." Richards immediately stopped walking. At that same time, Richards' boyfriend answered the phone, and Richards pleaded with him to come to her house. Stacy stepped in front of Richards. Richards turned away from him, but she did not take a step.

[¶ 7] Suddenly, Richards was struck from behind with substantial force. She landed face down on the ground with her hands beneath her body. While she was on the ground, the officers pulled her hands out from under her and pressed their knees into her side and her back. The officers never asked Richards to put her hands behind her back, nor did she resist their efforts to put her in handcuffs. They lifted her off the ground by the handcuffs, rather than by her arms, and took her to a police cruiser. She suffered severe pain in her shoulders. She complained that her handcuffs were too tight.

[¶ 8] The officers transported Richards to the Kittery Police Department where she was charged with criminal restraint in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 302 (1983 & Supp.2000). Subsequently, the York County District Attorney's Office declined to prosecute Richards.

[¶ 9] When Richards was released from the police department, she went directly to the hospital emergency room complaining of pain in her ribs, back, and shoulders. The doctor diagnosed shoulder strain and wrist contusion. Richards had visible bruises on her ribs, wrist, shoulders, neck, back, and face.

[¶ 10] Richards filed a nine-count complaint against the Town of Eliot, Stacy, and Godfrey. The claims asserted against all defendants are for unlawful arrest, excessive force, negligent infliction of emotional distress, violation of constitutional rights, and violation of 15 M.R.S.A. § 704 (1980). Two claims are asserted against the Town for negligent hiring and supervision. In addition, there are two claims asserted only against the two officers: malicious prosecution and violation of municipal procedures.² The Town and the individual officers moved for summary judgment on all counts of Richards' complaint on the grounds that the facts do not give rise to the claims and that the Town and officers are entitled to immunity. The court granted the motion, giving judgment to the defendants on all counts. Richards' motion for reconsideration was denied.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 11] On appeal from a grant of a summary judgment, "[w]e review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonprevailing party to determine whether the record supports the conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Northup v. Poling, 2000 ME 199, ¶ 6, 761 A.2d 872, 874. "The trial court appropriately enters summary judgment when `the party that bears the burden of proof on an essential element at trial has presented evidence that, if she presented no more, would entitle the opposing party to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Smith v. Cannell, 1999 ME 19, ¶ 6, 723 A.2d 876, 878-79 (quoting June Roberts Agency, Inc. v. Venture Props., Inc., 676 A.2d 46, 48 (Me.1996)).

III. CLAIMS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS

A. Claims Alleging Violation of Richards' Constitutional Rights

[¶ 12] Richards claims that her constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated by Officers Stacy and Godfrey because they arrested her unlawfully, used excessive force on her, and prosecuted her maliciously. Although she does not expressly articulate in her complaint that these claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Pamph.2001), Richards' memorandum of law in the Superior Court and her brief in this Court state that such claims are section 1983 claims.³ We will discuss each of the section 1983 claims separately, followed by a discussion on qualified immunity.

1. Unlawful Arrest

[¶ 13] In an unlawful arrest action brought pursuant to section 1983, "summary judgment is appropriate only if no reasonable jury could find that the officers did or did not have probable cause to arrest." McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir.1984). We have said that "[p]robable cause to arrest exists when facts and circumstances of which the arresting officer has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant an ordinarily prudent and cautious police officer to believe the subject did commit or was committing a crime." State v. Boylan, 665 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Me.1995). "[T]he existence of probable cause (and, in turn, the validity of an ensuing arrest) is gauged by an objective standard; as long as the circumstances surrounding the event warrant the officer's reasonable belief that the action taken is appropriate, the arrest is justified." Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1044 (1st Cir.1997).

[¶ 14] Officers Stacy and Godfrey arrested Richards for criminal restraint. It is a crime for a person, who knows she has no legal right to do so, to knowingly or intentionally retain a person under age fourteen. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 302(1)(A)(1) (Supp.2000).⁴ The information given to Stacy by Jennifer, which was reasonably trustworthy, was that there was no court order regarding the custody of the child. Stacy and Godfrey were aware, or should have been aware, that in the absence of a court order to the contrary, parents are the natural custodians of a child. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1651 (1998). This means that they could have reasonably believed that any person, other than the child's father, who refused Jennifer's request to turn the child over to her, was illegally restraining the child.

[¶ 15] The knowledge of Stacy and Godfrey before they arrived at Richards' residence was that Jennifer had gone to Richards' residence a short time earlier to pick up her child; that Richards had refused to give the child to the mother; and that there was no custody order. Once they arrived at Richards' home and asked Richards why she did not hand over the child to Jennifer, Richards stated that she did not have the authority to do so. Rather than trying to explain the situation to the officers, Richards began walking away from them across the lawn. Based on the objective facts, no reasonable jury could find that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Richards for criminal restraint.

[¶ 16] Richards seems to argue that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest her because they did not directly ask Richards to get the child and turn her over to them. However, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that Richards understood from their questions that the purpose of their visit was to retrieve the child. When Richards asserted that she did not have the authority to turn over the child to anyone and walked away from the officers while they were speaking to her, they were justified in...